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 OUR LOCALISM: PART II-LOCALISM
 AND LEGAL THEORY*
 Richard Briffault**
 A. A Tale of Two "Cities". Local Governments in Local Government Law
 A central theme in the literature of local government law is that
 local governments are powerless, incapable of initiating programs on
 behalf of their citizens or of resisting intrusions by the state.' How can
 scholars make this claim when under state legislation and federal and
 state judicial decisions local autonomy plays a critical role in the law of
 school finance,2 land-use regulation3 and local government formation
 and preservation?4 As we have seen, a partial response turns on the
 varying assessments of the nature of power.5 But much of the answer
 also has to do with differing assumptions about the underlying political,
 economic and social characteristics of local governments.
 There are more than 82,000 local governments in the United
 States, but when most scholars write about local governments generally
 they are, I suspect, thinking about one particular category of localities:
 cities. For example, Professor Frug's analysis of local government law
 is styled "The City as a Legal Concept."6 Professor Ellickson's contrast
 of public and private local organizations is titled "Cities and Homeown-
 ers Associations."7 And Professor Clark's study of local legal auton-
 omy is called "Judges and the Cities."8
 There is some sense to this. Although a minority of all local gov-
 * This is the second part of a two-part Article.
 ** Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. B.A., Columbia, 1974,J.D.,
 Harvard, 1977.
 1. See Briffault, Our Localism, Part I, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6-12 (1990).
 2. See id. at 24-39, 59-64, 99-101.
 3. See id. at 39-58, 64-72, 101-09.
 4. See id. at 72-86, 109-11.
 5. See id. at 111-115.
 6. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980) [hereinafter
 "City as Legal Concept"]; see also Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19
 Urb. Law. 553 (1987) [hereinafter "Empowering Cities"].
 7. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1519 (1982)
 [hereinafter "Cities"]. Professor Ellickson is aware of the centrality of suburbs to Amer-
 ican local government law. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
 and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale LJ. 385 (1977) [hereinafter "Growth Controls"]. Neverthe-
 less, when he addresses the issue of local public power generally he writes of "cities."
 8. G. Clark, Judges and the Cities: Interpreting Local Autonomy (1985). The title
 of Professor Williams's examination, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Lo-
 cal Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83, also
 assumes the equation of "local government" with "city," although within the body of
 her article she criticizes the practice of "lumping together these disparate [local] entities
 into one legal category ..." Id. at 83 n.l.
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 ernments,9 cities are the most numerous form of general purpose local
 government. In areas with multiple local governments, cities are the
 focus of local political life. As a matter of legal analysis, the term "city"
 sharpens the distinctions with "state" and with unincorporated rural
 areas. "City" thus serves as an understandable shorthand for the more
 cumbersome "local government."
 But "city" is a loaded term; indeed, it is an overloaded one, the use
 of which ultimately obscures legal analysis. "City" is not just a syno-
 nym for "municipal corporation"; it is also a political, economic and
 social concept that conjures up associations with respect to size, eco-
 nomics, politics, social life and history that the blander "local govern-
 ment" does not.10
 "City" usually implies "big city" or "central city" or "inner city"-
 a large center of population and production, commerce, communica-
 tions and culture, distinguished not simply from the "state" and the
 countryside, but also from small towns and suburbs. "City," according
 to Bernard Frieden, "suggests bustling streets with a mixture of facto-
 ries, offices, apartments and homes crowded together amidst heavy
 traffic, noise, dirt and excitement."" Lewis Mumford defined the city
 "as a complex of inter-related and constantly interacting functions"
 that large size and density make possible.12 For Jane Jacobs, similarly,
 the hallmark of "great American cities" is diversity-of people, func-
 tions, land uses and activities.13
 As a social and a political concept, the city is a heterogeneous
 place, combining residence, work, recreation and cultural life, and mix-
 ing people of different racial and ethnic groups, socioeconomic classes
 and levels of educational and occupational attainment. "City," in
 short, signifies a complex microcosm of the state or nation and a so-
 cially, economically and culturally dynamic part of the larger polity.
 Such a "city" seems a fitting place for legal and political autonomy,
 which is no doubt why many advocates of local autonomy make their
 case in terms of cities.'4
 9. More than half of all local governments are special purpose districts. See 1 Bu-
 reau of the Census, 1982 Census of Governments 3 (table 3). In 1982, 43,439 of the
 more than 82,000 local governments were either special districts or school districts. Id.
 An additional 16,734 local units were townships, which tend to function as limited sub-
 divisions of counties. There were 19,076 municipalities and 3,041 counties. Id.
 10. As Robert Dahl observed in criticizing the use of the term "city" to describe
 local governments too large for effective participatory democracy, "names conceal reali-
 ties." R. Dahl, After the Revolution?: Authority In a Good Society 157 (1970).
 11. B. Frieden, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism 17 (1966).
 12. L. Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its
 Prospects 85 (1961).
 13. J. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 141-51 (1961).
 14. See, e.g., Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1119, 1120 nn.267-70.
 Frug's citations to Arthur Schlesinger's The Rise of the City 1878-1898 (1933) and the
 work of the Chicago School of urban sociology indicate his association of "city" with
 "big city."
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 But once the term "city" is used in the sense of municipal corpora-
 tion, used, that is, "as a legal concept," in Frug's phrase-then many
 "cities" are neither large nor complex nor heterogeneous. Most cities
 are small. Half of all municipal corporations have populations of 1,000
 or fewer, and three-quarters of all municipalities have 5,000 people or
 fewer.15 Nearly one half of urban Americans live in municipalities of
 fewer than 50,000 people.16 Many "cities" are primarily residential,
 composed of homes and politically responsive to homeowner inter-
 ests;17 others are primarily industrial or commercial, functioning as
 centers of employment but with relatively few residents.18 Many mu-
 nicipal corporations are not demographic microcosms of the state but
 are instead composed predominantly of people of one race or class.19
 Simply put, in most metropolitan areas many of the entities the law
 defines as cities are-in social science parlance and lay understanding-
 suburbs.20 More Americans reside in suburbs than in either central cit-
 ies or rural areas, and sixty percent of the residents of metropolitan
 areas live in suburbs.21 In virtually every large metropolitan area, the
 suburbs outnumber the central city in both population and employ-
 ment.22 The suburb, not the city, is the principal form of urban settle-
 ment in the United States today.
 15. 1 Bureau of the Census, supra note 9, at 8-9 (table 6). Of 19,076 municipali-
 ties, 9,514 had fewer than 1,000 people and an additional 5,850 had between 1,000 and
 5,000 people. Id.
 16. Id.
 17. See J. Logan & H. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place
 191-92 (1987) (discussion of exclusive residential towns); Ellickson, Growth Controls,
 supra note 7, at 404-07 (discussion of homeowner domination of politics in suburban
 residential communities).
 18. See J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis 249-50 (4th ed. 1989) (ap-
 proximately one-third of suburbs are purely residential, another third are employment
 suburbs and the final third are mixed residential and industrial).
 19. See id. at 250-51 (categorizing suburbs according to demographic distinctions
 among residents-predominantly affluent, middle-class, working-class, black and elderly).
 20. In particular, a majority of the municipalities incorporated in recent decades
 are suburbs. See Miller & Forstall, Annexations and Corporate Changes: 1970-79 and
 1980-83, in The Municipal Year Book 1984 at 96, 100-01 (Int'l City Management Ass'n
 ed. 1984) (most of the 788 localities incorporated between 1970 and 1983 were "subur-
 ban in character"); see also D. Elazar, Building Cities in America: Urbanization and
 Suburbanization in a Frontier Society 4 (1987) (noting "the non-urban character (in
 common sense usage) of American urban settlements (in Census Bureau usage)").
 21. In 1980, 45% of Americans lived in suburbs, 30% lived in central cities and
 25% lived in nonmetropolitan areas. In other words, 60% of the residents of metropoli-
 tan areas lived in suburbs. See U/S: A Statistical Portrait of the American People 27 (A.
 Hacker ed. 1983).
 22. Of the 25 largest metropolitan areas in 1980, the central city had a majority of
 the population in only two. See M. Baldassare, Trouble in Paradise: The Suburban
 Transformation in America 7 (1986). The suburbs accounted for 70% or more of the
 metropolitan population in the Detroit, Washington, D.C., Boston, St. Louis,
 Pittsburgh, Atlanta and Miami areas. See id. at 26. The suburbs have also become ma-
 jor centers of industrial employment. In 1980, there were eleven million people em-
 [Vol. 90:346 348
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 Cities and suburbs differ from each other politically, economically
 and socially. Notwithstanding these differences, local government law
 does not distinguish within the category of municipal corporation be-
 tween city and suburb, and legal theory generally has not taken the dif-
 ferences between cities and suburbs into account. Law and legal theory
 both treat most suburbs as cities, and this critically affects any attempt
 to measure the scope of local power.
 Incorporated suburbs usually have the same legal status as central
 cities.23 Even those suburbs not accorded the full panoply of big city
 powers generally enjoy the fundamental elements of local autonomy:
 the authority to tax property, spend on local services and regulate land
 use,24 and the right to come into governmental existence and protect
 local autonomy from nonconsensual absorption into another locality.
 Indeed, local legal powers may be more adequately matched to local
 economic and social needs in the suburbs than in the cities.
 The logic of local legal autonomy assumes local solutions to local
 problems, with local programs funded by taxes on local property.25
 Many big cities, however, have relatively large social welfare and infra-
 structure demands.26 Local political existence, zoning autonomy and
 ployed in manufacturing in the suburbs, as opposed to just six million in the central
 cities. Id.
 23. Some states classify localities and tailor the scope of local authority according
 to population size so that smaller localities have fewer powers than larger ones. But
 state classification systems often treat as "first-class cities" localities with surprisingly
 small populations. In Arkansas, the minimum population for a first-class city is 2,500,
 Ark. Stat. Ann. ? 14-37-103 (1987); in Kansas the minimum is 15,000, Kan. Stat. Ann.
 ? 13-101 (1982); in Nevada it is 20,000, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 266.055 (Michie 1986); in
 South Dakota, 5,000, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. ? 9-2-1 (1981); in Virginia, 10,000, Va.
 Code Ann. ? 15.1-1011 (1981); in Washington, 20,000, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
 ? 35.22.010 (1965); see also 1 Bureau of the Census, supra note 9, at 118, 182, 241, 301,
 319, 325. And, of course, not all suburbs are small.
 24. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 18-25; see also M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at
 123-45 (discussing tax planning and service expenditures in Orange County, California
 suburbs); M. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion 50 (1976) (in 1968 more than half of
 suburbs with populations greater than 5,000 had the power to zone, as did nearly half of
 the smaller suburbs);J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 282 ("Almost universally in suburbs
 [the issues that dominate local politics] are taxes, schools, and zoning."); V. Ostrom, R.
 Bish & E. Ostrom, Local Government in the United States 206-07 (1988) (discussing
 city-suburb tax competition); R. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics 164
 (1959) (tax rates among central issues in suburban politics); id. at 186-94 (discussing
 centrality of schools and school expenditures in suburban politics).
 25. According to Hicks, the property tax, which "matured in congruence with the
 urban-industrial system," is based on a concept of localism that assumes that "localities
 are . . . self-contained entities whose tax bases can be harnessed to serve local needs in
 accordance with local wishes ...." Hicks, The Property Tax and Local Finance, in The
 Property Tax and Local Finance 208, 217 (C. Harriss ed. 1983).
 26. Central cities must deal with the problems of poverty, unemployment, depen-
 dent populations, crime, drug addiction, deteriorating housing and crumbling roads,
 bridges and mass transit, even as many of them are in economic decline. See R.
 Burchell, J. Carr, R. Florida & J. Nemeth, The New Reality of Municipal Finance: The
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 taxable property provide neither the regulatory authority nor the reve-
 nues necessary to meet these problems. To cope successfully with local
 needs, these cities must look beyond the city limits to outside public
 and private actions: intergovernmental aid, additional revenue-raising
 authority from the state and private investment.
 Many big cities are heavily dependent on intergovernmental aid to
 balance their budgets, pay their employees and satisfy local demands
 for basic public services.27 In terms of local political independence, it
 is an open question whether big cities are better off with intergovern-
 mental aid, which often comes with strings attached, or without it.28
 But there should be no question that the fiscal dependency of many big
 cities means that local legal authority alone is not sufficient to create
 real local autonomy.29
 Many big cities also need to raise revenues from internal sources
 other than real property. As commercial and production centers that
 provide services and employment opportunities to nonresidents, cities
 may be able to develop alternative bases of local revenues. Many states
 have, in fact, given some of their cities power to tax incomes and sales
 as well as property,30 yet these cities continue to be gripped by severe
 fiscal strain. Even for cities with relatively broad revenue-raising au-
 thority, the inadequacy of local financial resources is often a central fact
 of local existence-and a structural limitation on local political
 autonomy.
 Moreover, the realities of interlocal relations restrict the ability of
 big cities to exercise fully the revenue-raising authority they do have.
 Rise and Fall of the Intergovernmental City 93-132 (1984) (discussing fiscal burdens
 faced by cities).
 27. See, e.g., id. at 219-58.
 28. Compare Pfiffner, Inflexible Budgets, Fiscal Stress, and the Tax Revolt, in The
 Municipal Money Chase: The Politics of Local Government Finance 37, 57 (A. Sbragia
 ed. 1983) ("State aid ... often diminishes home rule and increases the centralization of
 control at higher levels of government, for there is a tendency for those who control
 financing to try also to control policy.... Spending priorities are eventually decided in
 state rather than in local political arenas.") with T. Clark & L. Ferguson, City Money:
 Political Processes, Fiscal Strain, and Retrenchment 224-32 (1983) ("[A]utonomy is pre-
 served by adapting outside funds to local preferences ....") and D. Elazar, supra note
 20, at 168 (the wide range of federal aid programs protects local autonomy).
 29. Robert Dahl has observed, "the greatest inroads on the autonomy of the city
 result from its lack of financial resources." R. Dahl, supra note 10, at 164.
 30. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code ? 7201 (West 1987) (authorizing counties to
 levy sales and use taxes); id. ? 7202.6 (Supp. 1990) (authorizing city redevelopment
 agencies to levy sales and use taxes); N.Y. Tax Law ?? 1202a-j (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
 1990) (authorizing hotel and motel taxes levied by various counties); id. ? 1301 (author-
 izing cities with over one million people to tax residents' incomes); id. ? 1340 (authoriz-
 ing cities with populations between 190,000 and 215,000 to tax commuters' incomes);
 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ?? 718.01-.06 (Baldwin 1988) (municipal income tax); Pa. Stat.
 Ann. tit. 53, ? 6902 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1989) (city income and sales taxes); id. tit.
 72, ? 4750.521 (Supp. 1989) (optional county sales and use taxes); seeJ. Aronson &J.
 Hilley, Financing State and Local Governments 142-50 (4th ed. 1986).
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 The fiscal well-being of most localities is determined fundamentally by
 the decisions of private taxpaying individuals and revenue- and employ-
 ment-generating businesses to move to, remain in, expand in or depart
 from the geographical confines of the city.31 Local dependence on pri-
 vate investment decisions limits the utility of legal autonomy for locali-
 ties generally,32 but for big cities with serious social welfare and
 infrastructure problems, straitened economies and traditionally high
 tax rates, the significance of formal legal power is particularly uncer-
 tain. Big city revenue-raising authority is severely constrained by the
 cross-cutting pressures to hold taxes low enough to make the city at-
 tractive to businesses and affluent residents while keeping taxes high
 enough to fund essential infrastructure and social welfare programs.33
 Big city zoning authority is comparably affected by the need to assure
 the availability of land for new economic development.34
 Even when cities deploy the full array of municipal powers to the
 satisfaction of business and high-income residents, there is no guaran-
 tee of success.35 Local power is merely the power to bargain and per-
 suade, to make concessions, provide incentives and reduce or eliminate
 local taxes or restrictions; it is not the power to compel people or busi-
 nesses to move into or remain in the jurisdiction. Cities compete with
 suburbs in better economic shape and with fewer social needs for the
 same attractive businesses and residents. Cities may have autonomy in
 law, but their economic and political power in practice is shaped by
 private investment decisions.36
 31. See, e.g., P. Peterson, City Limits 22-37 (1981).
 32. See, e.g., S. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic 36-60 (1987); T.
 Gurr & D. King, The State and the City 57-62, 189-90 (1987); T. Swanstrom, The Crisis
 of Growth Politics: Cleveland, Kucinich, and the Challenge of Urban Populism 136-53
 (1985); see also text at notes 278-291 infra (discussing mobility of business and resi-
 dents as a constraint on ability of cities to pursue progressive social agendas).
 33. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 5581-85, Agency Dkt. No.
 307-8/85 (Aug. 21, 1988), rev'd, C.37-89 (Comm'r of Educ. Decision, Feb. 22, 1989),
 aff'd, SB Dkt. No. 12-89 (State Board of Educ., Apr. 13, 1989) at 254-73, cert. granted,
 117 NJ. 51, 563 A.2d 818 (1989) (describing high taxes and depressed financial and
 economic circumstances of New Jersey's major cities); see generally J. O'Connor, The
 Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973) (state revenues lag behind expenditures).
 34. See, e.g., S. Elkin, supra note 32, at 90-95; J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note
 17, at 154-66; P. Peterson, supra note 31, at 22-37 (summarizing political effect of zon-
 ing and land-use devices).
 35. Local taxes and tax abatement programs may, in fact, make very little difference
 in the ability of local governments to attract industry. See Neenan & Ethridge, Competi-
 tion and Cooperation Among Localities, in Urban Economic Development, 27 Urb. Aff.
 Ann. Rev. 175, 188 (R. Bingham &J. Blair eds. 1984).
 36. See, e.g., Clarke, More Autonomous Policy Orientations: An Analytic Frame-
 work, in The Politics of Urban Development 105, 107-09 (C. Stone & H. Sanders eds.
 1987). This is not to say that cities offer residents and potential migrants no reasons to
 enter or to stay; but rather that, in the fierce competition for new and existing taxpayers,
 cities' powers to attract and retain the most sought-after residents and businesses are
 limited.
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 By contrast, for affluent or middle-class suburbs, local legal powers
 are more likely to be sufficient for the satisfaction of local wants. Less
 burdened by poverty, crime, congestion and physical deterioration than
 big cities, these localities tend to have lower per capita spending needs,
 while their tax bases are, per taxpayer, more substantial.37 In addition,
 local autonomy insulates suburban tax bases from the fiscal needs of
 city residents.38 To the extent that local resources are inadequate and
 further growth is required, suburbs find it easier than cities to compete
 for that growth.39
 Moreover, for many suburbs, particularly the more affluent ones,
 the principal local regulatory goals often are controlling growth and
 preserving the status quo. Local legal autonomy significantly empow-
 ers them in this quest. These suburbs can retain local revenues and use
 them to maintain local schools, utilize their land-use authority to pre-
 vent unwanted local development and resist merger or absorption into
 poorer central cities or regional governments. As a rule, local legal
 powers will be more effective in attaining the suburban goals of limiting
 growth and preserving formal autonomy than in attaining the central
 cities's goals of intergovernmental assistance and private investment.
 Of course, not all suburbs are affluent. The variations in municipal
 size, wealth and economic structure among and within states defy easy
 generalization. Poorer suburbs, lacking the commercial or industrial
 facilities of the cities, are fiscally poor indeed.40 More generally, the
 steady economic expansion and increasing demographic diversity of
 37. In the 37 largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (the Census Bureau's
 formal term for a metropolitan area), per capita central city expenditures exceeded sub-
 urban per capita expenditures by 25% in 1957 and 43% in 1970. W. Colman, Cities,
 Suburbs, and States: Governing and Financing Urban America 52 (1975). In 1970, for
 the four major regions of the country, city per capita expenditure exceeded suburban
 per capita expenditure by 48% in the Northeast, 38% in the Midwest, 28% in the South
 and 26% in the West. Id. The tax burden as measured by dividing per capita state and
 local taxes by per capita personal income shows that in 1970, city residents on average
 were paying 6.7% of income for state and local taxes compared to only 5% in the sub-
 urbs. Id.
 Unlike most big cities, suburbs are usually able to limit local spending to a relative
 handful of goods and services, primarily education. For most suburbs, school spending
 consumes one-half to two-thirds of local budgets while the majority of big city expendi-
 tures are for public safety, public health, welfare and physical infrastructure needs that
 do not exist in many suburbs. See, e.g., id. at 51-53.
 38. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 19-24.
 39. The lower tax rates and lower welfare burden, the newer physical infrastruc-
 ture, the better-financed school systems and the more affluent and family-oriented mi-
 lieu present a more attractive setting to new taxpaying residents and to business and
 commercial development. See R. Premus, Urban Growth and Technological Innova-
 tion, in Urban Economic Development, supra note 35, at 47, 51 (suburbs more attractive
 to high technology companies).
 40. J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 190-91. As the findings in some of
 the school finance cases demonstrated, the poorest localities in metropolitan areas, as
 measured by property wealth per child, are often poor suburbs. See, e.g., Board of
 Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 486-87, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 615 (Sup. Ct. 1978), mod-
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 the suburbs limits the force of the city-suburb distinction. Suburbia as
 a whole has become less residential and more socially and ethnically
 integrated than its traditional image would suggest.41
 Yet in many metropolitan areas the model of an economically de-
 clining inner city surrounded by more prosperous suburbs continues to
 have considerable descriptive power.42 Moreover, the increased heter-
 ogeneity of suburbia as a whole is usually not matched by a greater
 diversification within particular suburbs. There are now more poor and
 working-class people, more minorities and more industrial and com-
 mercial sites in suburbia. But poorer, working-class or black suburban-
 ites are likely to live in different jurisdictions separate from those
 inhabited by affluent or white suburbanites43-and legal and political
 ified, 83 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981), modified, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359,
 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
 41. See generally M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 1-45 (discussing national trend
 toward expansion of, and increased social diversity in, suburbs).
 42. The sharpness of the city-suburb gap and the magnitude of the suburban ad-
 vantage in terms of mean family income, average educational attainment and average
 occupational status correlates directly with the age of the metropolitan area. The sub-
 urbs had higher incomes, more high school graduates and more white-collar workers
 than the central cities in all 33 metropolitan areas in which the central city had been
 founded before 1880 and in roughly three-quarters of the metropolitan areas which ur-
 banized between 1890 and 1920. See J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 157-58. In the
 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas founded between 1930 and 1970, the suburbs
 consistently had a lower percentage of population in poverty, but in half the cases, the
 central cities had a higher median family income and more high school graduates. Id.
 A recent study of the Cleveland area found that in 1979, the average family income
 for Cleveland residents was only 61.5% of that for suburban residents while the poverty
 rate in Cleveland was nearly five times greater than in the suburbs. See T. Swanstrom,
 supra note 32, at 62.
 43. With respect to racial segregation, researchers have found that although the
 percentage of blacks living in suburbs has increased sharply, "[t]his suburbanization
 does not seem to have markedly affected the extent of black-white segregation." Massey
 & Denton, Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 94 Am. J. Soc.
 592, 593 (1988) ("Once a suburb acquires a visible black presence, it tends to attract
 more blacks than whites, which leads to neighborhood succession and the emergence of
 a black enclave."). Black suburban areas tend to have lower socioeconomic status,
 higher population density, weaker tax bases, poorer municipal services and higher de-
 grees of debt than white suburbs. Id. at 593-94. Although there is considerable re-
 gional variation, in some metropolitan areas black segregation is actually greater in the
 suburbs than in the central cities. See id. at 605 (citing Detroit, Michigan, Paterson,
 NewJersey, and Gary, Indiana). Massey and Denton also found both more suburbaniza-
 tion and less segregation for Hispanics and Asian-Americans. Id. at 621-22; see also M.
 Danielson, supra note 24, at 8 (In 1970, almost 90% of the black population in suburban
 Essex County, New Jersey lived in just three towns, where they composed from 27% to
 53% of the population; no other town in the county was as much as seven percent
 black).
 With respect to wealth differences, both the 10 richest and the 10 poorest incorpo-
 rated communities in America are suburbs. Metropolitan Chicago and metropolitan St.
 Louis can claim suburbs on lists of both the 10 richest communities of 2500 or more
 people (Kenilworth, Illinois, per capita income of $48,950, and Ladue, Missouri, per
 capita income of $40,700) and the 10 poorest communities of 2500 or more (Ford
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 authority is wielded by the governments of particular jurisdictions, not
 by an amorphous, unincorporated "suburbia."
 The schematic presented here-the abstraction of local govern-
 ments as cities and suburbs-while more concrete and detailed than the
 notion of local government tout court is, of course, still too general to
 capture the considerable variation within each category.44 But the
 smaller size and greater homogeneity of economic function, class or
 ethnicity of particular suburbs, in contrast to the relative heterogeneity
 of most big cities, are critical distinctions with important implications
 for thinking about local autonomy. The contrast between "city" and
 "suburb" may be a useful heuristic device, with "suburb" read as a
 shorthand or surrogate term for a municipality that is more functionally
 and demographically specialized than the traditional city, is a much
 smaller fragment of the metropolitan area and has fiscal resources and
 regulatory authority relatively adequate to its needs. Such municipali-
 ties will usually be suburbs, even if not all suburbs fall into this
 category.
 A full consideration of the scope of local government power, then,
 requires a double reconceptualization-of both "local power" and "lo-
 cal government." Instead of treating "local power" as the right to pre-
 vail in direct city-state conflicts, local power should, as noted in Part I,
 be viewed as emerging out of the standard state practices of delegating
 revenue-raising, regulatory and expenditure authority to localities and
 of not interfering with the local exercise of that authority.45 Localist
 values pervade the system and make state legislatures and courts resis-
 tant to altering these arrangements in ways that would undermine local
 independence. As a result, municipalities have considerable de facto
 power to frame local policies and pursue local goals.46 "Local govern-
 ment" should be analyzed in terms of the two most important types of
 localities-large, complex, heterogeneous and fiscally dependent "cit-
 ies," and smaller, more homogeneous "suburbs" with greater re-
 sources and fewer needs.47
 Heights, Illinois, $4523, and Kinlock, Missouri, $5529). See Johnson, The View from
 Poorest U.S. Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1987, at A18, col. 2; see also P. Florestano &
 V. Marando, The States and the Metropolis 23 (1981) (although there are rich, middle
 class and poor suburban residents, "[r]arely are these different income groups found
 integrated in the same suburban locality. The individual suburban localities are quite
 homogeneous as to the characteristics of their populations and their basic economic
 activities."); J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 187-99 (presenting a typology of
 suburbs-"the affluent employing suburb," "the working-class residential suburb" and
 "exclusive residential towns").
 44. Furthermore, there are a large number of local communities that are neither
 cities nor suburbs.
 45. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 111-15.
 46. See id.
 47. See, e.g., M. Danielson & J. Doig, New York: The Politics of Urban Regional
 Development 256-59 (1982) (comparing the relative ability of cities and suburbs to use
 local government powers to achieve local goals).
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 Cities, as just defined, tend to fare relatively poorly under this sys-
 tem, not because of a lack of legal autonomy, as the argument about
 city legal powerlessness suggests, but because the scarcity of local re-
 sources relative to local needs forces them to turn to external sources
 for financial support. More generally, the localist values in the system
 militate against the interests of cities. Legal localism presumes local
 fiscal self-sufficiency; it provides neither a legal basis for compelling
 state responsibility to help satisfy local needs when local resources
 prove inadequate nor a political basis for persuading state legislatures
 to assume a greater degree of responsibility for local fiscal inadequacy.
 Furthermore, localism legitimates state inaction, making it more diffi-
 cult for needy localities to obtain financial support from the state or
 from more prosperous localities.
 Suburbs, by contrast, often do better under this system. The core
 of local legal autonomy is defensive and preservative, enabling resi-
 dents of more affluent localities to devote local taxable resources to
 local ends, exclude unwanted land uses and users and protect the au-
 tonomous local political structure that allows them to pursue local poli-
 cies.48 These are precisely the goals of more affluent localities. Local
 autonomy enables these suburbs to protect their resources from the
 fiscal needs of nearby cities while securing their independence from in-
 volvement in the resolution of urban or metropolitan economic or so-
 cial problems. Suburbs benefit from the localist values of courts and
 legislatures that discourage modifications of this highly satisfactory sta-
 tus quo and protect them from outside interference.
 Moreover, although most discussions of local authority are limited
 to the legal relationship between states and local governments, this
 traditional focus on state-local bipolar conflict is too simplistic a model
 for analyzing local government law. Local government law must deal
 not just with disputes between states and localities, but also with con-
 flicts among localities.49 Strengthening local autonomy from the states
 does not benefit all localities, but instead benefits those with the great-
 est local resources or the fewest public service needs, to the detriment
 of poorer places. Local power thus can lead to city powerlessness.
 48. Swanstrom notes,
 Having a tax base more than ample to meet the service demands of a largely
 middle class population, many suburban governments practice the politics of
 exclusion, not the politics of growth. They are more concerned with excluding
 the poor and minorities, as well as dirty industry, than with attracting new in-
 vestment and residents. Ironically, it is precisely in those cities where growth is
 least possible that growth politics . . . has its most tenacious hold.
 T. Swanstrom, supra note 32, at 26.
 49. As Elazar points out, most smaller localities, "really do not develop a 'city' out-
 look in the political arena. As a rule, they align themselves with the so-called 'rural'
 areas (really a misnomer in the demographic sense today) against the 'big city' in urban-
 rural conflict situations." D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 152-53.
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 So, too, state power is not necessarily the enemy of local power,
 and enhancing state power need not injure all localities. For cities un-
 able to meet local needs or suffering from the external effects of actions
 taken by other localities, the state may be a source of financial assist-
 ance or serve as an instrument for controlling other, antagonistic mu-
 nicipalities. States, cities and suburbs form a triangular relationship, in
 which the states have the potential to regulate interlocal competition,
 address interlocal inequality and promote local interests on a state-wide
 basis-although states have, for the most part, preferred to take a pas-
 sive role, with the result that suburban autonomy goes largely
 unchecked.
 The different kinds of local governments, with their diverse needs
 and often conflicting concerns, cast real doubt on the utility of "local
 government" as a category for advancing legal analysis. The political,
 economic and social distinctions that divide cities from suburbs are as
 significant as the common legal status that unites them. Suburbs, their
 differences from the cities and the role of the states in addressing city-
 suburb conflicts, should be central to the analysis of local government
 law.
 Moreover, suburban development and the development of local
 government law are closely intertwined. The independence of suburbs
 and the resulting fragmentation of most metropolitan areas are, in an
 important sense, the product of local government law, while the emer-
 gence of suburbs may have contributed to the evolution of local gov-
 ernment law in a direction favoring expansive local powers. Judicial
 treatment of the suburb as the paradigm local government helps to ex-
 plain the localist results in many cases, much as the political power of
 the suburbs contributes to the localism of state legislation. The next
 two sections elaborate on these themes.
 B. The Suburbs and Local Government Law
 Suburban growth-the emigration of people and businesses from
 city centers to outlying areas-has been a constant feature of nine-
 teenth and twentieth century American urban history.50 The persistent
 lure of cheaper land and open space, the desire to avoid urban crowd-
 ing and proximity to people of undesirable classes or ethnic groups and
 50. KennethJackson explains that before 1815 most suburbs-in the sense of areas
 immediately outside a city-were industrial or blue collar slums, the locations of slaugh-
 terhouses, tanneries and brothels. See K. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The
 Suburbanization of the United States 12-19 (1985). Jackson traces the origin of the
 modern suburb-the middle class or affluent residential community whose inhabitants
 earned their livelihood in the city-to the transportation revolution that began in the
 early nineteenth century. Id. at 20-44. The steam engine permitted regular ferry links
 between New York and its first suburb, Brooklyn. The steam railroad and the horse-
 drawn street car led to the growth of other new suburbs around New York, Philadelphia
 and Boston in the period between 1815 and 1840. Id. at 35-42. Many of these early
 suburbs were ultimately absorbed into their central cities. Id. at 142-43.
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 the improvements in transportation and communication technology
 that freed people and industry from the need to be situated in the city
 have fueled a steady outward movement. For more than a century,
 people have moved away from the older sections of cities and opened
 up new urban neighborhoods while retaining economic ties to
 downtown.
 Growth on the urban fringe, however, does not necessarily mean
 suburban independence. Indeed, for much of American history, cities
 followed population growth and extended their boundaries to annex
 new neighborhoods on the urban fringe, thereby recapturing old resi-
 dents and adding new ones.51 The existence of large numbers of le-
 gally independent suburbs wielding the powers of municipal
 corporations is a relatively recent phenomenon. The emergence of au-
 tonomous suburbs and their legal and political separation from the city
 is to an important degree attributable to developments in local govern-
 ment law.
 1. The Authorization of Suburban Independence. - The localist charac-
 ter of the law of municipal formation, expansion and preservation con-
 tributed directly to suburban independence. As noted in Part I, most
 states have allowed the decisions to incorporate a local government and
 to expand or to merge municipalities to be made at the local level.52
 This facilitates the formation of new municipalities outside the major
 cities. Such an approach to local government formation, was not inevi-
 table; indeed, it was not always the case.
 In the early nineteenth century, the states played a different and far
 more active role in local government formation, participating directly
 in decisions concerning municipal formation and expansion and creat-
 ing or declining to create new municipalities one at a time. State poli-
 cies often favored city expansion, and state legislatures redrew
 municipal boundaries to increase the territorial scope of the central cit-
 ies as urban populations and urban economies spread into outlying
 areas.53
 51. Virtually every major city in the United States is substantially larger in area
 today than when it was first incorporated. Jackson notes that "the adjustment of local
 boundaries has been the dominant method of population growth in every American city
 of consequence." Id. at 140. Indeed, if "suburb" is defined solely in reference to the
 characteristic low-density residential neighborhoods, typified by single-family houses
 surrounded by yards, and not in terms of separate political existence, then all large cities
 today have suburbs within their borders. See R. Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise
 and Fall of Suburbia 6 (1987).
 52. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 73-81.
 53. The Massachusetts legislature, for example, consolidated the city of Boston
 with its environs. SeeJ. Teaford, City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of Met-
 ropolitan America 54 (1979). The Pennsylvania legislature expanded the size of
 Philadelphia to 130 square miles by merging 28 separate local governments into the city,
 without seeking the consent of any of the affected local residents. Id. at 33. Both ac-
 tions and comparable decisions by other states placed within city limits the people and
 businesses linked to the central city.
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 As the nineteenth century progressed, state legislatures withdrew
 from direct involvement in municipal formation and expansion deci-
 sions. The states passed general enabling laws for the incorporation of
 municipalities, thereby shifting operational decisions concerning local
 government formation to local actors. State constitutional restrictions
 on special or local acts, and the adoption of home rule,54 further con-
 strained the ability of legislatures to become involved in particular mu-
 nicipal formation or expansion determinations.55
 The adoption of general incorporation and annexation laws did
 not mean the end of urban expansion. Some states continued to associ-
 ate their economic development and prestige with the growth of their
 largest cities and, accordingly, pursued policies that discouraged the
 formation of independent suburbs and encouraged cities to add new
 land as urban populations moved beyond the city limits. Thus, states
 facilitated annexations of outlying areas by central cities, often allowing
 larger cities to add land without the consent of the residents of the ar-
 eas annexed. Between the Civil War and World War I, most of the
 great cities of the Northeast and Midwest experienced significant terri-
 torial growth through annexation or consolidation.56 The combined
 areas of the twenty most populous cities grew by approximately twenty
 percent per decade between 1870 and 1920.57 According to Kenneth
 Jackson, "[t]he predominant view in the nineteenth century was the
 doctrine of forcible annexation. No small territory could be allowed to
 retard the development of the metropolitan community."58
 Over time the structure of metropolitan development changed.
 State legislatures liberalized their incorporation laws, moving toward
 the contemporary criteria of relatively minimal population and area re-
 quirements.59 State courts often interpreted the remaining restrictions
 to facilitate the formation of autonomous municipalities on the urban
 54. According to Teaford, "[s]ince home rule meant rule by the local authorities
 and local electorates it also meant a halt to any broader efforts at reorganizing the ex-
 panding American metropolis." Id. at 38.
 55. Between 1870 and 1896, state consolidation and annexation plans for
 Cincinnati, Denver, Des Moines and Topeka were invalidated by state courts that viewed
 the plans as unconstitutional special acts. See id. at 37 (citing In re Extension of Bound-
 aries of the City of Denver, 18 Colo. 288, 32 P. 615 (1893); State ex rel. West v. City of
 Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521, 65 N.W. 818 (1896); City of Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, 4
 P. 800 (1884); State ex. rel. Attorney General v. City of Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18
 (1870)).
 56. The territory of the 20 largest cities grew 286% between 1870 and 1900. Id. at
 32. Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York
 City and Pittsburgh all enjoyed great territorial growth between 1870 and 1930. See
 Miller, Municipal Annexation and Boundary Change, in The Municipal Year Book 1986
 at 72, 78-79 (Int'l City Management Ass'n ed. 1986).
 57. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 53, at 77. The increase in big city area was 18% in
 the 1870s, 26% in the 1880s, 32% in the 1890's, 11% in the 1900s and 26% in the
 1910s. Id.
 58. K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 147.
 59. See J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 6-9.
 358  [Vol. 90:346
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 15:54:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 OUR LOCALISM
 fringe.60 Central city expansion began to tail off, and the number of
 independent municipalities in metropolitan areas began to grow.61
 Thus, although many states limited local government formation by
 requiring the existence of an "urban community" as a prerequisite to
 incorporation,62 courts defined "urbanness" and "community" to fit
 the economic and social characteristics of the emerging suburbs. The
 traditional notion of the urban center as a closely clustered, internally
 diverse settlement, spatially separate from other localities, began to
 give way. The lack of a densely populated urban core, the weakness of
 the internal ties of commerce, production or culture and the fact that
 suburbanites earned their livelihoods by commuting to the central city,
 were treated as products of advances in transportation-such as the au-
 tomobile, interlocal highways and interurban rail lines-which permit-
 ted the diffusion of population, the territorial separation of jobs,
 homes, culture and recreation and the emergence of wholly residential
 communities. These new places were neither too rural for urban gov-
 ernment nor too much a part of the central city to warrant independent
 60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pickrell v. Downey, 102 Ariz. 360, 366, 430 P.2d 122, 128
 (1967); State ex rel. Northern Pump Co. v. So-Called Village of Fridley, 233 Minn. 442,
 447-51, 47 N.W.2d 204, 208-10 (1951); State ex rel. Burnquist v. So-Called Village of
 St. Anthony, 223 Minn. 149, 153-55, 26 N.W.2d 193, 195-96 (1947); In re Borough of
 Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. 380, 382-83, 170 A. 319, 320 (1934); State ex rel. Stephens v.
 Odell, 61 Wash. 2d 476, 482-83, 378 P.2d 932, 936 (1963); Gotfredson v. Town of
 Summit, 7 Wis. 2d 400, 403-04, 97 N.W.2d 189, 191 (1959); In re Incorporation of the
 Village of Chenequa, 197 Wis. 163, 169-72, 221 N.W. 856, 858-60 (1928).
 61. See R. Wood, supra note 24, at 59. There were 55 municipalities in Cook
 County, Illinois in 1890 and 109 in 1920. In the New York metropolitan area, the
 number of separate municipalities rose from 127 in 1900 to 204 twenty years later. Id.
 62. See, e.g., State ex rel. Young v. Village of Gilbert, 107 Minn. 364, 367-68, 120
 N.W. 528, 530 (1909); State ex rel. Childs v. Village of Minnetonka, 57 Minn. 526, 533,
 59 N.W. 972, 974 (1894); Ascherin v. Milwaukee, 209 Wis. 645, 653, 245 N.W. 840, 843
 (1932). Urbanness-a certain density of population, the close clustering of homes, the
 mixture of commercial facilities and residences or the existence of a compact urban
 core-was necessary to justify the costs local government would impose on property
 owners. An evocative statement of the requirement of a traditional urban community as
 a prerequisite to incorporation is that of the Florida Supreme Court in State ex rel.
 Davis v. Town of Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So. 468 (1933). The Lake Placid court
 explained:
 The city of ancient Rome is the prototype for all municipalities of modern
 times. The desire to be in close touch with the glitter of social life and political
 activiity [sic] presented problems of overcrowding, bad sanitary conditions,
 crowding of streets and public places . . . were all problems of the ancient
 municipia of the Empire of Rome.
 These problems arose as the population of the towns or cities increased.
 So it is apparent that, before the legislative will may operate to establish a mu-
 nicipality, that is to say, to prescribe powers and duties for the governance of
 towns, villages, or communities, there must be in existence a town, village, or
 community of people, whose local public interests require, in the orderly
 processes of government, orderly administration under state authority ....
 Id. at 427-28, 147 So. at 471.
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 existence; rather they were deemed to possess "suburban character"63
 and to be suitable for incorporation.
 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court put it in reviewing the proposed
 incorporation of the Village of Chenequa, an entirely residential com-
 munity where all the petitioners for incorporation were "substantial
 business men of good repute" who lived in the village but worked in
 Milwaukee:
 [T]he villages of to-day are unlike the villages of 1848 [when
 the requirement that villages be urban communities was en-
 acted] in many respects. . . . Many villages adjacent or near
 large cities are built up for the purpose of the convenience and
 comfort of the residents who are largely business men of a
 city, who wish to get away from the noise and rush of the city
 to the quietude of country life. Such in a large measure was
 the situation of the people who lived in Chenequa.64
 Similarly, although the suburbs lacked the population density of
 traditional cities, and the expanses of unplatted land within suburban
 boundaries often caused suburbs to resemble rural districts more than
 urban centers, the legal concept of a city was effectively redefined to
 include this new form of community. The idea of a town had previously
 meant "a small assemblage of houses collocated under a regular plan
 regarding streets and lanes," a Pennsylvania court noted,65 but the dis-
 persal of homes and the lack of a town center did not mean that an area
 was not sufficiently urbanized to be incorporated: "[W]e cannot lose
 sight of the fact that in the more recent development of rural property
 adjacent to cities or towns, villages are formed with houses having
 larger areas surrounding them and the dwellings do not, strictly speak-
 ing, form a compact group."66 In a suburb, the "large area of land"
 between the homes "did not prevent the formation" of a
 municipality.67
 With dispersed settlement patterns and no requirement of com-
 63. Borough of Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. at 383, 170 A. at 320.
 64. Village of Chenequa, 197 Wis. at 168, 170-71, 221 N.W. at 858-59. In a later case
 the Wisconsin court observed
 While it may have been usual and customary fifty years ago, or twenty years
 ago, for a community to grow around the market or place of employment,
 school, church and perhaps the village blacksmith due to limitations in the
 means of transportation, this is not so today .... The construction of super
 highways and the technical improvement in the manufacture of automobiles
 have made it possible for families to live in one community, be employed in
 another, and seek recreation in still others.
 Gotfredson, 7 Wis. 2d at 403, 97 N.W.2d at 191.
 65. Borough of Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. at 382, 170 A. at 320.
 66. Id.; see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. So-Called Village of St. Anthony, 223
 Minn. 149, 151-52, 26 N.W.2d 193, 194 (1947) (where land was "suitable for division
 into smaller tracts and for use for suburban dwelling," court must note that such
 "change has been taking place not only in the area included in the village, but also in the
 surrounding area . . . and the trend in that direction is increasing.").
 67. Borough of Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. at 382, 170 A. at 320.
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 mon stores, jobs, schools or social or cultural facilities,68 what would
 bind suburban residents together in "communities"? Some state
 courts looked to the common desire for public services and public reg-
 ulatory authority and the common class interests and values of the resi-
 dents.69 Thus, where state law required that the local people " 'mingle'
 in business, social, educational, and recreational activities," an Arizona
 court found no need for the incorporated area to have a shopping or
 business district. Instead, the court found that the "mingling" require-
 ment was satisfied since the residents had "similar business interests,
 professions, and occupations" even though they pursued those inter-
 ests and occupations separately and outside the community.70
 To become a municipality, then, an area no longer needed to be a
 relatively built-up, diverse and economically and socially self-contained
 unit, set off from other localities by the density of its internal linkages-
 that is, a city. Instead, the area could be a decentralized, homogene-
 ous, residential district, economically tied to other localities-a suburb.
 Class homogeneity might remedy the lack of regular patterns of busi-
 ness or social interactions among residents, and the common demands
 of homeowners for public services and regulatory authority could sup-
 ply the element of "community" that districts without common busi-
 ness, commercial or cultural institutions would otherwise lack.
 Allied to the liberalization of the rules for incorporations were new
 restrictions on the authority of cities to expand. States banned annexa-
 tion of incorporated localities or conditioned such annexations on the
 approval of the voters in the communities sought to be annexed.7' The
 changes in incorporation and annexation law together meant that most
 major cities in the Northeast and Midwest were completely surrounded
 by incorporated suburbs that could not be annexed without consent.72
 68. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephens v. Odell, 61 Wash. 2d 476, 478-81, 378 P.2d
 932, 933-35 (1963).
 69. See, e.g., Village of St. Anthony, 223 Minn. at 152-53, 26 N.W.2d at 195 (1947);
 Eden Park Borough Incorporation, 158 Pa. Super. 40, 43, 43 A.2d 529, 530 (1945);
 Village of Chenequa, 197 Wis. at 171, 221 N.W. at 859.
 70. State ex rel. Pickrell v. Downey, 102 Ariz. 360, 366, 430 P.2d 122, 128 (1967).
 71. See, e.g., 4 E. Griffith, A History of American City Government 289 (1974)
 ("The local veto over boundary changes, on the part of both or all governmental units
 involved, came to be so rigid that only outside intervention by a higher power could
 break it."); see also Taliaferro v. Genesee County Supervisors, 354 Mich. 49, 57-59, 92
 N.W.2d 319, 323-24 (1958) (invalidating an attempt to incorporate a new city to be
 composed of the city of Flint and several incorporated suburbs on ground that home
 rule bars the nonconsensual consolidation or dissolution of a municipality); P.
 Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 67 ("In various states, legislatures passed
 more restrictive annexation laws, gave up their prerogatives to pass . . . special legisla-
 tion, and allowed fringe area residents a voice in the process, which usually meant resist-
 ance to annexation.").
 72. Changes in the law of incorporation and annexation did not always lead to
 changes in the pattern of metropolitan area development. Many cities continued to ex-
 pand through annexation even after suburban consent was required. See infra note 83.
 Suburban votes on annexation proposals were influenced by changing suburban percep-
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 As a result, those cities simply stopped growing as the residents of adja-
 cent areas incorporated and vetoed annexations.73
 Proposals to make city boundaries congruent with the territorial
 scope of metropolitan areas through the consolidation of central cities
 with their surrounding counties were also conditioned on voter ap-
 proval. Suburban voters blocked proposed city-county consolidations
 involving Cleveland, St. Louis and other cities.74 In many Northeastern
 and Midwestern states, city-county consolidation, like annexation and
 the merger of municipalities, long ago ceased to be a viable means of
 central city expansion due to the power of suburban voters to veto
 measures that threatened their local legal autonomy.75
 The pattern of urban growth through territorial expansion per-
 sisted longer in the South and West. State annexation and consolida-
 tion laws in the Sunbelt continued to facilitate the growth of major
 cities and curb the formation of suburbs during the middle years of the
 twentieth century.76 Much of the explosive population growth since
 World War II of cities like Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Phoenix and
 Oklahoma City is attributable to the cities' legal authority, under the
 liberal annexation laws of their states, to add hundreds of square miles
 of new land.77
 tions of the relative advantages and disadvantages of merger with the central city. These
 issues are discussed more fully in subsections 2 and 3 of this section, infra.
 73. St. Louis and Philadelphia added virtually no new territory after 1870; New
 York City, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, Boston and Pittsburgh added little or
 no new territory after 1930. See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 140.
 74. See P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 70-73. These results seem
 to have cast a permanent pall over city-county consolidation efforts in the Northeast and
 North Central states. A recent study of city-county consolidations proposed during the
 three decades between 1945 and 1976 found that no proposals at all were put before the
 voters in the Northeast, and only four went before the voters in the Midwest-and all
 four were defeated. By contrast, there were 64 proposals in the South and West, of
 which 17, or a little over 25%, passed; all those passing were restricted to small or me-
 dium-sized cities. No consolidation involving a city with a population greater than
 250,000 has received voter approval since World War II. See id. at 70-74.
 75. The result of increasing suburban power to block city expansion has been to
 bring city expansion to a halt. See authorities cited supra note 71; K. Jackson, supra
 note 50, at 149. Jackson observes that those large cities now losing population typically
 expanded rapidly from 1870 to 1930, but have grown "less than 10 percent since 1930."
 Id.
 76. Of the 12 largest cities that gained population between 1950 and 1980, all had
 also gained territory. These cities were predominantly in the Sunbelt, and included
 Dallas, Los Angeles, San Antonio, San Diego and San Jose. Of the 12 largest cities that
 lost population in the same period, 6 had gained no territory and 5 gained only 5 square
 miles or less. These cities were predominantly in the Northeast and Midwest. See id. at
 139-40.
 77. Between 1940 and 1984, Dallas grew by nearly 291 square miles, Houston by
 nearly 493 square miles, Phoenix by nearly 377 square miles and San Antonio by 242
 square miles; Oklahoma City grew by 553 square miles between 1950 and 1984. See
 Miller, supra note 56, at 78-79; see also C. Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth
 and Politics in Sunbelt Cities 52-54 (rev. ed. 1987).
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 More recently, legislatures in some Sunbelt states have begun to
 emulate their Northern and Eastern counterparts by curtailing big city
 expansion and permitting increased suburban independence. Thus,
 Texas responded to suburban concerns by amending its liberal annexa-
 tion laws to restrict the opportunities of larger cities to acquire new
 territory without the consent of the residents of the areas annexed.78
 In Georgia, residents of Atlanta's suburbs have blocked that city's an-
 nexation of new territory and rejected a consolidation of Atlanta with
 Fulton County.79 In Colorado, suburban resistance to Denver's growth
 prompted a succession of defensive incorporations by adjacent commu-
 nities, the adoption of a constitutional amendment requiring a county-
 wide referendum on any new annexations and suburban rejections of
 proposals to strengthen the county government.80 Oregon created lo-
 cal government boundary commissions81 primarily to constrain
 Portland's annexation program.82
 Changes in local government law have thus been critical in deter-
 mining whether large cities will be able to expand to follow outward
 population movements or whether new urban neighborhoods will be
 able to declare their independence and become autonomous suburbs.
 In this century, state laws have tended to favor suburban indepen-
 dence, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest and increasingly in
 the South and West as well.
 2. Incentives to Suburban Independence. - The legal right to become
 independent, and to prevent absorption into a larger city, is a necessary
 but not a sufficient condition for suburbs to choose autonomous gov-
 ernment. Historically, even after states conferred on suburbanites the
 right to veto annexation, many residents of outlying districts still con-
 sented to annexation proposals.83 Suburban independence required a
 78. Tex. Local Gov't Code Ann. ? 43.022 (Vernon 1988). See Ashcroft & Balfour,
 Home Rule Cities and Municipal Annexation in Texas: Recent Trends and Future Pros-
 pects, 15 St. Mary's LJ. 519, 526, 545 (1984) ("[S]uburban residents, many of whom
 reside within the [extra-territorial jurisdiction] of major central cities, have become in-
 creasingly active in initiating changes to curb the annexation power of home rule cities
 . . . . ).
 79. See C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 197; see also Smothers, Atlanta Still on a Roll,
 But New Doubts Arise, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1988, at A21, col. 1 (population of the city
 of Atlanta dropped by 12% from 1974 to 1987 while surrounding metropolitan area
 grew by 40% from 1970 to 1983).
 80. See C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 192-95.
 81. Or. Rev. Stat. ? 199.425 (Butterworth 1983).
 82. C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 198-200. In Oregon, each of the two local govern-
 ment boundary review commissions has jurisdiction over one of the state's two principal
 metropolitan areas, Portland and Eugene. Or. Rev. Stat. ? 199.425 (Butterworth 1983).
 In reviewing annexations, the Portland area commission's "major interest is the effect of
 annexation on the cost and efficiency of service delivery, a criterion that relegates central
 city desires for increased tax base or population diversification to second place." C.
 Abbott, supra note 77, at 199-200.
 83. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 53, at 61 (between 1850 and 1909, all eight annexa-
 tions Cleveland proposed were approved by the voters in the areas to be annexed; be-
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 shift in the relative balance of incentives to autonomy and disincentives
 to annexation. This shift had two major components: the increased
 economic and social segmentation of metropolitan areas and the in-
 creased regulatory authority of local governments over local land use.
 a. Metropolitan Economic and Social Segmentation. - Local indepen-
 dence carries with it the power to elect local officials, enact local laws,
 levy local taxes and spend locally raised revenues on local programs.
 This legal meaning of independence was relatively constant during
 both the era of urban expansion and the subsequent period of suburb
 formation, although the spread of home rule enhanced local powers in
 the later period. But suburban political autonomy, and the concomi-
 tant escape from the politics, legislation and taxes of the central city,
 took on new significance as industrialization and immigration intro-
 duced deep class and ethnic differences between territorially defined
 districts within the urban community.
 As the late nineteenth century cities filled with poor immigrants
 who eventually won urban political power, the older stock of Americans
 living in outlying areas, aware of the economic and social gap between
 themselves and city-dwellers, grew resentful of the new ethnic groups'
 dominance. They came to associate the cities with foreigners, crime,
 vice and political corruption.84 Fearing the emergent urban political
 machines, suburban residents began to reject annexation, preferring
 political autonomy in their own communities to minority status in the
 immigrant cities.85 Ethnic differences continue to be felt in the twenti-
 tween 1887 and 1898, 12 of 16 annexations Chicago proposed were approved by the
 local voters).
 84. A mid-twentieth century decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, sustaining a
 state law that provided certain benefits for police officers in Chicago but not in other
 municipalities, nicely captures this view of the city. The court held that the Illinois Gen-
 eral Assembly could reasonably conclude that a policeman's job in the city of Chicago
 is fraught with hazards uncommon to any other city in Illinois.... [A] conscien-
 tious study and survey of conditions in Chicago . . . would doubtless reveal
 congestion in travel, both pedestrian and vehicular, causing an uncommon
 number of automobile accidents; blight and slum areas; areas of unassimilated
 foreign elements where crimes are bred and protection is offered to fleeing
 criminals; skid rows where poverty, crime and general disrespect for the law
 abounds; narcotic rings, hoodlums, gangsters, and racketeers that kill with
 sawed-off shotguns, all of which pose problems in Chicago that are not found
 in other parts of Illinois.
 Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 111. 146, 154-55, 103 N.E.2d 617, 622 (1952).
 85. See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 150-51 (racial, ethnic and class distinctions
 most important reason why incorporated suburbs are separated from cities);J. Teaford,
 supra note 53, at 10-12, 82-85. City-suburb ethnic and class differences have policy as
 well as political ramifications that may also have encouraged suburban incorporation
 and resistance to annexation.
 One point of Yankee-immigrant conflict at the turn of the century was the sale of
 alcohol: prohibition was generally supported by older stock Americans and opposed by
 some immigrant groups. Before the national adoption of prohibition, numerous sub-
 urbs were incorporated to permit local residents to deny licenses to saloons and ban the
 sale of alcohol within municipal limits. According to Teaford, Pasadena, Monrovia,
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 eth century, as white communities have sought to incorporate, pursue
 annexation programs or resist annexations in order to avoid a political
 combination with minority areas.86
 Widening interlocal economic differences, and the right of locali-
 ties to set their own property tax rates and retain locally raised reve-
 nues, provided further incentives to independence. The turn of the
 century was a period of substantial urban spending on physical infra-
 structure and social welfare programs, with the result that municipal
 taxes and debt increased.87 Although initially the high quality of urban
 services attracted residents of outlying areas to annexation by the cen-
 tral city, over time the suburbs became wealthier and better able to
 fund their own infrastructure and services while they resisted paying
 high city taxes for redistributive social welfare programs with limited
 suburban benefit.88 Local suburban wealth, and the desire to avoid city
 Pomona and Compton in California and Oak Park and Berwyn in Illinois were all incor-
 porated so that residents could ban liquor. See J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 17-18.
 Jackson quotes from an antiannexationist editorial in the Morgan Park Post, a suburban
 Chicago weekly in 1907: " 'The real issue is not taxes, nor water, nor street cars-it is a
 much greater question than either. It is the moral control of our village.' " K. Jackson,
 supra note 50, at 151; see alsoJ. Bollens & H. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People,
 Politics and Economic Life 80 (3d ed. 1975) (describing an 1893 advertisement on be-
 half of the suburb of Wauwatosa, Wisconsin, which described the town as a place of
 "fine churches, street lights, transit facilities, and freedom from saloons and heavy in-
 dustry").
 Occasionally, a suburb was incorporated to authorize a looser approach to vice, as
 in the incorporations of Arcadia, California and North Randall, Ohio to permit the oper-
 ation of racetracks. J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 18-20. Similarly, a report to the
 Minnesota legislature in 1959 noted the incorporation of a village for the sole purpose
 of enabling the sponsors to obtain a liquor license. Under Minnesota law, a license
 could not be granted in an unincorporated area. See S. Sato & A. Van Alstyne, State and
 Local Government Law 48 (2d ed. 1977).
 Today, suburbs may incorporate to pursue more vigorous programs of environ-
 mental protection or to establish greater controls on growth than the central city is likely
 to approve. See R. Babcock & C. Siemon, The Zoning Game Revisited 95-118 (1985)
 (Sanibel, Florida incorporated so that residents could adopt a growth control plan); cf.
 Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d 271, 63 Cal. Rptr. 889
 (1967) (formation of a water district).
 86. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); United
 States v. City of BlackJack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
 (1975); Taylor v. Township of Dearborn, 370 Mich. 47, 120 N.W.2d 737 (1963); Village
 of Inkster v. Wayne County Supervisor, 363 Mich. 165, 108 N.W.2d 822 (1961);
 Marshall v. Mayor of McComb City, 251 Miss. 750, 171 So. 2d 347, cert. denied, 382
 U.S. 836 (1965); In re Incorporation of Bridgewater, 87 Pa. Commw. 599, 488 A.2d 374
 (1985); NAACP v. Town of Hilton Head, 287 S.C. 254, 335 S.E.2d 806 (1985); Sympo-
 sium, The White Curtain: Racially Disadvantaging Local Government Boundary Prac-
 tices, 54 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 679 (1977) (use of local governments' powers over
 boundaries to disadvantage racial minorities).
 87. See generally J. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in
 America, 1870-1900, at 217-306 (1984) (discussing provision and financing of high
 levels of services by cities in late nineteenth century).
 88. Some suburbs incorporated as tax havens. This practice was developed by in-
 dustry, which needed larger parcels of open land for factories, but had no need for social
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 taxes, formed part of the case for suburban incorporation.
 b. Suburban Autonomy and Local Land Use Regulation. - The opportu-
 nity to escape the politicians, policies and taxes of the central cities
 made local independence attractive, but it may not be a coincidence
 that the critical shift in the Northeast and Midwest from urban expan-
 sion to suburban incorporation after World War I occurred concur-
 rently with the widespread adoption, and judicial affirmation, of state
 legislation authorizing local zoning.
 Local zoning and the emergence of independent suburbs are
 closely linked. Although local zoning was first developed in the major
 cities in response to increasing urban congestion,89 within a few years
 after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
 Realty Co.,90 zoning had spread rapidly to the suburbs, where conges-
 tion was rarely a problem.91 Instead, zoning in the suburbs was a solu-
 tion to concerns about neighborhood stability. Zoning became a legal
 device critical to suburban development.
 Suburbanites, like the residents of the cities they left behind, were
 threatened by uncertainties created by the financial, social and racial
 dynamics of urban expansion. As relatively new communities, suburbs
 services and no desire to fund the programs of the big cities. The minimal population
 requirements for incorporation were readily satisfied and businesses and the small
 number of area residents could enjoy substantial freedom from urban taxation. In the
 late 1950s, California's City of Industry contained a few hundred residents but substan-
 tial industrial and commercial properties. By 1970, the town contained hundreds of
 industrial establishments with tens of thousands of employees, but still only a few hun-
 dred residents. See Hoch, City Limits: Municipal Boundary Formation and Class Segre-
 gation, in Marxism and the Metropolis 101, 111-12 (W. Tabb. & L. Sawers 2d ed. 1984).
 Similarly, Forest View, Illinois is an "enclave of industrial riches" with dozens of plants,
 fewer than a thousand residents and a tax rate one-third of Chicago's, but local expendi-
 tures per resident four times as high as Chicago's. See Bravin, Forest View Asserts Inde-
 pendence as an Enclave of Industrial Riches, Chicago Tribune, July 27, 1986, ? 3, at 1,
 col. 1.
 Taxes were initially less of a factor in the formation of residential suburbs since the
 local desire to keep down taxes was counterbalanced by the need for urban services. It
 was often cheaper for residents of outlying areas to join the cities and receive extensions
 of city water systems, sewers and power lines than it was for them to finance their own
 utilities. See J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 58.
 89. See generally S. Toll, Zoned American (1969) (discussing rise of zoning);
 Baker, Zoning Legislation, 11 Cornell L.Q. 164, 165-68 (1926) (describing zoning as
 solution to variety of problems arising from rapid and unplanned growth of American
 cities).
 An important goal of early zoning advocates was the prevention of nuisance in the
 crowded, rapidly growing and largely unplanned cities through the separation of incon-
 sistent land uses into distinct areal zones. Zoning was seen as mandated by the exigen-
 cies of urban life, particularly the need to restrict polluting industries and control the
 height and bulk of the new skyscrapers to maintain habitable residential districts. See H.
 McBain, American City Progress and the Law 92-123 (1918).
 90. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid was a suburb of Cleveland.
 91. See Danielson, supra note 24, at 50 (more than half of suburbs with populations
 greater than 5000 had power to zone, as did half of suburbs with populations less than
 5000).
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 were particularly risky sites for investment since there was little prior
 history of local development from which projections of future growth
 could be made. Some suburbs sought to maintain their exclusive char-
 acter through deed restrictions and restrictive covenants,92 but the
 costs of persuading all landowners in a community to accept and abide
 by private controls on sales and development meant that relatively few
 communities could rely on private agreements as a long-term guaran-
 tee of neighborhood stability.
 Zoning provided a solution. By precluding undesirable changes in
 land use and providing a firm basis for predicting the future physical
 and social evolution of the community, zoning reduced the risks to in-
 vestors in urban real estate.93 As a political rather than a private act,
 zoning required the approval of only a majority of residents, not the
 unanimous consent of all property-owners. Moreover, given the con-
 sistent state practice of delegating zoning authority to local govern-
 ments with little or no state supervision, zoning was a local solution.
 Zoning ordinances could be closely tailored to the preferences of local
 residents.94 However, zoning did require the legal existence of a local
 government. Suburban "[r]esidents perceived incorporation as a
 means of neighborhood protection[]"95 and many incorporated in or-
 der to zone.96
 92. See, e.g., T. Swanstrom, supra note 32, at 65-66 (discussing role of deed re-
 strictions in development of Shaker Heights, Ohio).
 93. See generally C. Perin, Everything in Its Place: Social Order and Land Use in
 America 149-61 (1977); White & Wittman, Long-Run Versus Short-Run Remedies for
 Spatial Externalities: Liability Rules, Pollution Taxes, and Zoning, in Essays on the Law
 and Economics of Local Governments 13, 42 (D. Rubinfeld ed. 1979) (noting that zon-
 ing, by reducing uncertainty, removes from individual landowners the burden of fore-
 casting land use changes in the neighborhood).
 94. Zoning spread rapidly in exclusive residential suburbs. Late nineteenth and
 early twentieth century suburbs were relatively affluent for technological reasons. Before
 the widespread use of the automobile and the construction of a highway system, com-
 muting to the city was largely restricted to rail systems and was relatively expensive.
 Consequently, when, after World War I, the mass production of the automobile and
 state investment in new roads led to rapid suburban growth, the most affluent suburbs
 may have felt particularly threatened. They responded by adopting zoning ordinances
 with alacrity. See Toll, supra note 89, at 192-93. Zoning's capacity for exclusion was its
 major selling point. See Makielski, Zoning: Legal Theory and Political Practice, 45 U.
 Det.J. Urb. L. 1, 5 (1967).
 95. Hoch, supra note 88, at 114.
 96. See, e.g., R. Babcock & C. Siemon, supra note 85, at 95-100; see also S. Toll,
 supra note 89, at 188-96 (describing the interaction and spread of zoning and
 suburbanization in 1920s); R. Wood, 1400 Governments 93-95 (1961) (describing the
 role of zoning in development of suburban Westchester County, New York in 1950s).
 Suburbs have incorporated so that the residents could exclude industry, low-cost
 housing, apartment houses and public housing or adopt growth control plans. See, e.g.,
 United States v. City of BlackJack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1974) (incorporation
 to exclude subsidized housing); R. Babcock & C. Siemon, supra note 85, at 95-106 (dis-
 cussing incorporation of Sanibel, Florida as part of local growth control strategy); see
 also Marcus v. Baron, 84 A.D.2d 118, 119-22, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590-91 (1981), rev'd,
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 Moreover, much as the authority to regulate local land use pro-
 vided a powerful incentive to suburban independence, the emergence
 of the independent residential suburb may have contributed to the judi-
 cial endorsement of local exclusionary practices. A defining character-
 istic of the suburb is that it is only a small piece of a larger metropolitan
 region. This was noted by courts in the incorporation cases, as they
 redefined the notion of an urban community to fit outlying residential
 neighborhoods composed of people who commute to work in other ju-
 risdictions.97 In the zoning cases, the limited size and residential char-
 acter of the suburb proved to be a justification, not an obstacle, for
 affirming local power to reject particular land uses. Some courts
 adopted a perspective that saw the region, and not the particular mu-
 nicipality, as the proper focus of land-use planning, allowing suburbs to
 exclude lawful land uses on the assumption that, since the people or
 businesses displaced by restrictive suburban zoning could find sites
 elsewhere in the region, no "exclusion," in the regional sense at least,
 had occurred at all.
 Thus, in the leading case of Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough
 of Cresskill,98 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld Cresskill's total ex-
 clusion of heavy industry by treating the town as a mere residential
 fragment of a broader regional economy. The Court would not rely on
 "the adventitious location of municipal boundaries"99 to bar Cresskill
 from excluding industry since the region's industrial needs could be
 satisfied by an all-residential Cresskill and factories elsewhere.100 In
 effect, Cresskill could turn itself into a residential "zone" as part of the
 balanced development of the region.
 Similarly, a federal court, relying on Ohio law, adopted a compara-
 ble "regional" perspective in sustaining the total exclusion of industry
 from the residential town of Valley View: "Traditional concepts of zon-
 ing envision a municipality as a self-contained community with its own
 residential, business and industrial areas,"101 wrote future United
 States Supreme CourtJustice Potter Stewart, then a judge of the United
 States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
 It is obvious that Valley View, Ohio, on the periphery of a
 large metropolitan center, is not such a self-contained commu-
 nity, but only an adventitious fragment of the economic and
 57 N.Y.2d 862, 442 N.E.2d 437, 456 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1982) (town of Ramapo, New York
 adopted a local law restricting the incorporation of villages within the town in order to
 protect the town's growth control program); Foderaro, Neighbors Try to Secede Over
 Housing Plan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1988, at B1, col. 2 (attempt to incorporate village in
 order to zone to prevent implementation of county plan to build housing for homeless
 in the area proposed for incorporation).
 97. See supra notes 62-70 (collecting cases).
 98. 1 NJ. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
 99. Id. at 515, 64 A.2d at 350.
 100. See id., 64 A.2d at 351.
 101. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 1955).
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 social whole .... The council of such a village should not be
 required to shut its eyes to the pattern of community life be-
 yond the borders of the village itself [but has the authority] to
 pass an ordinance preserving its residential character, so long
 as the business and industrial needs of its inhabitants are sup-
 plied by other accessible areas in the community at large.102
 Since Valley View and Cresskill were not self-contained cities, but
 only pieces of economically and socially diverse metropolitan areas,
 they did not have to make room within their borders for all legitimate
 land uses. Zoning, which initially sought the separation of inconsistent
 uses within a jurisdiction but not the total exclusion of otherwise lawful
 land uses, was transformed to permit a community, separated only by
 "invisible municipal boundary lines"103 from the rest of the region, to
 maintain itself as an exclusively residential place. By enabling subur-
 ban residents to reap the benefits of easy access to industrial or com-
 mercial opportunities in other jurisdictions without having to provide
 any land for locally undesirable land uses, these decisions mirrored
 suburban growth patterns and the suburban assumption that such resi-
 dential communities were a natural, indeed a beneficial, development.
 The cases ratified the emergence of all-residential communities, treated
 them as typifying local government, and then relied on the all-residen-
 tial model to sustain local legislation intended to mandate and continue
 that all-residential character.
 The regional perspective taken by the courts in the Cresskill, and
 Valley View cases, and elsewhere'04 is paradoxical. If the region is the
 proper focus of planning concerns, why are individual localities em-
 powered to zone at all? With each of the many local governments in a
 region zoning on the basis of its own interests, what guarantee is there
 that land uses and land users displaced from one community will find a
 place elsewhere in the region? More fundamentally, if a particular sub-
 urb is no more than a mere fragment of a larger community, set off
 from its neighbors by "adventitious" boundaries, why should its regula-
 tions enjoy the presumption of political legitimacy accorded urban gov-
 ernments without greater supervision by the state or coordination with
 other localities?105
 102. Id.
 103. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 NJ. 238, 247, 104 A.2d 441,
 446 (1954).
 104. See, e.g., Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal.
 App. 3d 488, 502-03, 108 Cal. Rptr. 271, 282 (1973).
 105. Courts have on occasion relied on the regional perspective to limit local au-
 tonomy when the actions of one locality impinged on another, thereby limiting the sec-
 ond locality's autonomy. For example, some courts have allowed a neighboring
 community, or its residents, to challenge a local zoning action and to have the neigh-
 bor's interests taken into account. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541,
 546-49, 492 P.2d 1137, 1139-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748-50 (1972); Township of
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 During the postwar suburban boom, these questions were not ad-
 dressed, let alone answered. Courts treated suburbs as autonomous
 municipal governments for purposes of providing legitimacy to local
 regulatory authority, yet also as "suburbs," that is as mere "adventi-
 tious fragments" of a larger, integrated metropolitan economy, in or-
 der to sustain local exclusionary policies. The regional perspective
 provided municipalities with a shield for local exclusionary actions but
 did not subject them to attack for failure to take regional interests into
 account. The metropolitan areas surrounding a Cresskill or Valley
 View might be seen as the appropriate "community at large" justifying
 a local decision to make the suburb a residential preserve, but, until
 recently, the argument that a community had to accept land uses it
 deemed undesirable in order to satisfy regional needs was generally re-
 jected.'06 Even now, as the discussion in Part I evidences, regionalism
 has had only a limited effect in constraining local zoning autonomy.107
 Nor was suburban land-use policy limited to the advancement of
 residential communities in general; instead, many suburbs had a very
 specific type of residence in mind. The emerging affluent suburbs of
 the postwar period regularly excluded not just commercial and indus-
 trial facilities, but apartment houses, other multifamily dwellings, and
 publicly subsidized housing. Courts in the period of rapid suburban
 growth accepted the suburban model of development and sustained lo-
 cal ordinances that lumped together apartments and other multifamily
 dwellings with industrial or commercial uses and excluded them from
 the locality as threats to the local residential character.'08 In a large
 city this would be a bizarre definition of "residential," yet in the sub-
 urbs the assumption that apartment houses were not homes went
 Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 NJ. 578, 584-86, 141 A.2d 308, 311-12
 (1958); Borough of Dumont, 15 NJ. at 245-49, 104 A.2d at 444-47.
 But these cases typically have involved actions by the zoning community to permit
 an industrial or commercial development or the construction of multifamily housing ad-
 jacent to a single-family residential district of the protesting second community. Ordi-
 narily local autonomy and the local preference for a residential community go hand in
 hand and the regional perspective operates to reinforce both autonomy and the exclu-
 sion of nonresidential uses. However, when local action threatens the residential nature
 of an adjacent community, the judicial vision of municipalities as residential communi-
 ties permits one community to use the regional perspective to limit the autonomy of
 another. Of course, even here the effect of the regional perspective is to deny a nonresi-
 dential use rather than curb the residential preference.
 These cases of interlocal conflict aside, courts generally have not questioned the
 municipality's power to zone or its right to base its zoning decisions on the best interests
 of the municipality.
 106. See, e.g., Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 NJ. 320, 328, 139 A.2d
 749, 754 (1958).
 107. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 39-58.
 108. The New Jersey Supreme Court commented, "Apartment houses are not in-
 herently benign" and their exclusion helped a community "retain its residential charac-
 ter." Fanale, 26 NJ. at 325-26, 139 A.2d at 752.
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 unchallenged. 109
 The large-lot zoning decisions also suggest the power of the subur-
 ban model in transforming the concept of the city from a place of peo-
 ple and buildings clustered tightly together, separated from the country
 and characterized by the congestion of its streets and public places and
 the intensity of its street life,10 to a setting of individual homes, sur-
 rounded by large amounts of privately owned open space with people
 living their lives relatively separate from their neighbors.l" Although
 large-lot zoning was justified, in part, by economic considerations,"2
 the judicial legitimation of exclusionary practices appears also to indi-
 cate a belief that large lots and large homes were constitutive of the
 character of suburban areas. 13
 As in the incorporation cases, decentralized settlement ceased to
 raise questions about an area's urban character. To the contrary, the
 separation of homes from each other became an appropriate goal of
 urban residential development. Courts referred to the "quiet and
 109. Constance Perin links the suburban hostility to apartment houses to the gen-
 eral suburban insistence on the separation of work from home. As apartment units are
 typically rented and not owned, apartment houses combine aspects of business with resi-
 dence. This results in the intrusion of the "profanities of work and commerce" into the
 "sacred aura of family." C. Perin, supra note 93, at 116-18.
 110. See, e.g., K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 14-16.
 111. Perin sees the residential "flight to the suburbs" and the suburban preference
 for single-family detached houses as similar expressions of strategies of social avoidance.
 Both the removal from the densely populated city and the meticulous detail in many
 suburban zoning ordinances governing the size of lots and back, front and side yards are
 mechanisms for reducing intrusions into residents' personal space. So too, zoning
 measures designed to achieve income homogeneity are aimed at avoiding social conflict
 and promoting "domestic tranquility." See C. Perin, supra note 93, at 81-98.
 112. Courts have recognized that the home is the principal asset of most suburban
 residents, and that by keeping down the demand for local public services and keeping up
 the cost of new homes, large-lot zoning protects property values. See, e.g., Flora Realty
 & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 1036, 246 S.W.2d 771, 776 (en banc) ("[A]
 reduction of the minimum area restrictions ... would have a materially adverse effect on
 the value of all the property in the general vicinity."), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802
 (1952).
 Indeed, large lot requirements not only serve residents' individual interests, but,
 since suburban communities are composed largely of homeowners, the protection of
 property values serves the community as a whole. See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v.
 Wayne Township, 10 NJ. 165, 174-75, 89 A.2d 693, 697-98 (1952), appeal dismissed,
 344 U.S. 919 (1953); Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 41 NJ. Super. 47, 60, 64, 124 A.2d
 54, 61, 63 (App. Div. 1956).
 113. Some courts that plainly were troubled by the economically exclusionary po-
 tential of large-lot regulations nevertheless were willing to sustain these costly man-
 dates, and the allied requirements concerning large building frontages and large floor
 areas, because they found them to be consistent with the proper social development of
 the suburbs. See, e.g., Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 563-67, 42 N.E.2d
 516, 518-20 (1942); see also C. Perin, supra note 93, at 164-68 (local motivations to
 adopt growth controls are cultural as much as fiscal).
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 beauty of rural surroundings,""14 the "nice homes"" 5 or "better-type
 home areas,"16 and the right of the residents to prefer "more land,
 more living room, indoors and out, and more freedom in their scale of
 living."'17 Suburbs were defined around yards, open spaces, roomy
 homes, low population density and the lack of urban noise, traffic and
 congestion. Where once city and country had stood as opposites, with
 municipal government associated with the former and not the latter, in
 the suburbs the two were combined. Suburban land-use regulation en-
 abled residents to enjoy the privacy and "blessings of quiet seclu-
 sion"""8 of country life"19 within commuting range of the employment
 opportunities and cultural amenities of the city. Courts sustained the
 efforts of developing municipalities to use their zoning powers to pre-
 serve the "country" aspects of local life and prevent their transforma-
 tion into "cities."'120
 Zoning, of course, is not limited to the suburbs. The protection of
 property values, the preservation of social status and the defense of the
 psychological and emotional benefits derived from a familiar and de-
 pendable environment in the face of a dynamic urban land market are
 goals of many city residents, too. But city residents have not been as
 successful in using zoning to produce stable residential neighborhoods.
 In part, this is a result of timing. By the time zoning became wide-
 spread in the 1920s, most of the cities of the Northeast and Midwest
 were substantially developed. The poor had already settled in these
 cities in large numbers, and much city land was already devoted to
 multiunit housing or commercial and industrial uses. Exclusionary
 zoning can prevent the influx of low-income people and the construc-
 tion of less expensive housing, but it cannot eject people who are al-
 ready there or destroy housing that already exists.121 Zoning is a more
 effective tool for shaping the future than for dealing with the conse-
 quences of the past.
 Moreover, zoning is a regulatory device exercised on behalf of the
 entire polity. In the cities, middle class and affluent residents share
 power with the poor, the working class and business groups. It may be
 114. Simon, 311 Mass. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
 115. Flora Realty, 362 Mo. at 1036, 246 S.W.2d at 776.
 116. Clary, 41 NJ. Super. at 67, 124 A.2d at 65.
 117. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 NJ. 165, 174, 89 A.2d 693, 697
 (1952).
 118. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
 119. Lionshead Lake, 10 NJ. at 174, 89 A.2d at 697.
 120. The commitment to the pattern of separated settlement goes beyond a con-
 cern to keep down population density. Some suburbs have opposed planned unit devel-
 opments (PUD's) and cluster housing, neither of which would increase density but both
 of which depart from the detached single-family dwelling that is characteristic of subur-
 ban areas. See R. Babcock, The Zoning Game 75-76 (1966).
 121. Of course, urban renewal and slum clearance programs are an effective means
 of destroying existing low-income housing and, thereby, excluding low income residents
 from the city. See, e.g., J. Mollenkopf, The Contested City 97-212 (1983).
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 more difficult for any one group to prevail consistently or to use the
 legal powers of the city as a whole to protect a particular neighbor-
 hood.'22 In the city, a neighborhood cannot by itself zone to maintain
 its particular economic and social status quo or control the pace and
 122. This is not to deny that white, middle class city neighborhoods can, and often
 do, dominate municipal housing and zoning decisions to maintain patterns of housing
 segregation within the city. They may do this, for example, by siting all public or subsi-
 dized housing in poor or minority areas. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v.
 City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971);
 United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837
 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988).
 Nevertheless, cities are more likely to be called to account for segregative housing
 practices. Cities are more likely to have minority residents with standing to sue the mu-
 nicipality, whereas in exclusionary suburbs the persons aggrieved by the segregative
 practices are more likely to be nonresidents, who would probably lack standing. See
 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), discussed in Briffault, supra note 1, at 107-09.
 Cities, especially poor cities like Yonkers, are more apt to seek federal assistance for
 public or subsidized housing and become subject to federal statutory and administrative
 obligations governing the siting of such housing. Suburbs, since they tend to depend
 less on federal housing assistance, may be sued only under the equal protection clause
 of the fourteenth amendment or more general fair housing statutes. It may be easier for
 plaintiffs to demonstrate a city's violations of the conditions for housing assistance than
 to prove a suburb's violation of the Constitution, since, given the general refusal of
 suburbs to accept subsidized housing, it is difficult to distinguish racially-motivated ex-
 clusionary ordinances from usual local zoning practices. See Village of Arlington
 Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
 Thus, Yonkers, for all its sins, is a city that in 1988 was 11%o black, had a median
 family income of $28,000, and had 6800 units of low-income housing. By contrast, in
 the nearby suburb of Hastings-on-Hudson, the population was 3% black, the median
 income was $41,000, and there were no units of low-income housing; in the suburb of
 Scarsdale, the population was 2% black, the median income was $93,000 and there were
 no units of public housing; and in the suburb of Bronxville the population was 0.1%o
 black, the median income was $70,000 and there were no units of low-income housing.
 See Salins, A Tale of Racism in the Suburbs, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1988, at A27, col. 1.
 Yet, under current law only Yonkers could be sued successfully for discriminatory hous-
 ing practices.
 Moreover, changes in the structure of local legislatures will make it more difficult
 for cities with any substantial minority population to engage in discriminatory practices
 against their own residents. Under the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 96
 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. ?? 1971-1973c (Supp. III 1985)), the Department of
 Justice and the courts have given close scrutiny to at-large city councils and local appor-
 tionment plans that do not result in the election of minority representatives in numbers
 reflecting the minority share of the local population. See, e.g., Cruz Gomez v. City of
 Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1534 (1989); United
 States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
 Ct. 1768 (1989). With greater minority representation on city councils, the ability of
 white neighborhoods to dominate municipal housing and zoning decisions should be
 lessened, and local legislatures should be more attentive to minority interests in a city.
 By contrast, minority interests will continue to be unrepresented in the local legislatures
 of all-white suburbs. Those municipal councils are already responsive to local residents'
 interests; from the perspective of housing integration that is precisely the problem. The
 only way to reduce segregative actions by suburbs would be to require them to represent
 the interests of nonresidents-something well beyond the scope of the Voting Rights
 Act and, for the most part, outside the general strictures of local government law.
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 direction of future growth. But in the suburbs, a neighborhood, once
 incorporated, can.'23
 Zoning, thus, joins political, legislative and fiscal autonomy in pro-
 viding a legal incentive for suburban incorporation. The emergence of
 the autonomous suburb was closely intertwined with doctrinal changes
 in incorporation and zoning law that resulted from suburban growth,
 much as the development of the suburbs led to changes in the legal
 assumptions governing the political, economic and social characteris-
 tics of municipalities. Local governments and local government law
 were suburbanized together.
 3. Reducing Disincentives to Suburban Independence. - The right to in-
 corporate and the expansion of local regulatory authority might not be
 sufficient to lead a suburban area to incorporate if the suburb's tax base
 is inadequate to fund basic municipal services.'24 Indeed, as previously
 noted, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the high
 quality of city services and the high cost to suburbs of providing
 equivalent services independently led many suburbs to forego incorpo-
 ration and accept annexation by the larger cities.125
 The basic goals of the suburbs-separation from the city and the
 provision of high-quality municipal services-are in tension.126 In the
 123. Babcock observes,
 The central city is a conglomeration of many neighborhoods, each of which
 may have as much social and historic unity as the average suburb. The suburb,
 however, enjoys virtually absolute control over the location, size, style, and
 characteristics of housing and other land uses, while an equivalent neighbor-
 hood in the city has no control whatsoever over its own affairs.
 R. Babcock, Billboards, Glass Houses and the Law: And Other Land Use Fables 39
 (1977); see also Hays, The Changing Political Structure of the City in Industrial
 America, 1J. Urb. Hist. 6, 27 (1974) (formation of"[s]uburban political units reflected a
 desire to separate out one's community from the larger urban world").
 124. Even today the working-class suburb "is quite likely to be unincorporated. It
 is cheaper that way ....' " J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 251 (quoting C. Adrian & C.
 Press, Governing Urban America 46 (4th ed. 1972)). In order to preserve their indepen-
 dence from the city, these communities will either take their services from the county or
 a special district, see infra text at notes 128-140, or choose to receive a lower level of
 services.
 125. The major cities were the first localities to create professional police and fire
 departments, develop extensive school systems, pave streets, sidewalks and roads, create
 parks and invest in the costly public works necessary to provide water, power and sew-
 age and waste removal. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 87.
 Moreover, not only were independent suburban services costlier, but suburban per
 capita tax bases were smaller. Suburbs may have lacked the inner city's poor, but they
 were also without the cities' manufacturing and commercial establishments. Even as
 industry began to move to the suburbs, industrial establishments often concentrated in
 particular business-oriented communities and were of little direct help in financing in-
 frastructure and services in residential communities.
 126. Cf. J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 260 (discussing tension between suburban
 goals of autonomy, which call for "small-town suburban governments," and the need to
 supply the infrastructure for growth, such as highways, sewers, water supply, hospitals
 and schools, which is "too expensive for small-town governments to do on their own.").
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 nineteenth century relatively few communities could afford to go it
 alone.127 Even as suburban affluence increased and the ethnic and cul-
 tural rifts between cities and suburbs widened, reducing the fiscal dis-
 advantages of independence while increasing the perceived social and
 political price of joining the city, the costs of paying for local services
 still caused many suburbanites to draw back from incorporation.
 New state laws reduced this fiscal disincentive to suburban incor-
 poration in three ways: the creation of new governmental structures
 which allowed suburbs to combine with each other and with cities in
 order to fund infrastructure without ceding local political autonomy
 over other matters, the authorization of intergovernmental contracting
 and direct financial assistance from the state.
 a. Limited-Purpose Governments. - Since the turn of the century,
 state legislatures have invented a "baffling array" of "pseudo govern-
 ments" to provide infrastructure services to the suburbs without dis-
 turbing suburban political autonomy. 28 These entities-variously
 christened boards, districts, authorities and commissions-are author-
 ized to construct, operate or finance physical infrastructure services,
 usually water supply services, sewers, parks or transportation, over an
 area including many general-purpose governments. These limited-pur-
 pose entities can pool the resources of a number of localities in an area,
 but solely to provide one or a handful of specified services.
 Where the board's jurisdiction includes both the city and the sub-
 urbs and the city has already installed its own water supply or sewers
 out of its own funds, the board effectively redistributes city revenues to
 the installation and support of suburban services.'29 Where the board
 or district includes only developing areas in need of the initial installa-
 tion of new services, the creation of a single area-wide water or sewer
 system and the combination of revenues from numerous localities lead
 to substantial economies of scale, reducing the per capita cost of pro-
 viding new infrastructure systems but undermining the competitive ad-
 vantage of the central city and permitting suburbs to enjoy municipal
 Harrigan notes that "[i]f the system of autonomous small-town suburban governments
 was going to be maintained, some mechanisms had to be created to provide those ex-
 pensive essential services." Id.
 127. A harbinger of things to come was the decision in 1874 of the voters of
 Brookline, the self-styled "richest town in the world," to reject annexation by Boston-
 "the first really significant defeat" for big city expansion. K. Jackson, supra note 50, at
 149. In the preceding decade, Boston had successfully annexed five outlying cities, and,
 even after Brookline's rebuff, Boston would again annex areas poorer than Brookline in
 need of urban services, but Brookline's action set the future pattern for wealthier sub-
 urbs. See id. Brookline's decision had significant effects on the long-term development
 of the Boston metropolitan area. See M. Edel, E. Sclar & D. Luria, Shaky Palaces:
 Homeownership and Social Mobility in Boston's Suburbanization 233-63 (1984).
 128. R. Wood, supra note 24, at 84.
 129. See M. Edel, E. Sclar & D. Luria, supra note 127, at 60-61.
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 services without submitting to annexation or consolidation.'30
 The structure and design of these special-purpose units minimize
 the intrusion on suburban autonomy. First, they are limited-purpose
 governments. The metropolitan unit overlaps cities and suburbs but
 has no general governmental authority over the territory or residents
 within its jurisdiction. Cities and suburbs are not merged, and the city
 gains no lawmaking authority over the suburbs. Rather, different mu-
 nicipalities are linked only for a particular purpose, such as supplying
 water or removing wastes.
 Second, these units provide services that facilitate separate subur-
 ban political existence without disrupting suburban class or ethnic ho-
 mogeneity. In Oliver Williams's terminology, the metropolitan special
 districts perform "system-maintenance functions" without impinging
 on suburban "lifestyles."131 The physical infrastructure that metropol-
 itan districts provide usually lacks broader implications for the eco-
 nomic or social demography of suburban communities. Special
 districts supply engineering solutions to technical problems; they do
 not directly engage in area-wide social or economic policymaking.'32
 Metropolitan districts do not zone or provide police, housing or
 schools on an area-wide city-suburb basis.133 Suburbs that have ac-
 cepted regional provision of certain transportation facilities, like air-
 ports, have been able to reject other area-wide services, like
 metropolitan mass transit systems, because of the concern that the lat-
 ter would increase the ability of central city residents to travel to the
 suburbs.134
 Third, special districts' financial and governance arrangements
 minimize their regional redistributive and political potential. The op-
 eration of these agencies is usually funded through service fees or user
 charges, with local service recipients paying a specified amount for each
 130. See, e.g.,J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 78-81; see generally Schwartz, Evolu-
 tion of the Suburbs, in Suburbia: The American Dream and Dilemma 1, 18-21 (P. Dolce
 ed. 1976) (discussing New York and Philadelphia suburbs' successful opposition to city
 expansion).
 131. Williams, Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Ar-
 eas, 48 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 299, 304-07 (1967).
 132. See R. Wood, supra note 24, at 248.
 133. See R. Babcock, supra note 120, at 38; Friedland, Piven & Alford, Political
 Conflict, Urban Structure, and the Fiscal Crisis, in Marxism and the Metropolis, supra
 note 88, at 273, 285.
 134. See C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 193, 197 (describing refusal of three subur-
 ban Georgia counties to join Atlanta's regional mass transit system and limitation of the
 functions of Portland's metropolitan service district to solid-waste planning and the
 zoo); Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or Reality, 58 Geo. L.J.
 675, 684 (1970) (voters in metropolitan Seattle refused to add mass transit to the func-
 tions of metropolitan Seattle public authority previously handling regional sewage dis-
 posal); Schmidt, Racial Roadblock Seen in Atlanta Transit System, N.Y. Times, July 22,
 1987, at A16, col. 3 (continued refusal of Atlanta suburbs to join transit system, alleg-
 edly due to fear that extension of transit lines will bring more blacks to suburbs).
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 unit of service they receive. Local tax bases are generally not exposed
 to the public service needs of the region or of people residing outside
 local political boundaries.
 The metropolitan boards generally lack regional popular political
 constituencies. Often their members are unelected, and are, instead,
 appointees or officials of the affected municipalities serving ex of-
 ficio.135 The board members do not serve as representatives of a re-
 gional electorate, but either represent their home locality to the
 regional unit-where they vote on a "one government, one vote" and
 not a "one person, one vote" basis-or they are not locally representa-
 tive at all. There are few political ties linking metropolitan districts di-
 rectly to the residents of the metropolitan area, so that these districts
 do not significantly disturb the existing political alignment of cities and
 suburbs. 136
 As metropolitan areas have grown, special districts have prolifer-
 ated. There are now more than 28,000, and the special district is the
 most common form of local government.'37 In most areas there are
 more special districts than municipalities.138 At one time, political
 scientists saw these metropolitan boards and districts as a bridge from
 local independence to regional government. They predicted that as lo-
 cal governments developed institutions for interlocal cooperation and
 saw the need for regional solutions to area-wide problems, metropoli-
 tan consolidation would follow.139 Instead, the opposite has occurred.
 135. See, e.g., Friedland, Piven and Alford, supra note 133, at 283 ("transportation
 and industrial development policies are often delegated to agencies . . . whose officials
 are not elected .. ."); Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 553, 554-55
 (1957); cf. Comment, An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional and Multicounty, 71 Mich.
 L. Rev. 1376, 1380-81 (1973) ("On the whole, there are more elected than appointed
 officials directing special governments, but the more important authorities are usually
 governed by appointed directors."). Moreover, even where special district boards are
 elected, those elections are, with the exception of school board elections, not subject to
 the one-person, one-vote rule, so that the electorate is often limited to landowners who
 are entitled to vote on a "one-acre, one-vote" basis. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
 355, 370-71 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
 719, 733-34 (1973).
 136. See, e.g., M. Edel, E. Sclar & D. Luria, supra note 127, at 60-80; R. Wood,
 supra note 24, at 83.
 137. In 1982, there were 28,588 special districts, not including school districts; by
 contrast, there were 19,076 municipalities and 3041 counties. See J. Aronson & J.
 Hilley, supra note 30, at 76. The number of special districts has also grown more rap-
 idly than that of municipalities. Between 1957 and 1982, the number of municipalities
 rose by 1893; in the same period, the number of special districts increased by 14,183.
 Id.
 138. In 1972, the average metropolitan area included 20 municipalities and more
 than 30 special districts. See W. Colman, supra note 37, at 125. In the 31-county New
 York metropolitan area there were 780 municipalities and 716 special districts. See M.
 Danielson & J. Doig, supra note 47, at 4.
 139. See, e.g., Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a "Proper" Areal Division of Govern-
 mental Powers, in Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government 27, 42-43 (A. Maass
 ed. 1959); cf. W. Sayre & H. Kaufman, Governing New York City: Politics in the Me-
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 State-authorized limited-purpose governments have provided suburbs
 with an alternative to annexation, consolidation to the central city or
 acceptance of full-fledged metropolitan governments.'40 A suburb can
 maintain political independence, including control of its tax base,
 schools and lands, while still sharing in the economies of scale provided
 by infrastructure services organized and funded on a regional basis.
 b. Interlocal Contracts. - Interlocal contracting provides a second
 method of solving suburban service delivery problems without forfeit-
 ing political independence. In forty-two states, municipalities are au-
 thorized to purchase services from other localities.14' Typically, this
 means that a small suburb can purchase municipal services from a
 larger suburb, the central city or the county. This permits smaller sub-
 urbs to benefit from economies of scale and to pay only for the margi-
 nal cost of extending services to a newly developed area rather than the
 larger, fixed costs of creating entirely new service systems.
 As with special districts, interlocal contracts operate on a service-
 by-service basis. Interlocal contracts are not redistributive; the suburb
 pays for the cost of receiving the particular service but does not con-
 tribute more broadly to the cost of city or county government. A sub-
 urb's decision to contract for any one service has no broader
 implications for interlocal agreements for any other services. Although
 interlocal contracts often cover a wide spectrum of services, and may
 include law enforcement, street maintenance and administrative ser-
 vices as well as sewers, water supply and parks and recreation,142 there
 are few agreements to provide services with social implications.'43
 Interlocal contracts are even less of a threat to local autonomy than
 metropolitan special districts. States may create special districts with-
 out the express consent of the affected localities, but interlocal con-
 tracts are entirely a matter of local option. No locality need enter into a
 contract with any other. Moreover, while special districts have no fixed
 term and their bond obligations may guarantee them long lives, interlo-
 cal contracts do expire and the decision to renew is, again, a matter of
 local option. Still less do interlocal contracts entail creation of a re-
 gional government. The purchasing suburb contracts with an existing
 tropolis 596 (1965) (New York City-area Metropolitan Regional Council's "influence
 appears likely to increase gradually but steadily in years ahead.").
 140. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 130, at 18-21.
 141. See Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 81; see, e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat.
 Ann. ? 7339b (West 1989); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 127, ? 743.1 (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp.
 1989); NJ. Stat. Ann. ? 40:8A-3 (West 1967 & Supp. 1989);
 142. See, e.g., R. Bish, The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas 86-87 (1971).
 143. See, e.g.,J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 85, at 291-98, 327. The reluc-
 tance of local governments to cooperate over issues with lifestyle implications, for exam-
 ple subsidized housing, is illustrated by the refusal of the suburbs of Cleveland to enter
 into agreements with the regional housing authority to accept subsidized units within
 their borders. See Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th
 Cir. 1974).
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 locality; there is not even the minimal danger of a regional entity exer-
 cising control over the suburban jurisdiction.
 Interlocal contracts, of course, must benefit the central city or
 county providing the suburb with public services as well as the suburb
 receiving the service. For some urban governments, interlocal contracts
 provide a means of employing excess capacity. The extension of city
 utility services to the suburbs may be an inexpensive means of earning
 additional revenues. For a city unable to expand by annexation, in-
 terlocal contracting is a kind of consolation prize; it permits the city to
 obtain some financial support from outlying areas, although the reve-
 nues received are usually tied to the cost of the services provided and
 the contractual relationship is likely to result in less redistribution from
 affluent or middle class suburbs to the central city poor than annexa-
 tion would have.'44 Moreover, although interlocal contracting takes
 some of the sting out of the city's inability to annex, it also makes it far
 more likely that an outlying area will reject annexation.
 The most famous elaboration of interlocal contracting as an alter-
 native to annexation is illustrative. In the 1950s Lakewood was a
 rapidly growing area in Southern California, adjacent to the city of
 Long Beach. To avoid annexation by Long Beach, an attorney for a
 local developer, together with county officials, devised a plan whereby
 the community could incorporate as a city but contract with the county
 to receive all the county services it had received as an unincorporated
 area plus additional services necessitated by population growth.145
 Lakewood became the first municipality to exist on the basis of
 purchasing all of its basic services from another unit of government.146
 The plan assured Lakewood the necessary municipal services while pro-
 tecting it from being annexed and allowing it to govern itself and exer-
 cise its own taxing and police powers, including zoning.
 The Lakewood Plan provoked an explosion of incorporation activ-
 ity in Southern California, with twenty-five additional suburban com-
 munities incorporating into separate municipalities between 1954 and
 1961.147 The Lakewood Plan continues to provide a model for suburbs
 seeking a fiscally feasible method of sustaining political independence.
 Together with the formation of metropolitan service districts,
 Lakewood-style contracting provides suburbs with an alternative to
 joining the central city or agreeing to general governments that span
 144. Cities that supply public utility services, such as water and power, to other
 localities are sometimes subject to the same restrictions as privately owned public utili-
 ties. Hence they may not be able to discriminate in pricing these services in favor of city
 residents unless such discrimination is justified by differences in the cost of providing
 the service. See, e.g., City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 151 Tex. 100, 104-05, 246 S.W.2d
 622, 624-25 (1952).
 145. See Hoch, supra note 88, at 103.
 146. SeeJ. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 261-63.
 147. See R. Bish & V. Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government 60 (1973).
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 metropolitan areas. 48
 c. Intergovernmental Aid. - The states also facilitated suburban au-
 tonomy by providing funds directly for the construction of suburban
 physical infrastructure. State programs contributed to the building
 and maintenance of the highways connecting the suburbs to the cities,
 the financing of suburban water and sewer systems and the funding of
 suburban schools.
 Highway construction was a major economic activity of state gov-
 ernments in the 1920s.'49 Highways permitted large numbers of mid-
 dle-class city residents to emigrate to the suburbs while continuing to
 work in the city, and the extensive state role in highway construction
 and maintenance in the decades before the federal interstate system
 relieved the suburbs, which depended on these new roads, from what
 could have been a severe financial burden.150
 Similarly, the states were actively involved in securing the provi-
 sion of water supply and sanitary services to the suburbs-functions
 which the central cities had financed for themselves in prior decades.'51
 In part, the pattern of state assistance to suburbs with respect to water
 and sewers was a result of timing. In the nineteenth century, the major
 cities were far more activist than the states in supplying public goods
 and services to their residents.152 The cities were the first governments
 to develop effective water and sewer systems.153 The city systems es-
 tablished new standards of public health and amenity, which, by the
 twentieth century, came to be considered a governmental obligation.
 With the rapidly growing areas on the urban fringe often unable to con-
 struct or fund their own systems, the more active state governments
 began to assume some degree of responsibility, either through the for-
 mation of special districts, direct state provision or financial aid to sub-
 urban localities.154 The physical facilities that the major cities had
 funded for themselves were, to a considerable degree, provided for the
 suburbs through programs of state assistance.
 148. For a generally favorable description of the Lakewood Plan, see id. at 59-61.
 149. See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 166-68 (between 1919 and 1929, every state
 adopted a motor fuel tax and earmarked the revenue to fund highway construction);
 Ashton, Urbanization and the Dynamics of Suburban Development Under Capitalism, in
 Marxism in the Metropolis, supra note 88, at 54, 63-64; see alsoJ. Aronson &J. Hilley,
 supra note 30, at 240 (table A-6) (in 1927 highways were second only to education as
 recipients of state and local expenditure); id. at 246 (table A-12) (in 1927 one-third of
 state assistance to local government was for highway construction).
 150. See, e.g., Ashton, supra note 149, at 63-66.
 151. SeeJ. Teaford, supra note 87, at 219-27.
 152. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 15.
 153. See id.
 154. See, e.g., M. Danielson, supra note 24, at 283. Federal water, sewer and high-
 way grants also enabled suburbs to grow while remaining independent, without strain-
 ing local resources. See, e.g, W. Colman, supra note 37, at 73-74; K. Jackson, supra
 note 50, at 293; R. Wood, supra note 96, at 170.
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 State school-aid programs were also developed, initially, to enable
 the suburbs and rural areas to meet the educational standards set by
 the cities.155 Because of the lack of industrial and commercial property
 in most suburbs and the large concentrations of families with children,
 the capital costs of creating new public school systems placed a major
 strain on the budgets of the emerging suburbs. Although older,
 wealthier suburbs were able to carry this burden and offer educational
 programs comparable to the cities' without state assistance, the newer,
 less affluent middle-class suburbs of the twentieth century might have
 been unable to fund school systems internally.'56 State aid formulas
 generally favored the suburbs, for example, by funding a higher pro-
 portion of school construction or pupil transportation costs, which
 were far more important in the developing, sprawling suburbs than in
 the older, more concentrated cities.157 State aid was critical in enabling
 the newer suburbs to build their schools and start up their school sys-
 tems. Indeed, from the inception of state school assistance programs
 until the 1960s, in most metropolitan areas suburbs generally received
 more aid per pupil than did the central cities.158
 Together, state intergovernmental aid, state authorization of in-
 terlocal contracts and state creation of special service districts made
 suburban independence fiscally feasible and rendered merger with the
 central city unnecessary. These developments in local government law
 allowed suburbs to be politically separate from the city and still enjoy
 high-quality municipal services without bearing unduly burdensome
 costs.
 As a result, even as metropolitan areas have expanded and the lo-
 calities of a region have become economically intertwined, local gov-
 ernments have grown apart politically. Outside the central cities, the
 imaginary lines separating neighborhoods of different classes or ethnic
 groups are also political boundaries, setting off self-governing munici-
 palities. The rise of autonomous suburbs has had profound implica-
 tions for the political structure of most metropolitan areas. Moreover,
 by providing a new model for thinking about local government, the
 155. See, e.g., S. Sacks, City Schools/Suburban Schools: A History of Fiscal Con-
 flict 57-58 (1972).
 156. See Williams, supra note 131, at 309.
 157. In addition, state equalization assistance looked to local expenditures per cap-
 ita, not per pupil, as the measure of local fiscal capacity. In cities the school-age popula-
 tion is generally a smaller proportion of the total population than in suburbs. Thus, city
 education spending may appear higher than suburban spending if both are measured
 per capita but lower if both are measured per pupil. State aid that focuses on equalizing
 spending per capita will help suburbs and rural areas; only if the aid program focuses on
 spending per pupil will cities benefit more than suburbs. See, e.g., Bossert, Education in
 Urban Society, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life 299 (D. Street & Associates,
 eds. 1978).
 158. See S. Sacks, supra note 155, at 92.
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 suburb has contributed to the ideological commitment to local auton-
 omy that is a hallmark of our localism.
 C. Changing Paradigms: The Suburb and the Legal Concept of the City
 Much as local government law has contributed to suburban inde-
 pendence, the localist structure of state-local relations may be seen as
 reflecting the emergence of the suburb as a distinct, if not dominant,
 form of contemporary urban community. Contemporary courts and
 legislators frequently appear to model their notions of local govern-
 ments on the small size, homogeneous populations and residential na-
 ture of suburbs. Questions of local power are often resolved by an
 implicit reliance on the idealized residential suburb as the paradigm
 locality. In a sense, "the city as a legal concept," has become a suburb,
 and this has contributed to the broad judicial deference to local auton-
 omy elaborated in Part I.159
 The essence of the suburban model is the association of local gov-
 ernment with the values of home and family. The suburb, the most
 common form of local government today, is conceived of as a small,
 primarily middle-class residential community, a place for domestic con-
 sumption rather than industrial production and a haven from the heart-
 less political and economic world beyond local borders. The central
 function of local government is to protect the home and family-en-
 abling residents to raise their children in "decent" surroundings, ser-
 vicing home and family needs and insulating home and family from
 undesirable changes in the surrounding area.
 This association of the municipal corporation with home and fam-
 ily provides a stronger foundation for legal localism than did the older
 notion of the locality as a complex urban ministate. At the same time, it
 obscures the perception of local government as a state institution and
 thus erodes the longstanding legal rule that local government actions
 are attributable to the state. In cases of head-to-head conflict with the
 state or of clear local violations of constitutional norms, the legal status
 of localities as state subdivisions will operate to limit local power. But
 when local governments conflict with individuals, particularly outsid-
 ers, or even when local governments prove fiscally unable to fulfill their
 responsibilities, then, so long as constitutional norms limiting govern-
 ment power are not clearly at issue, the locality may be seen as an agent
 not of the state but of local families, acting to defend the private sphere
 surrounding home and family.
 The frequent linkage of local government to home and family leads
 to a deferential or protective attitude toward local power and a reluc-
 tance to mandate state intervention in local arrangements. As exten-
 sions of home and family, local governments appear to be less of a
 threat to personal liberty and less subject to central state control.
 159. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-58, 85-111.
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 Rather, local governments merit legal protection because of their close
 association with the home and family interests of their residents.'60
 This is clear from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,'6' not simply in the holding sustaining
 local zoning authority to exclude nontraditional households,'62 but in
 the Court's broader evocation of local government as a kind of moat
 protecting home and family from the crime, congestion and alien influ-
 ences of the outside world.'63 The local government in Belle Terre was
 an extension of the home, not an arm of the state, a defender of the
 family rather than an oppressor of individual liberty.'64 The locality's
 exclusion of people who practiced an alternative lifestyle was unobjec-
 tionable because it was seen as an action similar to that of a family
 choosing not to welcome an unwanted guest into its home. Nor was
 Belle Terre's authority undermined by its position as a component of
 an economically and socially heterogeneous and interdependent metro-
 politan region. Rather, the village was, in Justice Douglas's words, "a
 sanctuary for people," 165 a sort of national park for homes and families
 threatened by state power and urban ills.
 The idea of local government as a "sanctuary for people" helps
 explain judicial and legislative support for local autonomy in zoning
 and school finance. Of all government activities, land use regulation
 and education have perhaps the greatest implications for home and
 family; these are the areas in which the local government as suburb may
 be presumed to be most effective in vindicating home and family
 values.166
 In the exclusionary zoning setting, as noted in the previous sec-
 tion, the new suburban paradigm was critical in redefining the concept
 of a residential area and of the role of local government in protecting
 "the well-being of our most important institution, the home."167
 160. Elazar points out, "Suburbia has become the equal of small-town America as
 the symbol of the country's grassroots." D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 12.
 161. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
 162. See id. at 7-10.
 163. See id. at 9.
 164. In her discussion of Belle Terre, Professor Radin links the defense of the home
 to the concept of "personhood." She writes that "[o]ur reverence for the sanctity of the
 home is rooted in the understanding that the home is inextricably part of the individual,
 the family, and the fabric of society." Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev.
 957, 1013 (1982).
 165. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
 166. Suburban development has been closely associated with protection of homes
 and families. "The appeal of the suburbs had a great deal to do with anxiety about
 child-rearing, about giving one's children the space they needed yet controlling the peo-
 ple they met and what they did outside the home." G. Wright, Building the Dream: A
 Social History of Housing in America 210 (1981). Buder refers to this as "family territo-
 riality." See Buder, The Future of the American Suburbs, in Suburbia: The American
 Dream and Dilemma, supra note 130, at 193, 200.
 167. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 173, 89 A.2d 693,
 697 (1952); see supra text accompanying notes 89-120.
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 Courts justified local laws restricting land use to large, private, owner-
 occupied, single-family houses situated on large lots as home-protec-
 tion policies, with the courts implicitly accepting the suburban def-
 inition of "home." Even courts troubled by exclusionary zoning did
 not doubt the legitimacy of local efforts to support the socioeconomic
 interests of suburban homeowners.168
 The courts' underlying assumption that protecting the home re-
 quires policies that mandate an affluent homogeneity in the surround-
 ing community drew on the suburban model of local government,
 which differs profoundly from the traditional concept of a city as a place
 of diverse incomes, lifestyles and land uses. American cities are not
 exclusive communities but rather heterogeneous microcosms of the
 larger society that surrounds them. Judicial legitimation of local zoning
 that seeks residential homogeneity as a home-protection policy sug-
 gests the influence of suburban settlement patterns.'69 Even today,
 Mount Laurel 70 and a handful of cases like it notwithstanding, the asso-
 ciation of home protection with local control and homogeneous resi-
 dential communities remains powerful.
 Similarly, the school finance cases171 reflect the influence of the
 suburban model and the transformation of local government from
 subordinate arm of the state to protector of family interests. For many
 courts the central issue in these cases was not interlocal inequality but
 local control. The courts that defended local control, accepted wealth-
 based spending differences and rejected demands that the states
 assume a greater fiscal responsibility did so not because of any assump-
 tion that local governments possessed technical superiority in funding
 or operating schools but because they equated local control with paren-
 tal involvement in the education of children. Not only would local con-
 trol permit a larger parental role than under a system providing for
 greater state responsibility, but local control was also treated, at least
 metaphorically, as identical to parental control.172
 168. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
 608-09, 557 P.2d 473, 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 56-57 (1976); see also Robert E.
 Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 414 N.E.2d 680, 683,
 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183 (1980) (large lot zoning is an appropriate means to assure open
 space and protect locality "from the ill-effects of urbanization"), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
 1042 (1981).
 169. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 39-41; supra text accompanying notes 160-168.
 170. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 NJ.
 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 48-55.
 171. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-39 (discussing cases).
 172. See Lujan v. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo. 1982); Thompson
 v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 803, 537 P.2d 635, 645 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
 57 N.Y.2d 27, 46, 439 N.E.2d 359, 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 652 (1982), appeal dismissed,
 459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 377-78, 390 N.E.2d
 813, 820 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). Treating local school districts as
 surrogates for local parents, some courts were quick to reject arguments for equalizing
 school spending and imposing limits on spending by more affluent districts based on
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 The association of local control over school financing with family
 or parental control of education may be more likely to occur when sub-
 urbs, not cities, are the focus of attention. The association may, in fact,
 be more accurate when applied to the suburbs. Residents of suburban
 communities focus on family and school issues; schools and taxes,
 along with land use, are the chief subjects of suburban political dis-
 course.173 Suburban school districts tend to be smaller and have
 smaller bureaucracies than urban ones, so the structure of suburban
 school governance makes it easier for suburban parents and families to
 get involved in educational decision-making than it is for their counter-
 parts in the cities.74 Suburban districts also commonly have more
 money to spend on local needs. Local tax revenues are devoted pri-
 marily to schools, and the smaller percentage of suburban children who
 are poor, who do not speak English, come from broken homes or need
 special educational assistance in the suburbs minimizes the local need
 for outside financial support. For cities, local fiscal autonomy-in edu-
 cation as in other areas-is often an illusion, and parents' interests
 would be better served by greater state fiscal responsibility for local
 schools.
 Local control of education is more likely to be seen as a means of
 protecting the family interest in public schools if suburbs, rather than
 cities, are the norm in thinking about local governments. The ten-
 dency to conceptualize local government after the model of suburbs as
 centers of families and homes facilitates the equation of local control
 with family control, encourages deference to state decisions devolving
 educational, administrative and financial responsibilities to the local
 level and makes it more difficult for concerns about interlocal inequality
 and the external effects of local actions to overcome the decentraliza-
 tion endemic to the system.
 This "suburbanization" of local government law suggests that ex-
 clusionary zoning and school finance, rather than being weak links in
 the localist system of state-local relations,175 may have been the most
 problematic subjects for seeking to challenge the dominant pattern of
 state decentralization of regulatory authority and financial responsibil-
 federal or state equal protection grounds. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973) ("In part, local control means ... the freedom to
 devote more money to the education of one's children"); see also Briffault, supra note 1,
 at 29-30.
 173. See R. Wood, supra note 24, at 186-94. A higher percentage of suburban
 than city residents are families with school age children and a greater percentage of tax
 dollars is devoted to local schools in the suburbs than in big cities. See W. Colman,
 supra note 37, at 51-53. "In the suburbs, schools comprise a central institution around
 which community ties form, often because the school is the first and most important
 institution in the new community." Bossert, supra note 157, at 302.
 174. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 104-18. But see Bossert, supra note 157,
 at 302 (despite centrality of schools to suburban community life and structures facilitat-
 ing parental participation in school governance, rates of participation are low).
 175. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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 ity for basic public services. By focusing on the largest and most expen-
 sive public service and the most important local regulatory authority,
 law reformers may have thought they were spotlighting the inequalities
 and inefficiencies built into the localist system of state-local relations.
 Yet schools are the public service most bound up with the idea of fam-
 ily, and zoning is the regulatory function most likely to signal "home"
 to courts attentive to suburban values. As the subjects most likely to
 trigger localist concerns in courts and legislators, schools and homes
 may be questionable candidates for attempts to reduce local autonomy
 or increase the state role in decisions affecting the metropolitan
 area.176
 Beyond the issue of local powers and responsibilities, the identifi-
 cation of local government with the small, homogeneous residential
 community and the values of home and family may have contributed to
 the courts' tendency to downplay the "createdness" of local govern-
 ments. Although traditional doctrine provides that local governments
 exist only because of an act of creation by the state-with the implica-
 tion that they hold their powers on behalf of the state-many of the
 cases reviewed in Part I177 take local governments and their powers as
 givens rather than as products of conscious choices by states to struc-
 ture governmental power in a particular way.
 Thus, several state courts, in resisting the claim that the education
 articles of their state constitutions imposed a fiscal or administrative
 obligation, looked to state history and found that local school districts
 and local fiscal responsibility predated the constitutional obligation to
 provide public schools and may even have predated statehood itself.178
 The rejection of the redrawing of school district boundary lines or the
 restructuring of districts to promote greater interdistrict wealth equal-
 ity or racial integration suggests a view of local school districts as some-
 how organically connected to local parents and not as state-created
 boundaries dividing the larger metropolitan community.179
 176. See, e.g., Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem
 of Local Legitimacy, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 837, 911 (1983).
 177. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-58 (reviewing cases).
 178. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1021 (Colo. 1982);
 Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 803, 537 P.2d 635, 645 (1975); Hornbeck v.
 Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 654, 458 A.2d 758, 788 (1983); Board of
 Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 377, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (1979); Olsen v. State,
 276 Or. 9, 24-25, 554 P.2d 139, 147 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 427, 399
 A.2d 360, 367 (1979); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 570-72, 247 N.W.2d 141, 150-52
 (1976).
 179. The question of the nature of suburban school districts-whether they are lo-
 cal or arms of the state-was at the center of the division of the United States Court of
 Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc in the Kansas City school desegregation
 case, Jenkins ex rel. Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (plurality opinion),
 cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). The dissenters would have approved a metropolitan
 area-wide interdistrict remedy because (1) the state of Missouri had been found liable
 for having previously required and supported segregated schools in Kansas City and (2)
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 Local school autonomy, in a sense, became pregovernmental. The
 New York Court of Appeals, in denying that the state had any responsi-
 bility to remedy interlocal taxing and public service inequalities, ex-
 plained: "[T]he cited inequalities existing in cities are the product of
 demographic, economic, and political factors intrinsic to the cities
 themselves, and cannot be attributed to legislative action or inac-
 tion"180-as if the state were not responsible for the rules limiting city
 expansion and facilitating the formation of independent, exclusionary
 suburbs. Similarly, in New Jersey, the Robinson v. Cahill181 Court ex-
 cused the state from having to equalize spending across district lines so
 long as interdistrict spending disparities were not mandated by the
 state but rather resulted from seemingly natural interdistrict variations
 in wealth.182 The United States Supreme Court's hostility to interdis-
 trict remedies for educational and housing disparities, as illustrated by
 Milliken v. Bradley 183 and Hills v. Gautreaux,184 suggests the Court's ac-
 ceptance of suburban governments as independent entities, defenders
 of local families and homes, rather than as creatures of the state, acting
 on behalf of the state in their local territories.185
 the suburban school districts were arms of the state, and therefore could be included in
 the Kansas City remedy. As Chief Judge Lay wrote in dissent,
 While it is true that the [suburban school districts ("SSDs")] may have some
 authority to act independently, that authority is delegated to them by the state
 and the state retains ultimate authority over the SSDs' actions. The SSDs exist
 pursuant to provisions of the Missouri constitution, are maintained at the plea-
 sure of the Missouri legislature, and are subject to the authority of state statutes
 and the rules and regulations of the Missouri State Board of Education.
 Id. at 699 n.6 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
 The plurality, however, relied on the finding of the district court that "the SSDs
 were autonomous and independent" and that "the establishment and maintenance of
 school district boundaries was a local matter in Missouri, determined through local initi-
 ative," id. at 668, 678, to reject the argument that the state's liability could provide a
 basis for forcing the suburban districts to participate in a metropolitan area plan to de-
 segregate the schools in Kansas City.
 180. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 41, 439 N.E.2d 359, 365, 453
 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (1982); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 28.
 181. 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 31-35.
 182. See Robinson, 62 NJ. at 499-500, 303 A.2d at 286.
 183. 418 U.S. 717 (1974), discussed in Briffault, supra note 1, at 94-96.
 184. 425 U.S. 284, 303-06 (1976) (upholding lower court remedial order requiring
 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to site public housing
 projects in Chicago suburbs in part because HUD could not build housing without ap-
 proval by locality where proposed site was located); see Briffault, supra note 1, at
 106-07.
 185. The move from local school districts as creatures of the state to local districts
 as possessors of a kind of organic independence was made with little discussion in
 Milliken. Early in the opinion, the Court, in summarizing the district court's findings
 concerning the state of Michigan's liability for segregation in the Detroit school system,
 noted: "School districts in the State of Michigan are instrumentalities of the State and
 subordinate to its State Board of Education and legislature." 418 U.S. at 726 n.5. The
 Court cites as authorities the provision of the state constitution directing the legislature
 to " 'maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools,' "
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 Of course, not all courts have adopted the suburban model of local
 government. The state courts that invalidated local property-tax-based
 school finance systems did so, in part, by harkening back to the tradi-
 tional notion of local governments as arms of the state. Treating edu-
 cation as the responsibility of the state and emphasizing that local
 school districts were created to carry out the state's educational duty,
 these courts held the state accountable for interlocal spending differ-
 ences and mandated state action to improve the quality of education in
 the poorest districts.186 Similarly, the handful of courts that challenged
 exclusionary zoning returned to the concept of local power as dele-
 gated state power, and held that exclusionary measures could be invali-
 dated since there was no state interest in local exclusion.187 The Mount
 Laurel doctrine, mandating that developing suburbs plan and provide
 for their "fair share" of regional low- and moderate-income housing
 needs, 88invoked the older notion of the locality as a microcosm of the
 id. (quoting Mich. Const. art. 8, ? 2), and two Michigan Supreme Court decisions from
 the first decade of the twentieth century that took the black-letter law position that
 " '[t]he school district is a State agency .... of legislative creation' " and " 'no part of
 the local self-government.'" Id. (quoting Attorney Gen. ex. rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 131
 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W. 289, 290 (1902); Attorney Gen. ex. rel. Zacharias v. Detroit Bd.
 of Educ., 154 Mich. 584, 590, 118 N.W. 606, 609 (1908)).
 A few pages later, in finding that the separate existence of the suburban school
 districts immunized them from involvement in any remedial plan for the desegregation
 of the Detroit schools, the Court took a very different position on the autonomy of
 school districts. The Court stated that the district court's
 analytical starting point was its conclusion that school district lines are no more
 than arbitrary lines on a map drawn "for political convenience." Boundary
 lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for
 interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be casually ig-
 nored or treated as mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history
 of public education in our country. . . . [L]ocal autonomy has long been
 thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support
 for public schools and to quality of the educational process.
 Id. at 741-42. At this point, the Court cited various Michigan statutes providing for the
 popular election of school boards, giving control of the "day-to-day affairs of the school
 district" to the local board and spelling out local school board authority. Id. at 742 n.20
 (citing Michigan Schools Code of 1956 (current version at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
 ?? 380.1-380.1853 (1988 & Supp. 1989))). Local autonomy in practice proved to be
 more constitutionally significant than the formal status of school districts as state
 instrumentalities.
 186. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 603, 487 P.2d 1241, 1254, 96 Cal.
 Rptr 601, 614 (1971), ("[g]overnmental action drew the school district boundary
 lines ...."); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 501-521, 303 A.2d 273, 287-98 (1973).
 187. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
 Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 601, 607, 557 P.2d 473, 483, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 51, 55
 (1976); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 NJ. 158,
 209, 456 A.2d 390, 415 (1983); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
 Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 174-77, 336 A.2d 713, 725-26, appeal dismissed and cert.
 denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); cf. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 189, 382
 A.2d 105, 108 (1977) (state's interest in having each municipality bear its "fair share" of
 growth requires heightened scrutiny of antigrowth zoning ordinances).
 188. Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. at 178-88, 336 A.2d at 727-34.
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 larger society. Mount Laurel sought to require suburbs-as political
 arms of the state-to wield their state-delegated zoning power to allow
 people of different backgrounds to live among them and become so-
 cially and economically integrated communities.
 Belle Terre189 and Mount Laurel exemplify the different approaches
 to local government and to the relationship between locality and state.
 Both have a place in thinking about local government law. Local gov-
 ernments are state-created and state-empowered, yet particularly re-
 sponsive to local residents' social concerns. Local governments can be
 heterogeneous microcosms of the larger society or class-segregated
 residential enclaves. But as the review of the law in the areas of school
 finance, land use and local government formation indicates,190 the ap-
 proach taken in Belle Terre appears to be dominant.191 And the power
 of the Belle Terre approach is consonant with the role of the suburb as a
 paradigm for thinking about local governments.
 The argument that the legal conceptualization of the city as a sub-
 urb may have contributed to the tendency of courts to affirm the localist
 structure of the law is an ironic counterpoint to Gerald Frug's conten-
 tion that local governments lack power, and that local powerlessness is
 attributable to changes in "the legal concept" of the city-but to
 changes very different from the ones identified here.
 The gist of Frug's argument is that in the eighteenth and early
 nineteenth centuries, cities enjoyed considerable legal power, in part
 because the word "corporation" in the term "municipal corporation"
 had legal significance. In that era, the city was akin to a closely held
 corporation, combining economic and political authority.'92 The state
 was not hierarchically superior to the city, nor was the city merely a
 political subdivision of the state. Rather, the city was conceived of as an
 independent association of its constituents, more like a church, a uni-
 189. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see Briffault, supra note 1,
 at 101-04; supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.
 190. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-111.
 191. Even in New Jersey, Mount Laurel's vision of the local government as a re-
 gional microcosm was expressly modified by the legislature, which authorized suburbs
 to contract out of their Mount Laurel obligation to absorb their fair share of regional
 housing needs by making payments to other, presumably less exclusive communities.
 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 54-55. A New Jersey deputy public advocate has been
 quoted as stating that the regional agreements do not permit a challenge to exclusionary
 local practices but instead " 'have the effect of reinforcing racial stratification.' " Han-
 ley, Open Housing is Mired in Lawsuits Again, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at B1, B4, col.
 3.
 The state supreme court decisions invalidating school finance systems, see Briffault,
 supra note 1, at 36-38, indicate that the relationship between the two models continues
 to evolve, and that, with respect to education, the legal model requiring the states to
 take greater responsibility for the operation of the state-local system may come to play a
 larger role.
 192. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1095-99. Frug writes that
 colonial towns did not have charters and may not have been corporations in the techni-
 cal sense, but that they were "conceived of as corporations." Id. at 1098.
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 versity or a guild-or a modern business corporation.'93
 Frug argues that in the nineteenth century courts came to deny the
 autonomy of cities and to downgrade the significance of a municipal-
 ity's corporate status.194 The city ceased to be an association of its
 members and became instead a mere subdivision of the state, subject to
 extensive state regulation and control. City powers were limited to
 those expressly provided by state legislation, and were circumscribed
 by Dillon's Rule.195 City autonomy fell victim to the view of municipali-
 ties as inferior creatures of the states, and states became free to inter-
 vene in municipal matters.
 According to Frug, the change in the legal concept of the city can
 be attributed to the emergence of liberal ideas that sought to vest a
 unitary political sovereignty in the state legislature and strengthen the
 bonds directly linking the state and the individual. Once the state be-
 came the fundamental unit of political association, Frug contends,
 there was no room for political bodies that operated independently.196
 Thus, the municipality was transformed into a subordinate arm of the
 state, and its powers, political processes and regulatory goals limited to
 those the state chose to give it. Moreover, municipal action became
 subject to the constitutional rules that limited state regulatory and eco-
 nomic activity.197 The demotion of the municipality from autonomous
 corporation to state subdivision curbed the scope of municipal action
 and restricted the ability of municipalities to engage in entrepreneurial
 activity.198
 193. The corporate city did not just regulate the private use of local land; it owned
 substantial local property and developed that property for overarching public purposes.
 The city did not just administer state laws locally, but legislated independently over a
 broad range of subjects for its own constituents, and its charter and corporate status
 insulated it from state interference with internal municipal affairs. See generally H.
 Hartog, Public Property and Private Power 1-60 (1983).
 194. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1099-1109.
 195. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing Dillon's Rule).
 196. Early American cities were not particularly democratic. Indeed, early nine-
 teenth century state legislatures were hostile to the municipal corporation of the time, in
 part because of property or wealth requirements for the municipal franchise. These
 requirements inspired the view that municipal corporations were citadels of entrenched
 privilege to be stormed by state governments as the guardians of democratic control.
 State legislative intervention was not seen as outside intervention in the local polity but
 rather as democratization of municipal governance. See generally J. Teaford, The Mu-
 nicipal Revolution in America 79-90 (1975) (discussing increasing role of state legisla-
 tures in supervising municipal affairs).
 197. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1099-1120.
 198. Going beyond Frug's argument, the changing legal image of the city in the
 nineteenth century was followed by political, economic and social changes that con-
 firmed the judicial tendency to support strong state controls over local governments.
 See, e.g., Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of
 the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 477-79 (1987). Immigration and industrial
 growth created sharp distinctions between the people, politics and ways of life of the big
 cities and the rest of the state. The city came to be perceived as a noisy, dirty, crowded,
 foreign and politically corrupt place. Many city taxpayers and residents of older, Yankee
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 Frug fails to note that the nineteenth century view of the great cit-
 ies was not consistently negative. The city's political, economic and so-
 cial complexity, the density of its internal interactions, the distinctive
 cast of its problems and the enormous differences between urban and
 rural areas during this period of rapid economic and demographic
 change provided some justification for city autonomy. Underlying the
 contemporary home rule movement was the belief that the city needed
 a government responsive to its particular needs and that it could sus-
 tain a diverse local public life.199
 The coexistence of home rule and Dillon's Rule reflected, and con-
 tinues to reflect, this tension between two views of the city: a complex
 local polity, entitled to self-governance and capable of supporting a lo-
 cal political system; and an administrative arm of the state, and as such
 both a potential threat to individual liberty and a hierarchically
 subordinate institution subject to state control. These developments
 concurrently justified and constrained local autonomy. But neither ur-
 ban development nor legal modelling ended with World War I. The
 municipal corporation has been transformed again, this time from city
 to suburb-from local government as political, social and economic mi-
 crocosm to local government as middle-class residential refuge.200
 stock became political minorities in the cities they once controlled and may have felt
 greater kinship with the interests and values of the nonurban parts of the state than with
 the immigrant-dominated machines. These traditional urban elites opposed municipal
 spending and revenue-raising programs, so that for them state limitations on municipal
 taxing, borrowing and spending were no interference with their political freedom but
 rather a defense against the encroachments of corrupt local governments. See generally
 M. Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America,
 1860-1920, at 88-132 (1977). At the same time, the emigration of these groups from
 the city to the outlying suburbs provided the political basis for the legal changes facilitat-
 ing suburban incorporation and permitting suburbanites to resist annexation. See, e.g.,
 J. Teaford, supra note 53, at 82-84; supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
 The legal concept of the city as a junior political institution, then, was reinforced by
 a negative perception of the city as a social entity.
 199. See M. Schiesl, supra note 198, at 6-24 ;J. Teaford, supra note 87, at 103-22.
 200. As political scientists and sociologists have noted, contemporary suburbia,
 considered as a whole, is no longer exclusively residential or middle class, but it is in-
 stead marked by considerable functional and demographic diversity. See, e.g., M.
 Baldassare, supra note 22, at 30-31, 49-50; R. Fishman, supra note 51, at 182-207; J.
 Harrigan, supra note 18, at 249-52; J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 187-92.
 Yet, as these scholars also point out, "the suburban image" of a "white middle class
 settlement" "is so strong as to be engraved in America's collective memory." M.
 Baldassare, supra note 22, at 30; accordJ. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 249 ("our think-
 ing about suburbs is in many ways still dominated by several myths that .... portrayed
 suburbia as a large dormitory ...."). It is this image, not current practice, that affected
 the conceptualization of suburbs which appears in local government law. Moreover, the
 suburban myth may have more closely approximated suburban reality in the early and
 middle decades of the century when the suburbs, and legal status of the suburbs, were
 first being formed. M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 6. Perhaps once the changes affect-
 ing suburbia are more widely understood, the hold of the traditional suburban model
 will weaken and a new approach to local governments-one that recognizes the frag-
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 Adding the two earlier views of the city to the current concept of
 local government as suburb suggests that there are three concepts
 of local government at work in the law today: the traditional standard
 of local government as arm of the state; the "city" idea of local govern-
 ment as a diverse, urban polity-a state in microcosm; and the subur-
 ban notion of local government as the site, and virtual extension, of
 home and family. Exclusive focus on local government as state subdivi-
 sion leads to the assumption that the legal system provides no place for
 local control. When combined with the further assumption that most
 local governments are cities, it is easy to indict local government law for
 failing to provide political autonomy to those urban polities clearly ca-
 pable of local self-government. But when attention is given to the third
 model, a different picture emerges. Within the constraints of the for-
 mal, underlying authority of the state, suburbs enjoy substantial legal
 autonomy.
 As was suggested at the beginning of this Part, legal theory must
 attend to the wide variety of places captured within the broad category
 of local government, especially the economic and social differences that
 distinguish cities from suburbs. As cities have been the focus of tradi-
 tional writing about local governments, this section and the two which
 preceded it have sought to underscore the importance of suburbs, the
 fit between local powers and suburban interests, the role of the law in
 promoting and protecting suburban autonomy and the role of the sub-
 urbs in the shaping of local government law. An understanding of the
 place of the suburbs in the legal landscape is crucial to the critical de-
 scription of the scope of local legal authority and to an analytical ac-
 count of how a body of law ostensibly built around a state-centered
 theory evolved into a strongly local-oriented set of powers, practices
 and institutions.
 The salience of the suburbs, in fact and in law, must also be taken
 into account in addressing the question of how broad local powers
 ought to be. Much of the contemporary case for expanding local power
 relies on the traditional association of local government with city, and
 on the presumed difference between the city and the state. Once
 greater attention is paid to the significance of the suburbs and to in-
 terlocal differences, the argument for greater localism becomes consid-
 erably more problematic.
 D. The "Polis" and the "Firm, " or Two Tales of the City
 Contemporary normative discourse about the proper scope of lo-
 cal autonomy is dominated by two theories which-although they pro-
 ceed from distinctive premises, are phrased in different rhetoric and
 represent separate scholarly traditions-converge on the general prop-
 mentation of metropolitan areas and the significance of interlocal wealth differences, see
 infra text accompanying notes 369-380-will emerge.
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 osition that local autonomy should be protected and enhanced. The
 two arguments emphasize different fundamental values: participation
 in public life in the one and efficiency in the provision of public sector
 goods and services in the other. Similarly, the theories rely on con-
 trasting metaphors for the central mechanism of local public life:
 "voice" in the one case and "exit" in the other.20' Yet the two tales
 told by political and economic theorists share a common commitment
 to localism.
 This Section sketches out these arguments, political and economic,
 for local autonomy, and then examines their relative strengths and
 weaknesses, their points of agreement and their common failings. It
 attempts to show that the two localist theories, whether considered sep-
 arately or taken together, fail to provide a compelling normative basis
 for an ideological commitment to localism.
 1. Localism and Participation: Local Government as "Polis." - As
 Clayton Gillette has written, "[p]articipation is again in the air. Appar-
 ently fueled by current debates concerning decentralized power and re-
 publican versus pluralist traditions in our political and legal theory,
 those concerned with political decisionmaking have turned their atten-
 tion to calls for increased public involvement in the process."202 The
 argument for enhancing opportunities for individuals to participate in
 politics has been strongly tied to local autonomy.
 The centerpiece of legal scholarship advancing the link between
 political participation and local government is Gerald Frug's The City as
 a Legal Concept.203 Frug's thesis has three parts: (i) individual participa-
 201. The source of this typology of mechanisms for collective decisionmaking is A.
 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
 States (1970).
 202. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government
 Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 930, 930 (1988).
 203. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6; see Frug, Empowering Cities, supra
 note 6, at 563-66; Frug, Property and Power: Hartog on the Legal History of New York
 City, 1984 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 673, 687-90 [hereinafter "Property and Power"].
 Frug's work, particularly its commitment to decentralized decision making as a basis
 for "devising viable alternative visions of society," Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Poli-
 tics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought,
 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 230 (1984), has become an integral part of the Critical Legal Stud-
 ies canon, although the endorsement of participation and the connection to local power
 has not been limited to proponents of Critical Legal Studies.
 On the place of Frug's work on local government in the body of Critical Legal Stud-
 ies scholarship, see M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 206-12 (1987) (Frug
 situated in the Critical Legal Studies movement's consideration of legal process and
 institutional issues); Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293, 302 & n.28 (1984) (Frug an
 example of a Critical Legal Studies thinker who proposes "concrete" reforms); Presser,
 Some Realism About Orphism or the Critical Legal Studies Movement and the New
 Great Chain of Being: An English Legal Academic's Guide to the Current State of
 American Law, 79 Nw. U.L. Rev. 869, 892 & n.86 (1985) (calling Frug's examination of
 local government as a form of "intermediate association" one of the "most prominent
 example[s]" of "the noblest . . . work" in Critical Legal Studies scholarship); Sparer,
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 tion in public decision making is an important political value, yet op-
 portunities for participation are inadequate and declining; (ii)
 individual involvement can occur only in small political units, primarily
 local governments; and (iii) individuals will participate in local politics
 only if there is "a genuine transfer of power" to local government.
 Frug thus moves from asserting the value of popular participation in
 politics to making a normative claim for greater local legal power.204
 Frug's argument for political participation is couched in terms of
 benefits to the individual and the society. Indeed, individual and social
 welfare are intertwined, with political participation seen as enhancing
 both the lives of the participants and the welfare of the polity that pro-
 motes it. Following Hannah Arendt,205 Frug and other participation
 theorists return to the concept of "public freedom'-the ability to par-
 ticipate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life."206
 Frug claims that modern society allows "little opportunity ... for the
 individual to create his own material life, determine his own political
 future, or form his own ideas from personal experience."207 Political
 participation can thus serve as a remedy for this condition, a form of
 personal empowerment and an antidote to the anomie and alienation of
 modern mass society. Moreover, since political issues are collective is-
 sues, individuals involved in politics will be compelled to discuss, delib-
 erate and debate with each other. They will have to listen to each
 other's positions, learn the arts of persuasion and compromise and en-
 gage in what Frug refers to as "a conversation designed to find a satis-
 Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly
 Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, 510 & n.4 (1984)
 (Frug "is the leading work in American legal literature on decentralized government au-
 thority."); Williams, supra note 198, at 477-79 (criticizing Frug's local government work
 but calling it "extremely influential in CLS circles").
 Other legal scholars who justify local power at least partially in terms of participa-
 tion include Gillette, supra note 202, at 952 ("[O]nly at the local level [can] the mass of
 individuals . . . fully participate and realize their potential."); Gillette, Fiscal Federalism
 and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1030, 1076-78 (1983)
 ("Given the distance between electors and elected at the state and national levels, local
 politics remains the last bastion of political participation."); Libonati, Reconstructing
 Local Government, 19 Urb. Law. 645, 651-52 (1987) (discussing impact of "communal-
 ist thinking" on local autonomy); Rose, supra note 176, at 883-84 ("Participation or
 voice is a particularly venerable legitimator of local government.").
 Contemporary "civic republican" political theory also justifies expanded local
 power in terms of political participation. See, e.g., S. Elkin, supra note 32, at 10,
 105-07, 146-83 (treating cities as "formative institutions" that provide citizens with op-
 portunities for participating in self-government).
 204. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1068-70.
 205. H. Arendt, On Revolution (1963).
 206. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1068 (quoting H. Arendt, supra
 note 205, at 114-15, 119-20).
 207. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1069. According to Jane
 Mansbridge, participatory democracy fills "human needs." J. Mansbridge, Beyond Ad-
 versary Democracy 4 (1980).
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 factory resolution of differences ...."208 Participation, it is asserted,
 will improve the relationship between the self and others and so
 strengthen the fellow feeling within a community.
 In addition, through political participation it is hoped that people
 will learn about the issues, processes and institutions of government.
 They will come to know their government better-how to use it and
 how to control it. Participation is an education for self-government in a
 double sense: it equips people with the "individual attitudes and psy-
 chological qualities" that make self-government possible while provid-
 ing an opportunity for what Carole Pateman calls "practice in
 democratic skills and procedures."209 The expansion of opportunities
 for participation in public life becomes a way of saving the civic republi-
 can tradition from an elite-dominated, special-interest pluralism. Par-
 ticipation, it is suggested, will enable the people to reclaim their
 political birthright from professional politicians and will infuse public
 decision making with public-regarding values.
 Running through the work of Frug and the other writers who link
 participation and its attendant political, social and psychological bene-
 fits to local autonomy is what Robert Dahl called the "millennial ap-
 peal" of the Greek city-state.210 The "polis" metaphor is important,
 both as an invocation of a mythic, golden era in the history of democ-
 racy when political communities were small enough to give each citizen
 an effective voice and the citizenry exercised a collective role in politics
 and as a contemporary exhortation to vest power in today's cities.211
 The "tradition from Aristotle to Rousseau"212 associated democratic
 self-governance with urban states. Although the size and scale of a con-
 tinental polity like the United States limits the relevance of Periclean
 Athens, Rousseau's Geneva or the colonial New England town as a
 model for national governance,213 the longing for a greater degree of
 citizen involvement in public life has led many participation theorists to
 make the contemporary vestige of the polis-local government-a focal
 208. Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 6, at 559.
 209. C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 42 (1970).
 210. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 953, 954
 (1967). In the American setting, the longing for the polis is often transmuted into nos-
 talgia for the New England town meeting. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City En-
 ters., 426 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1976).
 211. Referring to another historical place that has become a metaphor for the
 shared values of participation and local empowerment, Ira Katznelson writes, "[v]isions
 of the high-medieval town perform an important ideological function for those who wish
 to distinguish a more satisfactory past from the present. Distinctions such as those be-
 tween Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, folk and urban, and tradition and modernity are used
 to distinguish a lost (but retrievable?) past from contemporary society." I. Katznelson,
 City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States 25-26
 (1981). Frug devotes considerable attention to the high-medieval town. See Frug, City
 as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1083-90.
 212. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1069.
 213. See Dahl, supra note 210, at 956-57.
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 point for efforts to advance participatory democracy.214
 Local governments are crucial arenas for participation because
 they are small in area and population-at least when compared to the
 state or nation. Frug asserts that "individual involvement in decision-
 making is impossible except on a small scale"215-and that means local
 governments. Small size facilitates the deliberative process, the ex-
 change of information and ideas that is at the heart of participation.
 Face-to-face interaction is possible only in small units.216 Furthermore,
 people in small units are believed to understand more about the issues
 at stake and know more about each other, both of which may facilitate
 public-spirited decision making.217 It is often assumed that people in
 smaller units are likely to have common interests and to share values
 and norms,218 and that, as a result, they may be willing to put aside
 individual self-interest for the local city's common good.219 In other
 words, localities may have a greater sense of community, which, it is
 assumed, will facilitate participatory decision making. Participation, in
 turn, is said to reinforce the sense of community that promotes greater
 local participation.220
 214. See, e.g., R. Dahl & E. Tufte, Size and Democracy 53-62 (1973); Dahl, supra
 note 210, at 963-64 ("[In pursuing the quest for] a unit that seems optimal for rational
 self government .... I think that we shall finally end up about at the place where the
 Greeks left off: somewhere within view of the democratic city."). Noting developments
 in communications technology, Benjamin Barber presents the relatively rare argument
 that participatory democracy is possible in large-scale institutions. B. Barber, Strong
 Democracy 260-98 (1984).
 215. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1069. Frug actually provides
 very little discussion of the link between small size and participation. He states simply,
 without citation, that "[o]ne step towards meeting th[e] objective" of increasing the de-
 gree of individual involvement in societal decision "is the reduction of the scale of deci-
 sionmaking, since limited size appears to be a prerequisite to individual participation in
 political life or at the workplace." Id.
 216. SeeJ. Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 281-85.
 217. Clayton Gillette puts it in economic terms: small size permits repeated inter-
 actions among identifiable members of the community. See Gillette, supra note 202, at
 984-85. Once people see that fellow community members are willing to look to the
 common good, they will also put community interest over self-interest. See id. at 965.
 Jane Mansbridge and Robert Wood make the same point but in different language.
 For Mansbridge, small size permits "face-to-face assembly" and the attendant benefits of
 "empathy and commitment to the common good." J. Mansbridge, supra note 207, at
 270, 275. Wood links the value of the small community to propinquity, interdepen-
 dence and common beliefs and background. From living close to each other people
 become familiar with each other's needs and characteristics; interdependence leads to
 good will and cooperation; shared goods and values are conducive to collective decision
 making. All three of these aspects facilitate participation, and all three are present in a
 small community. See R. Wood, supra note 24, at 266-67.
 218. See R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 13-14;J. Mansbridge, supra note
 207, at 270-73, 281; R. Wood, supra note 24, at 267-68.
 219. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 202, at 964-68.
 220. See P. Steinberger, Ideology and the Urban Crisis 67 (1985).
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 Furthermore, small size is important, it has been argued, because
 only in smaller units will people feel that their participation counts, that
 they can make a difference. At the national or state level, the individual
 may well conclude that his voice will be drowned out by millions of
 others, that her views will have only an infinitesimal effect on the out-
 come, and therefore that participation is futile. But where the unit is
 small, each individual can be heard by and can influence a significant
 portion of the community. In small units, each citizen has a greater
 share of power. The resulting enhanced sense of "citizen effective-
 ness"221 presumably will lead to more participation, which, by reinforc-
 ing the sense of effectiveness, will maintain and increase
 participation.222
 Although the link between local government and greater participa-
 tion is strong in theory, it is uncertain in fact. In a leading empirical
 study of the connection between unit size and political participation,
 Dahl and Tufte compared large and small democratic nations and
 found no general correlation between size and participation. They also
 looked within countries at units of the same legal type but different size
 and again found no general relationship between size and participa-
 tion.223 In the United States, it is common knowledge that voter turn-
 221. The term is from R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 41.
 222. Local governments are not the only small units. Many writers assert that the
 work place, rather than the local government, is the more likely place for the develop-
 ment of participation. See C. Pateman, supra note 209, at 45-102; see also J.
 Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 47-58, 139-48 (examining participation in both a New
 England town and a work place). Frug notes that work places as well as local govern-
 ments are of sufficiently small scale to provide opportunities for participation but be-
 lieves that decentralization of power is far more likely to occur in public institutions like
 governments than in private work places. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6,
 at 1148-49.
 Stephen Elkin makes a different argument for the empowerment of local govern-
 ments as opposed to other small institutions. He asserts that local governments are
 particularly well-suited for educating people in self-government because of the nature of
 the issues that come before local governments. Elkin writes:
 [S]truggle and debate over the public interest must be connected to the day-to-
 day vital interests of citizens .... Political argument about the public interest
 must be tied, then, to specific policy choices, and those choices must be of such
 a kind that at least the major dimensions are comprehensible to those involved;
 in the case of ordinary citizens, this means choices that involve such things as
 neighborhood matters, schools, the land-use patterns of their localities ....
 S. Elkin, supra note 32, at 153.
 Thus, as John Stuart Mill put it, participation at the local level is the "practical part
 of the political education of a free people." J.S. Mill, On Liberty 181 (Penguin ed.
 1974).
 223. R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 41-66. A study of political behavior in
 the suburbs of metropolitan Philadelphia found that participation was more directly cor-
 related with the income and education of residents than with the size of the jurisdiction.
 See C. Gilbert, Governing the Suburbs 275-77 (1967).
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 out is usually higher for presidential elections than for state-wide elec-
 tions, and greater for state-wide contests than for local ones.224
 Frug, however, suggests that the lack of empirical support for the
 claimed connection between unit size and participation is largely attrib-
 utable to the lack of local autonomy, which, he argues, characterizes
 American local government law.225 People will not engage in local
 politics, Frug contends, because local governments have little power.
 Enhanced participation requires not simply the existence of small units
 but the devolution of power to them. He claims that "[p]ower and par-
 ticipation are inextricably linked: a sense of powerlessness tends to
 produce apathy rather than participation, while the existence of power
 encourages those able to participate in its exercise to do so."226
 This insight is at the center of Frug's argument and links his posi-
 tive and normative critiques. Much of Frug's article attempts to sub-
 stantiate the assertion that local governments have little power, that the
 legal status of American cities has been in steady decline and that local
 government law has crippled the cities. "City powerlessness mat-
 ters,"227 he argues: it excuses the current low levels of participation in
 local politics and it justifies the call for greater local autonomy and the
 protection of local governments from state interference. Empower lo-
 calities, restrict the states from imposing their will on local units, and
 greater participation will result.228
 Political participation, thus, drives Frug's commitment to ex-
 panding local legal power. Greater local legal power and the decentral-
 ization of authority from the states to localities will give people a
 stronger voice in public decision making and a new ability to take
 charge of the decisions that affect their lives. In turn, greater local au-
 tonomy, by encouraging participation and giving people a sense of
 their capacity for governance, will affect the politics of the larger soci-
 224. Mansbridge's study of a Vermont town found that only about one-third of
 voters attended town meetings-this in a town with an adult population of approxi-
 mately 350, where the town meeting had plenary authority over zoning and school
 budgets. J. Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 47-48. This is consistent with other findings
 about participation in local elections. By comparison, even the recent low levels of voter
 participation in presidential elections have consistently exceeded 50%. See, e.g., N.
 Polsby & A. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections 14 (7th ed. 1988) (table) (turnout in presi-
 dential elections as a percentage of eligible voters was 60.9% in 1968, 55.2% in 1972,
 53.5% in 1976, 52.6% in 1980 and 53.3% in 1984); Berke, 50.16% Voter Turnout Was
 Lowest Since 1924, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1988, at 36, col. 1 (reporting preliminary find-
 ings concerning turnout of age-eligible Americans in 1988 presidential elections).
 225. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1067-71. But see Briffault,
 supra note 1, at 6-12 (critically discussing Frug's characterization of local government
 autonomy).
 226. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1070.
 227. Id. at 1067.
 228. See id. at 1073; see also S. Elkin, supra note 32, at 176 ("[U]nless political
 institutions touch on the day-to-day concerns of citizens, they will not succeed in placing
 citizens in a deliberative relation.").
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 ety. It will also, it is hoped, transform the people from apathetic on-
 lookers and occasional participants in the quadrennial choice among
 candidates representing a limited range of positions to active, public-
 spirited agents of change. The participationist case for local autonomy
 envisions local power as, ultimately, the key to the reformation of na-
 tional politics and the creation of a new, more vibrant public life.229
 2. Localism and Efficiency: Local Government as "Firm. " - Like localist
 participation theory, the principal economic analysis of local govern-
 ment also proceeds from a concern that the centralization of public
 power at the national level impairs the vindication of a fundamental
 norm. The economists' focus is on the lack of a market mechanism by
 which the national government can register and respond to individual
 preferences with respect to the types and levels of public goods and
 services.230 As a result, both the aggregate level of public goods and
 services and their mix are unlikely to correspond to public desires.231
 Given the government's coercive power and its monopoly over the pro-
 vision of public goods and services, taxpayers are likely to be compelled
 to pay for goods and services they do not want, and the overall opera-
 tion of the public sector will be inefficient.
 Like the participation theorists, the urban economists see the em-
 powerment of local governments as a way to overcome the perils of
 centralization. In his seminal article, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
 tures,232 Charles Tiebout hypothesizes that "'a market-type' solu-
 tion"233 exists to determine the a level and mix of government
 expenditures that are responsive to citizens' demands-but only at the
 local level. Tiebout argues that the local public sector is more likely to
 be efficient than the national government because at the local level peo-
 ple have more freedom to choose the services they want and to pay for
 229. See, e.g., Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1067-73, 1149 ("[A]
 restructuring of city power to promote a greater degree of 'public freedom' is the ratio-
 nale for an increase in city power.").
 230. See, e.g., Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416,
 416-18 (1956) (discussing work of Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson in public fi-
 nance theory).
 231. "No 'market type' solution exists to determine the level of expenditures on
 public goods." Id. at 416. Earlier writers suggested that because of the lack of an ade-
 quate mechanism to get citizens to reveal their preferences, and because of the free rider
 problem, public services would be underprovided or not "sold" at all. See id. at 417
 ("As things now stand, there is no mechanism to force the consumer-voter to state his
 true preferences; in fact, the 'rational' consumer will understate his preferences and
 hope to enjoy the goods while avoiding the tax."). Later public-choice writers empha-
 sized the ability of relatively small special interests to manipulate the process to get the
 public as a whole to pay to implement their agenda because the public as a whole was
 immobilized by steep barriers to collective action. See, e.g., J. Buchanan & G. Tullock,
 The Calculus of Consent 283-95 (1962); M. Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action 144
 (1971).
 232. Tiebout, supra note 230.
 233. Id. at 416.
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 just those services.234
 Tiebout's model does not rely on the small size of localities or the
 greater opportunities for participation in the local political process. In-
 deed, he has nothing to say about the inner workings of local govern-
 ment at all. Instead, he proceeds from two other characteristics of local
 governments that sharply differentiate them from the national govern-
 ment: their numbers, and the relative ease of individual movement
 from one locality to another.235
 The multiplicity of local governments in a metropolitan area
 means that, as long as each locality is free to adopt its own mix of ser-
 vices, regulations and charges, area residents will be offered a wide ar-
 ray of types and levels of public services and a wide variety of rates of
 taxation. By moving from one locality to another, an individual can
 select from among these diverse local tax, service and policy packages
 the one that best matches her interests. The multiplicity of local gov-
 ernments and the freedom of individuals to move among them together
 create a market in public services.
 Tiebout assumes that local governments play a relatively passive
 part in this market-type mechanism, presenting a variety of revenue and
 expenditure patterns that are "more or less set."236 The dynamic ele-
 ment in the public sector marketplace is the individual, or, in Tiebout's
 terminology, "the consumer-voter."237 The central mechanism for re-
 vealing public service preferences is relocation: "The act of moving or
 failing to move ... replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a
 good and reveals the consumer-voter's demand for public goods."238
 By settling in a particular locality, "[t]he consumer-voter may be viewed
 as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern
 for public goods."239 People decide on the taxes they want to pay and
 the type and level of services they want to receive by "shopping
 around" among the various localities in a given metropolitan area
 before "purchasing" by moving to the one that best fits their needs.
 The multiplicity of localities assures a range of choices and increases
 the likelihood that one locality will approximate the mobile consumer-
 voter's preferences.
 Since Tiebout first articulated his theory, the economic approach
 to local government has evolved from an assumption of purely passive
 localities to include an argument that consumer-voters influence local
 government policies, taxes and services. A consumer-voter is free to
 leave a locality that taxes her at a rate higher than she wants to pay,
 pursues policies she dislikes or funds services she does not want; she
 234. Id. at 418.
 235. Id. at 419.
 236. Id. at 418.
 237. Id. at 417.
 238. Id. at 420.
 239. Id. at 418.
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 can move to another locality that provides a more optimal mix of taxes
 and programs. A locality whose public policies are inconsistent with
 the preferences of too many of its residents or potential entrants will
 lose population and tax revenue. Such a locality will respond by cutting
 costs, reducing taxes and altering policies.240
 The addition to the model of activist local governments that com-
 pete with each other like private firms heightens the market-like fea-
 tures of interlocal relations.241 The freedom of taxpayers to exit and
 the availability in a metropolitan area of large numbers of local govern-
 ments as possible destinations restrain the monopolistic tendencies of
 government.242 Interlocal competition constrains taxing, spending and
 administrative inefficiency for all localities and thereby improves local
 government's general responsiveness to consumer-voter concerns
 while systematically holding down the aggregate cost of local
 government.243
 The urban economists' commitment to the efficiency value of local
 autonomy and interlocal competition has significant programmatic con-
 sequences. A basic premise of the Tiebout hypothesis is that localities
 can and must have the power to set the types and levels of public ser-
 vices they offer and must rely on local resources to fund their expendi-
 tures. The multiplicity of local governments would not promote
 efficiency unless each could set its own fiscal policies. Thus, urban
 economists support local decision-making authority over taxing and
 spending.
 Moreover, these economists strenuously oppose such traditional
 "good government" proposals as the consolidation of smaller localities
 into larger units,244 the creation of metropolitan-area-wide govern-
 ments,245 restrictions on the incorporation of new municipalities246
 and the transfer of responsibility for the provision of public services
 from localities to higher levels of government.247 Whereas traditional
 240. See, e.g., R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 53.
 241. See, e.g., V. Ostrom, R. Bish & E. Ostrom, supra note 24, at 206 ("[R]ivalry
 among local governments is analogous to rivalry among firms ....").
 242. See R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 30-31.
 243. See, e.g., P. Peterson, supra note 31, at 46-47.
 244. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 55; V. Ostrom, R. Bish & E. Ostrom,
 supra note 24, at 139-87.
 245. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 79-103; Wagner & Weber, Competition,
 Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 18J.L. & Econ.
 661, 672 (1975) (metropolitan-area-wide government can force taxpayer to pay for the
 "full line" of government services rather than allowing him to select among components
 of the government's "line"); Warren, A Municipal Services Market Model of Metropoli-
 tan Organization, 30 J. Am. Inst. Planners 193 (1964).
 246. See, e.g., Martin & Wagner, The Institutional Framework for Municipal Incor-
 poration: An Economic Analysis of Local Agency Formation Commissions in California,
 21 J.L. & Econ. 409, 414-16 (1978).
 247. See, e.g., Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, The Organization of Government in
 Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 831, 841-42 (1961).
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 political scientists warned that the fragmentation and overlap of local
 governments that characterize most metropolitan areas posed a threat
 to political accountability, these urban economists praise fragmentation
 and overlap for enhancing the capacity of the "metropolitan municipal
 services marketplace" to accommodate differences in personal prefer-
 ences for public goods and services and to generate the efficiencies that
 result from interlocal competition.248
 This endorsement of fragmentation and overlap follows directly
 from the Tiebout model. The multiplicity of local governments is sig-
 nificant not simply because it provides consumer-voters with a variety
 of public service and tax packages, but also because it facilitates the
 operation of Tiebout's central decision-making mechanism-con-
 sumer-voter mobility. The more governments there are in close prox-
 imity to each other, the easier it is for any individual to gather
 information, to compare the tax and service packages offered by each
 locality and to move from one to another. The greater the number of
 local government "firms" in competition, the more responsive each will
 be to the preferences of consumer-voters, and the more efficient local
 government will be.249
 Although Tiebout's localism is based primarily on the multiplicity
 of localities and the freedom of interlocal movement, other economists
 have also looked to the internal structure of localities to justify local
 autonomy. Like the political theorists, these economists emphasize the
 value of small size, contending that the costs of government correlate
 directly with the size of the governmental unit. Even without interlocal
 competition, they argue, government is likely to be more efficient at the
 local level because the costs of government will be lower.
 The costs of government include the costs of political transac-
 tions-the time and effort involved in the bargaining, debate and inter-
 actions that are necessary for a collective body to reach a decision-and
 the costs to individuals of government decisions that go against them.
 Bish refers to the former as decision-making costs and the latter as
 "political externality costs."250 Decision-making costs relate directly to
 the size of the polity. The larger the group, and the more interactions
 within it, the more time and effort a collective decision will require.
 Political externality costs may also increase with the size of the polity
 since bigger units are typically more heterogeneous. In heterogeneous
 units more people are likely to have preferences that diverge from the
 median, while in smaller, more homogeneous units, there may be less
 248. See, e.g., R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 71-75; V. Ostrom, R. Bish &
 E. Ostrom, supra note 24, at 83-95; Wagner & Weber, supra note 245, at 661, 684.
 249. See, e.g., Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note 247, at 838.
 250. R. Bish, supra note 142, at 35-37; see also J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra
 note 231, at 63-84 (applying economic theory to structures for political decision
 making).
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 internal disagreement.251
 The economic argument for small size and the reduction of polit-
 ical externality costs is reinforced by the Tiebout model. The multi-
 plicity of local governments and the mobility of consumer-voters, it is
 argued, mean that people will be drawn to localities providing the types
 and levels of services they prefer. The theory suggests that people will
 sort themselves out through free movement, settling in the localities
 that offer the taxes and services they want and leaving the localities
 whose taxation and service packages they dislike. As a result, localities
 will draw the people that most resemble existing local majorities, lose
 local dissenters and fail to attract people who do not agree with local
 public decisions. Localities will tend to become more homogeneous,
 thus reducing political externality costs within each jurisdiction.252 By
 facilitating local homogeneity, small size253 joins Tiebout's multiplicity
 and mobility factors in justifying local autonomy and the proliferation
 of local governments as the best means of promoting efficient
 government.
 3. The Two Tales Taken Together: The Uncertain Case for Local Auton-
 omy. - Despite their divergent intellectual provenances and differing
 normative first principles, the political and economic arguments for lo-
 calism have much in common. The two theories arrive at the same end
 point of advocating local autonomy and complement-and borrow
 from-each other along the way.
 Thus, participation theorists have on occasion relied on Tiebout's
 assumptions about the importance of interlocal personal mobility as an
 important rejoinder to the Madisonian attack on local power.254
 Madison's defense of the size of a continental republic based on the
 251. See R. Bish, supra note 142, at 51-52.
 252. See id. at 52.
 253. History demonstrates that small size does not always mean internal harmony.
 As Dahl observed about the classical Greek and medieval Italian city-states,
 [t]heir history is a tale of bitter conflicts and an almost total failure to develop
 effective institutions for settling political disputes by peaceful and constitu-
 tional means. Not only did they lack institutions for settling disputes between
 one city-state and another; they were not much better at settling internal con-
 flicts, which erupted with great frequency along all the lines of cleavage . . .
 family, kinship, neighborhood, occupation, class, religion. The outcome of
 political conflict was typically savage.
 R. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy 10 (1982).
 Although the conflicts were less intense, Mansbridge also found politics in Vermont
 marked by sharp cleavages, primarily between newcomers and old-timers. See J.
 Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 89-96.
 254. Cf. Rose, supra note 176, at 882-87 (weaving "voice" and "exit" concerns
 together to develop an anti-Madisonian legitimation of local decision making); Gillette,
 supra note 202, at 944-45 (noting that ease of exit at the local level "underlies de
 Tocqueville's esteem for decentralized administration" and that "exit from a locality
 that has acted invidiously is largely salutary, as it informs the original municipality that
 its policies require reform," though acknowledging the limits of the exit option in forc-
 ing changes in local decisions).
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 dangers of"factious combinations" and majoritarian tyranny in smaller
 polities has long posed a potent political counterweight to the
 Jeffersonian tradition of favoring the decentralization of power to local
 governments.255 Following Madison, political scientists have con-
 tended that dissenters find it more difficult to express their disagree-
 ments with political decisions and maintain their opposition in the face
 of majority pressures in smaller polities256 and that smaller govern-
 ments are more subject to factional domination than bigger or more
 populous jurisdictions.257
 Contemporary participation theorists, however, rely on the ease of
 exit from local governments to mitigate the tyranny latent in small
 units. Frug uses the economists' analogy of the city to the firm to argue
 that city politics are not coercive but voluntary since "no one is forced
 to live in a particular city any more than he is forced to work for, buy
 from, or invest in a particular corporation. ... In both cases, we can
 select which entity we prefer."258 It is easier to leave a particular city
 than the political or economic systems of the whole society.259 The ar-
 guments of Carol Rose for broader local discretion in land-use regula-
 tion and of Clayton Gillette for greater use of plebiscites in community
 decision making follow a similar structure of combining the values of
 "voice" and "exit": the greater possibility for participation and a more
 communitarian political process at the local level provide the affirma-
 tive argument for new local authority, while ease of exit answers the
 Madisonian criticism of small units and takes some of the sting out of
 the danger of majoritarian oppression at the local level.260
 Conversely, some economists have relied on "voice" considera-
 tions to bolster their claim that local governments, because of their rel-
 atively small size, will be more efficient in meeting citizen public service
 preferences than higher level units. Bish and Ostrom, for example,
 note the value of small units in promoting participation, which permits
 people to indicate their public service demands to decision makers
 255. See. e.g., A. Syed, The Political Theory of American Local Government
 (1966). According to Madison:
 the smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and inter-
 ests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more fre-
 quently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number
 of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which
 they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
 oppression.
 The Federalist, No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
 256. See, e.g., R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 89-109.
 257. See, e.g., G. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (1966).
 258. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1135.
 259. See id. at 1135-36; see also Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 6, at 560
 ("[I]t would be a mistake to overstate the contrast between the free choice and participa-
 tion theories of democracy ... .").
 260. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 202, at 944-45; Rose, supra note 176, at 886.
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 more precisely, improving government efficiency.261 Voice can supple-
 ment exit in promoting citizen satisfaction with public services, and
 these economists agree with the participationists that voice most readily
 occurs at the local level.
 Despite the convergence of participation- and efficiency-based ar-
 guments in support of local autonomy, and the occasional analytic sup-
 port each theory gives to the other, the two approaches differ in their
 assumptions and in their reasons for valuing local power. Although the
 two theories are not in direct conflict, an examination of each theory
 from the perspective of the other may be a useful heuristic device to
 evaluate their claims. As we shall see, however, when taken together,
 each theory compounds, rather than ameliorates, the flaws of the other.
 The two localist theories, whether contrasted or combined, demon-
 strate the uncertain nature of the case for localism.
 a. Political Localism and the Economic Model. - The legal, political
 and social data that confirm the descriptive accuracy of Tiebout's theo-
 retical axioms about the local setting illuminate two major weaknesses
 in Frug's theory: Frug both misconceives the scope of local lawmaking
 power and fails to address the significance of the multiplicity of local
 governments and interlocal mobility.
 Frug asserts that localities are legally powerless. This is important
 to his argument since otherwise it would be difficult to account for the
 low level of popular participation in local politics. Indeed, much of
 Frug's article is an historical and legal account of the loss of local au-
 tonomy in the United States.262 Yet a fundamental premise of the
 Tiebout hypothesis is that localities possess substantial discretion over
 local taxing, spending and regulatory decisions. Although this premise
 usually passes unstated,263 Tiebout's theory would make no sense with-
 out it, since it is this discretion that allows local governments to re-
 spond to consumer-voter preferences. Mobile citizens and multiple
 local governments would have little economic significance if each local-
 ity simply executed the decisions of a higher level government or if
 local decisions were regularly superseded by state or federal action.
 As Part I of this Article indicates,264 the economists' assumptions
 come far closer to capturing the scope of local legal authority than does
 Frug's assertion of city powerlessness. Local governments have sub-
 stantial autonomy in deciding the size and distribution of local budgets,
 setting tax rates and regulating local land use. The states generally
 grant localities broad discretion, and as a rule state courts and legisla-
 261. See R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 24.
 262. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1080-1120.
 263. Economists generally do not address explicitly the scope of local legal author-
 ity, but one legal scholar of local government who follows the economic perspective has
 noted the relatively broad authority of local governments, particularly with respect to
 the power to participate in business activities. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 7, at
 1568-73.
 264. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 6-18.
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 tures have been reluctant to interfere with local autonomy in these im-
 portant areas. State incorporation and annexation laws facilitate the
 formation of new governments with the full panoply of local powers
 while inhibiting the expansion of older governments or the consolida-
 tion of localities into metropolitan or regional units.265 In short, the
 economists' basic premise about local legal power captures local gov-
 ernment law in practice; Frug's assertion of "city powerlessness" does
 not.
 Tiebout's assumptions about the number of local governments and
 the mobility of people also have considerable contemporary validity.
 Focusing only on general-purpose governments, one study of the
 twenty-five largest urbanized areas found that in twenty-one areas there
 were twenty or more local governments; in twelve areas there were
 more than fifty local governments; in six areas there were more than
 one hundred local governments.266 Another researcher found that in
 only two metropolitan areas did the central city account for as much as
 half the metropolitan area population and in most cases the central
 city's share of population was forty percent or less.267 Nor was there a
 concentration of land or population in a relatively small number of
 large suburbs.268 Instead, most urbanized areas are fragmented into
 numerous general-purpose jurisdictions, and "[m]ost people who live
 in large metropolitan areas do have several local governments in whose
 jurisdiction they could realistically live."269 As for mobility, since the
 1950s approximately twenty percent of American households have
 moved each year.270 Over a five-year period nearly half of all families
 change their residence at least once.271 Although the majority of
 moves are to new homes within a few miles of the original residence,
 many moves, including some involving relatively short distances, entail
 changes in political jurisdiction.272
 265. See section B.1, supra.
 266. See Fischel, Is Local Government Structure in Large Urbanized Areas Monop-
 olistic or Competitive?, 34 Nat'l TaxJ. 95 (1981). The study, based on the 1970 census,
 found that the 25 largest urbanized areas accounted for 60% of the population in all 248
 urbanized areas, or more than one-third of the total United States population. The ur-
 banized areas with the most general-purpose local governments-Fischel included only
 those local governments with zoning authority-were New York (399), Minneapolis
 (180), Chicago (178), Philadelphia (166), St. Louis (116) and Los Angeles (104).
 267. See A. Hacker, supra note 21, at 26-27 (1980 census figures).
 268. See Fischel, supra note 266, at 96, 101-02.
 269. -Id. at 102. This is especially true in the Northeast, the North Central States
 and the West.
 270. See Hawley, Urbanization as Process, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban
 Life, supra note 157, at 3, 13; see also M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 190-91.
 271. See A. Hacker, supra note 21, at 263 (between 1975 and 1980, 45.2% of fami-
 lies containing married couples changed their residence at least once).
 272. See M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 191; A. Hacker, supra note 21, at 263.
 According to Hacker, of the 45.2% of families that moved in the 1975-1980 period,
 24.2% moved within the same county, and 19.2% either changed counties or moved to
 another state. (Another 1.8% moved to the United States from overseas.) Although
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 The large number of local governments and the mobility of local
 residents lessen both the significance, if not the likelihood, of local
 political participation in two ways. First, the impact of participation is
 reduced when the multiplicity of local governments and the resultant
 interlocal competition narrow the scope of local politics.273 Second,
 the multiplicity of local governments and the interlocal mobility of peo-
 ple together undermine the notion that local communitarian feelings
 will inspire residents of local governments to greater participation than
 is likely to occur at the state or national level. The bonds linking tran-
 sient residents to their localities may be weak, and the sense of belong-
 ing to a particular place may be attenuated by the multiple linkages
 each resident has to other jurisdictions.
 Although Frug puts the case for participation primarily in terms of
 the psychological and emotional benefits of individual involvement in
 political life, latent in his theory is the assumption that city power will
 somehow transform local politics in the direction of greater social jus-
 tice. His specific proposals-that cities operate banks, insurance com-
 panies and other financial institutions, provide housing, create food
 cooperatives and run profit-making businesses274-reflect the idea that
 such municipal activity would radically transform local political life and
 provide a basis for empowering workers, the poor and consumers.
 Thus, he suggests that a municipal bank or insurance company
 "might make different judgments about the relative value it places on
 the profit margin, the kinds of loans it deems socially useful, and the
 kinds of consumer protection it seeks to provide" than would private
 lenders.275 Municipal ownership of housing "could prevent gentrifica-
 tion of these units, and encourage democratic control over the opera-
 tion of multiple-family housing."276 City-owned enterprises could lead
 to the manufacture of socially useful products and provide opportuni-
 ties for experiments in worker self-management.277 In short, Frug sug-
 gests, greater individual participation in urban government would lead
 to more redistributive local governments.
 But it is highly unlikely that greater local participation would have
 such a transformative effect.278 The multiplicity of localities and the
 Hacker gives no further information concerning intracounty moves, it must be assumed,
 given the large number of municipalities in most counties, that a significant fraction of
 these moves involved a relocation from one municipality to another. But cf. Sharp,
 "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty" in the Context of Local Government Problems, 37 W. Pol. Q.
 67, 70 (1984) (a large number of movers are repeat movers).
 273. See, e.g., T. Gurr & D. King, supra note 32; P. Peterson, supra note 31.
 274. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1150; Frug, Property and
 Power, supra note 203, at 687-91.
 275. Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1150.
 276. Frug, Property and Power, supra note 203, at 688.
 277. Id. at 688-89.
 278. This discussion is intended to address the likelihood of local adoption of new
 social or economic programs, not the desirability of Frug's goals or the efficacy of his
 specific proposals in promoting those goals. Nevertheless, it may be worth noting that
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 mobility of people and capital that Tiebout describes and that exist to-
 day seriously erode the capacity of most cities to undertake new pro-
 grams that would impose costs on already straitened local budgets and
 that are likely to be perceived as benefiting the poor or municipal work-
 ers at the expense of business and middle- and upper-income interests.
 Corporate and upper-income residents are the city residents most sen-
 sitive to changes in local taxes and the quality of urban services. It is
 relatively easy for affluent people and businesses who feel dissatisfied
 with municipal tax and spending policies to leave the city, become resi-
 dents of adjacent communities and continue to have ready access to the
 city as a place to work, shop, sell and enjoy recreational and cultural
 amenities. Officials in city governments know this, and the range of
 political choices available to them is accordingly constrained.
 Contemporary cities, as a rule, do not engage in innovative redis-
 tributive programs, not because they lack the legal authority, but rather
 because they fear that initiating such programs would cause residential
 and commercial taxpayers to depart.279 It is debatable whether pro-
 gressive social programs and redistributive policies caused the urban
 fiscal problems of the 1970s,280 but undeniable that urban politics in
 the major cities in recent decades has been dominated by concerns
 most publicly owned or operated enterprises have not realized their radical potential,
 but rather are run much like private enterprises in the same industries, as low-risk,
 profit-oriented activities. See A. Walsh, The Public's Business: The Politics and Prac-
 tices of Government Corporations 155-57 (public authorities are overly sensitive to con-
 cerns of private financiers such as minimizing investor risk), 233-39 (widespread
 mismanagement in government agencies) (1978); Berkowitz, Economic Development
 Really Works: Baltimore, Maryland, in Urban Economic Development, supra note 35, at
 201, 209-21 (urban economic development program's reliance on public-private part-
 nerships); see also D. Henriques, The Machinery of Greed: Public Authority Abuse and
 What to Do About It 7 (1986) (public authorities are subject to corruption).
 279. See P. Peterson, supra note 31, at 37-38, 64, 167-68, 182-83; W. Tabb, The
 Long Default: New York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis 37-40 (1982). According to
 Tabb, local governments are
 under continual pressure not to redistribute from the rich to the poor ....
 "[M]oney providers" will leave if the "service demanders" want more than the
 providers wish to provide. In a competitive economy, therefore, local govern-
 ments must give less to demanders in order to satisfy providers. If they fail to
 do so, some other jurisdiction will.
 280. Rubin outlines the theories explaining the 1970s' fiscal crises, including mi-
 gration of poor blacks and Hispanics to big cities; exit of middle- and upper-class people
 and jobs and consequent erosion of tax base; growth of city bureaucracies and institu-
 tional impetus to greater city spending; and increased vulnerability of city political coali-
 tions to demands of groups seeking higher levels of spending on social programs. See I.
 Rubin, Running in the Red: The Political Dynamics of Urban Fiscal Stress 5-12 (1982);
 see also R. Bailey, The Crisis Regime: The MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of
 the New York City Financial Crisis 3-4 (1984) (linking the New York City fiscal crisis to
 growing gap between revenues and expenditures, inability to raise money in private cap-
 ital markets, and long-term decline in manufacturing employment); C. Morris, The Cost
 of Good Intentions: New York City and the Liberal Experiment, 1960-1975, at 238-40
 (1980) (treating the New York City fiscal crisis as a result of public sector expansion and
 municipal budget manipulation); T. Swanstrom, supra note 32, at 163-71 (hostility
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 about credit ratings, balanced budgets, lower taxes, basic infrastructure
 and curtailing expectations about urban government.281 Such con-
 cerns are far more important than limits on local legal powers in re-
 stricting the ability of cities to pursue progressive social agendas.
 Although the rise to power of black and Hispanic mayors in most
 of the nation's largest cities and the switch from at-large to district rep-
 resentation in many city legislative bodies has increased the role of mi-
 nority and neighborhood interests in urban government, the
 imperatives of protecting the local tax base and maintaining access to
 capital markets continue to structure urban politics.282 New political
 coalitions have reallocated patronage, integrated municipal workforces
 and made marginal adjustments in spending on established services,283
 but there has been relatively little change in the size of the municipal
 public sector or the role of city government in the urban polity or econ-
 omy. Here, as elsewhere, the choices open to local governments re-
 among local business interests to Mayor Kucinich's populist programs contributed to
 Cleveland's 1978 default).
 281. See, e.g., W. Tabb, supra note 279, at 97-100 (New York City gave tax abate-
 ments for building rehabilitation projects while reducing funding for programs to bene-
 fit low-income residents). According to Mollenkopf, "the competition among local
 jurisdictions to offer the best political climate for new investment produces a Gresham's
 Law' effect. Public-service-poor jurisdictions have tended to drive out public-service-
 rich jurisdictions. This dynamic has restricted the ability of either type of jurisdiction to
 deal with pressing urban problems .... "J. Mollenkopf, supra note 121, at 253. Thus,
 market discipline has reduced government burdens on the private sector while increas-
 ing urban distress. See id.; see also R. Bailey, supra note 280, at 172 ("Whereas govern-
 ment might once have used what few 'slack' resources it had in attempts to reintegrate
 alienated groups into the political system, now it must spend them on keeping business
 in New York."); M. Shefter, Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of
 New York City 234 (1985) ("[M]ost participants in urban politics regard the imperative
 of maintaining access to the capital market as akin to a law of nature .... "); Swanstrom,
 Semisovereign Cities: The Politics of Urban Development, 21 Polity 83, 107 (1988)
 ("land interests, in coalition with growth-oriented politicians" play substantial role in
 shaping city economic policies.).
 282. See, e.g., P. Heilig & R. Mundt, Your Voice at City Hall: The Politics, Proce-
 dures, and Policies of District Representation 133-48 (1984); Elkin, State and Market in
 City Politics: Or, The "Real" Dallas, in The Politics of Urban Development, supra note
 36, at 25, 25 ("Diversifying participation in electoral politics does not alter development
 policy in any simple or direct way. Instead it leads to a reconstitution of the urban
 regime."); Reed, A Critique of New-Progressivism in Theorizing About Local Develop-
 ment Policy: A Case from Atlanta, in id. at 199, 199-215 (economic reality forced
 Atlanta's first black mayor to accommodate traditionally powerful white private
 interests).
 283. There remains substantial debate over whether increased minority success in
 winning municipal office results in a greater minority share of municipal jobs. See gen-
 erally Mladenka, Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 165
 (1989) (reviewing the literature and arguing that minority success in entering public
 employment and gaining a greater share of public sector resources is subject to consid-
 erable regional variation and linked to other aspects of the local political structure).
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 main limited by economic, not legal, factors.284
 Developments in transportation, communication and production
 technologies have increased the ease of movement of both people and
 capital. The locational advantages cities once possessed, in terms of
 the presence of large markets and proximity to rivers and railroads, are
 of decreasing significance in the age of aviation, computers and the
 electronic and telephonic transmission of data and documents. As a
 result, interlocal competition for businesses and affluent residents has
 intensified,285 city tax bases have become more fragile and cities' fiscal
 capacities to carry out their current public service functions, let alone
 implement progressive innovations, are more severely stressed.286
 284. See, e.g., D. Judd & R. Ready, Entrepreneurial Cities and the New Politics of
 Economic Development, in G. Peterson & C. Lewis, Reagan and the Cities 209, 218-37
 (1986) (discussing attention to economic development incentives in Denver after the
 election of its first Hispanic mayor and Chicago after the election of its first black
 mayor). See The Politics of Urban Development, supra note 36.
 285. Ira Katznelson quotes former New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch as saying
 " 'The main job of municipal government is to create a climate in which private business
 can expand in the city to provide jobs and profit.' " I. Katznelson, supra note 211, at 4.
 Several studies have found that, despite the rush to provide tax abatements, low-
 interest loans and parcels of land, corporate investment and plant location decisions
 generally turn on factors beyond the control of local governments, such as the presence
 of a network of suppliers, prevailing wage scales or the degree of unionization. "Never-
 theless, public officials desperate forjobs and tax dollars are understandably reluctant to
 risk losing a source of revenue by offering fewer concessions than their ever-present
 competitors; although they can't afford to offer the tax reductions, they can't afford not
 to." Jones & Bachelor, Local Policy Discretion and the Corporate Surplus, in Urban
 Economic Development, supra note 35, at 245, 249; see also Blair & Wechsler, A Tale of
 Two Cities: A Case Study of Urban Competition forJobs, in id. at 269, 269-82 (analo-
 gizing the competition between Springfield, Ohio and Fort Wayne, Indiana for an
 International Harvester plant to game of Prisoner's Dilemma in which "the combined
 welfare of residents . . . would have been maximized if neither city had offered Interna-
 tional Harvester financial incentives," but in fact both cities offered large assistance
 packages). But cf. Markusen, Class and Urban Social Expenditure: A Marxist Theory of
 Metropolitan Government, in Marxism and the Metropolis, supra note 88, at 82, 95-96:
 The movement of industrial and mercantile establishments to suburban juris-
 dictions is largely a response to private-sector gains . . . but taxes and public
 services do play an important role. ... The existence of fragmented political
 units allows corporations to play off one jurisdiction against the other to secure
 preferential tax and expenditure arrangements ....
 286. See, e.g., M. Castells, City, Class and Power (E. Lebas, trans.) 25-26 (1978);
 W. Tabb, supra note 279, at 69-75.
 Federal policies over the last decade have accelerated the dynamic of interlocal
 competition. Drastic cuts in assistance to cities have thrown the cities ever more on their
 own resources, while federal tax cuts have served to highlight differences in local tax
 rates, increasing the pressure on relatively high-tax jurisdictions to keep taxes down,
 even if this limits the local capacity to fund social programs. In 1987, federal aid for just
 13.6% of state and local revenues, down from 18.7% in 1978 and the lowest figure since
 1966. See Federal Aid to States, Localities Hits 20-Year Low, Wash. Post, Nov. 23,
 1988, at A19, col. 1. The federal share of state and local revenues had declined from a
 high of 18.7% in 1978. See id. On the significance of federal cutbacks for local auton-
 omy, see T. Gurr & D. King, supra note 32, at 189-90.
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 The watchword in urban politics in the last decade has been "eco-
 nomic development."287 Cities have indeed been innovative in using
 and stretching their legal authority in pursuit of economic growth.288
 The "public purposes" for which cities may spend, borrow, lend and
 condemn have been expanded, but more often than not the goal of
 expanded city powers has been to frame public policies that will retain
 old businesses, attract new investment and promote gentrification
 rather than reform urban life or empower ordinary citizens.289 Cities
 already have sufficient legal authority to intervene broadly in economic
 life, take on traditional business functions and pursue ambitious social
 programs.290 But the economic constraints on urban politics deriving
 from the multiplicity of local governments and the mobility of people
 and businesses are structural, and they make the municipal pursuit of
 private capital a far more likely prospect than the adoption of a pro-
 287. According to a study prepared by the National League of Cities, local govern-
 ments "expend tremendous energies maintaining and enhancing their economies." A.
 Bowman, The Visible Hand: Major Issues in City Economic Policy 7 (NLC Working
 Papers, Nov. 1987). Indeed, of 326 mayors surveyed by Bowman, 86% identified eco-
 nomic development as one of their top three priorities, and 36.5% said it was their
 highest priority. See id. at 8.
 288. As Bingham and Blair have concluded,
 [T]he creativity of local development officials has been substantial. But the cre-
 ativity has been directed at developing new (and complicated) arrangements
 between governments, businesses, and third sector organizations. The variety
 of subsidy/compensation schemes is enormous. However, the idea that a bet-
 ter city can be achieved by more jobs, money, tax revenues, and so forth is
 entrenched in local economic development efforts.
 Bingham & Blair, Introduction, in Urban Economic Development, supra note 35, at 11,
 13.
 289. See, e.g., Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1 (Me. 1983) (bond issue to re-
 build harbor facilities to keep shipbuilding company in state); Poletown Neighborhood
 Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (condemnation of populous
 residential neighborhood to attract auto assembly plant); Yonkers Community Dev.
 Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975) (condemna-
 tion for urban redevelopment), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1010 (1975). But cf. Purvis
 v. Little Rock, 282 Ark. 102, 667 S.W.2d 936 (1984) ("tourism bonds" to finance motel
 construction invalid for lack of adequate public purpose). Cities have also adopted pro-
 gressive measures linking economic development to payments for necessary municipal
 improvements. See, e.g., Russ Bldg. Partnership v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 3d 839, 750
 P.2d 324, 244 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988) (development fee on new office construction to help
 fund mass transit), appeal dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 209 (1988).
 290. The intensity of the interlocal competition for new investment illustrates both
 the breadth of local legal authority and the fragility of local economies. Interlocal com-
 petition is possible only because localities have the policy-making discretion to pursue
 programs to attract industrial and commercial concerns; interlocal competition is neces-
 sary primarily because of the mobility of capital. See Jones & Bachelor, supra note 251,
 at 263-65.
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 gram of municipal socialism.29'
 Beyond narrowing the range of local political choices, the multi-
 plicity of local governments and the mobility of people casts doubt on
 the assumption, fundamental to participation theory, that local auton-
 omy and the spirit of community are mutually reinforcing-that partici-
 pation will be stronger in local governments because localities are
 communities. Many writers treat "local government" as a synonym for
 "community." As is true with the frequent equation of "local govern-
 ment" with "city" discussed in Section A, above,292 the legal term "lo-
 cal government" has become freighted with the powerful social,
 political and emotional associations that ordinarily accompany the
 word "community."293 For participationists, local governments are
 communities-places where an individual's activities and experiences
 are bound up with those of her neighbors, where repeated interactions
 and daily communications breed interdependence, shared feelings and
 values and a public-spirited commitment to the community's well-be-
 ing.294 This sense of community is said to provide an incentive to par-
 ticipate in local affairs and to ease participation by providing residents
 with an awareness of how much they have in common, thereby facilitat-
 ing community decision making.
 But the connection between today's local governments and the
 spirit of community is tenuous. One cannot, of course, find a standard
 metric to gauge the sense of community. If, however, as some urban
 sociologists contend, "the single most important variable leading to
 stronger social bonds is length of residence"-more than social class or
 291. See, e.g., P. Peterson, supra note 31, at 167-83 (realities of local politics pre-
 clude widespread implementation of redistributive programs); Clarke, supra note 36, at
 107-09 (same).
 Of course, interlocal economic competition does not strictly determine local polit-
 ical decisions. There is "[s]lack in the intergovernmental marketplace [that] creates
 room for political discretion." Swanstrom, supra note 281, at 95. "Local decision mak-
 ers do not simply follow the imperatives that emanate from the national political econ-
 omy; they must also interpret those imperatives, apply them to local conditions, and act
 on them within the constraints of political arrangements they build and maintain."
 Stone, The Study of the Politics of Urban Development, in The Politics of Urban Devel-
 opment, supra note 36, at 3, 4. Local politics involves the particularities of time, place
 and specific political actors, and cities may find opportunities to implement progressive
 innovations within the structural constraints of interlocal economic competition.
 292. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
 293. As Raymond Williams has noted, although "community" may have many defi-
 nitions, the term "seems never to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any posi-
 tive opposing or distinguishing term." R. Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture
 and Society 66 (1976). Albert Hunter agrees that among social scientists "community
 [is] an unqualified good. The positive connotations of friendliness, warmth and support
 are seldom countered .. ." Hunter, Persistence of Local Sentiments in Mass Society, in
 Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life, supra note 157, at 133, 134-35.
 294. See, e.g., R. Wood, supra note 24, at 102-08 (suburban government seen as
 enhancing "community'/).
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 stage of life295-then the high rate of interlocal mobility suggests that
 community bonds within localities cannot be very strong. We are a mo-
 bile society,296 and the ease and frequency of relocation necessarily
 reduces the sense of common needs, mutual values and shared lives
 "community" ordinarily connotes.297
 Furthermore, the large number of localities in each metropolitan
 area is a significant reminder that people are regularly involved in more
 than one locality in the course of their daily lives. We are not just a
 mobile society; we are also a commuter society. Most people no longer
 reside in the locality in which they work, and they no longer confine
 their weekly travel, shopping, social, cultural or other routine activities
 to the community in which they reside. The statement of a southern
 California woman-" 'I live in Garden Grove, work in Irvine, shop in
 Santa Ana, go to the dentist in Anaheim . .. and used to be president
 of the League of Women Voters in Fullerton.' "298-is emblematic of
 the multijurisdictional lives most metropolitan area residents lead.299
 Some sense of interdependence and common experience, of
 shared values and mutual knowledge and sympathy, no doubt remains.
 Clearly, however, this sense cannot be as strong as participation theo-
 rists contend when so many communities are composed of newcomers,
 transients and people whose attention is often focused on issues and
 events outside the local jurisdiction.300 Participation theory, like the
 law, treats an individual as a member of only one local community-the
 295. Janowitz & Street, Changing Social Order of the Metropolitan Area, in Hand-
 book of Contemporary Urban Life, supra note 157, at 90, 111.
 296. According to Daniel Elazar, one of the hallmarks of American life that has
 affected our urban development is the "nomadism" of the American people. See D.
 Elazar, supra note 20, at 16; see also Lemann, Stressed Out in Suburbia, Atlantic, Nov.
 1989, at 34, 46 (finding that in Naperville, Illinois, a Chicago suburb, "the average
 house . . . changes hands every three years"; in one of the city's two school districts
 "new students make up more than a quarter of the enrollment every fall").
 297. See D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 16 (American "nomadism" eliminates the no-
 tion of a "stable, self-perpetuating community"); cf. D. Popenoe, Private Pleasure, Pub-
 lic Plight: American Metropolitan Community Life in Comparative Perspective 149-56
 (1985) (noting the particularly high level of interlocal mobility in the United States as
 compared to Great Britain and Sweden; recommending policies that would promote
 residential stability as a means of increasing sense of community).
 Jane Mansbridge reached a similar conclusion in her study of the Vermont town
 meeting-that improved communications and mobility had reduced the political and so-
 cial importance of the town in the lives of local citizens. SeeJ. Mansbridge, supra note
 207, at 44. More generally, she recognized that national economic changes, including
 increased interlocal interdependence and the expansion of scale of economic activity
 and social problems, made intensive local participation in town-meeting form of govern-
 ment a thing of the past. See id. at 126-29.
 298. Quoted in C. Abbott, supra note 77, at 186.
 299. See D. Popenoe, supra note 297, at 35-36 (the separation of work, shopping,
 cultural and recreational activities and residence, as well as the economic segregation of
 residents, are aspects of the social differentiation that dominates metropolitan life).
 300. "The separation of work from residence and the concentration of daily activi-
 ties outside the home and neighborhood have reduced the sense of belonging."
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 one in which he or she currently resides. But other localities-places of
 work, schooling or shopping; places through which a person passes
 during the diurnal commute; places of former residence-may play an
 important role in the individual's life, thereby reducing interest in and
 involvement with the person's current home locality.301
 Despite their numerous contacts with other local governments,
 people remain intensely concerned with issues pertaining to their juris-
 diction of residence. It is this locality that makes tax, regulatory and
 spending decisions that directly affect the value of one's home, the
 character of one's neighbors and the quality and cost of basic public
 services. Still, the mystic quality with which the term "community"
 often invests these shared interests-the hint of some organic unity of
 the individual and the place-is hard to sustain. The strong identifica-
 tion of the citizen with the local community that characterized the
 Greek polis, the high-medieval city and the New England town has
 given way to a society in which daily life is spread over a number of
 places. The role of any one locality in the life of the individual, the
 personal commitment to that locality and one's fellow feeling for other
 local residents must be correspondingly reduced.302
 The role of mobility and the multiplicity of local governments in
 limiting the sense of community as an incentive to and a benefit of par-
 ticipation do not require us to reject participation as a political value or
 to deny the importance of the local setting as a focus of participa-
 tion.303 But we can question whether participation would be greatly
 advanced by further local autonomy and whether the benefits of the
 increment in participation would be worth the costs additional local au-
 tonomy would impose.
 Kronus, Race, Ethnicity, and Community, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life,
 supra note 157, at 202, 232.
 301. In his comparative study of metropolitan community life in the United States,
 Great Britain and Sweden, Popenoe found the greatest separation of work, residence
 and shopping in the United States. See D. Popenoe, supra note 297, at 81-82.
 302. This is just another version of Max Weber's observation that "when the city
 lost its walls the city ceased to be." Long, The City as Reservation, 25 Pub. Interest 22,
 22 (Fall 1971) (paraphrasing Weber). As Long points outs, for Weber the city began as
 a "bounded association, literally enclosed by walls that clearly marked it off from the
 outside society. Within these walls it had a life in common and a shared common pur-
 pose." Id. Today, "[t]he unwalled city can be safely exploited by those who can reside
 without." Id. at 36.
 303. Even assuming that smaller is better, a locality would have to be quite small in
 order for residents to reap the full benefits of the potential for participation. Using the
 town meeting as a model, Dahl calculated that if a town held a six-hour meeting and
 limited participants to two minutes of speaking each, about 200 people would be able to
 actually participate in the meeting. That would be 20% of the population of a town of
 1000 people-and only 1% in a town of 20,000. R. Dahl, supra note 10, at 70-71. Dahl
 and Tufte found that participation was best achieved in communities with populations
 under 8000. See R. Dahl & E. Tufte, supra note 214, at 62-65. Although most local
 governments are small, most people live in local governments too large to permit full
 participation by all adult members of the community.
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 Greater local autonomy would not substantially advance participa-
 tion. There already is a great deal of local legal power, and the princi-
 pal constraint on local power is often not legal but economic: the limits
 of local resources and the structure of interlocal competition. So, too,
 mobility and the spread of daily activities across a metropolitan area are
 far greater impediments to a revitalized sense of local community than
 any nominal limits on local legal power. As long as the social trends
 that have eroded the connection between locality and community ties,
 continue unabated, it is difficult to believe that augmenting local gov-
 ernments' already substantial legal powers will have any significant ef-
 fect on either the sense of community or the extent of political
 participation at the local level. At the same time, the cost of local legal
 autonomy, the burden it places on poorer localities and the crippling
 effect it has on efforts to remedy local economic and social problems,
 are far greater than participationists acknowledge.
 b. Economic Localism in Political Perspective. - The Tiebout hypothe-
 sis describes the contemporary urban setting better than does Frug's
 theory. But the descriptive power of economic localism does not trans-
 late into a satisfactory normative justification for the enhancement of
 local power or even for the current broad scope of local autonomy.304
 Tiebout's theory is one of interlocal movement. It does not ad-
 dress the internal operations of urban government, local political insti-
 tutions or local political activity. The model provides no basis for
 understanding how local governments make decisions, nor is it con-
 cerned with how local residents participate in local decision making.
 Indeed, Tiebout's model hardly acknowledges that local governments
 are governments, and does not recognize the concept of local citizen-
 ship at all. Under economic localism, governments are little more than
 purveyors of public goods, and local residents are not citizens but
 "consumer-voters," and highly transient ones at that.305
 For Tiebout, the central mechanism of citizen-government rela-
 tions is departure. The individuals who drive the system and make it
 work are the ones who leave, are likely to leave or have recently arrived;
 their significance to the local polity derives from their marginal status.
 Although the interlocal competition for taxpayers and investors indi-
 cates that there is considerable descriptive power in this view of local
 government, it is unclear why we should want a local government sys-
 tem in which the critical actors are those with the weakest ties to the
 304. The ensuing discussion in the text presents a normative critique of the
 Tiebout model; it assumes arguendo the descriptive validity of Tiebout's analysis. The
 Tiebout model, however, has been subject to considerable debate on positive as well as
 normative grounds. See, e.g., Lowery & Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional Bounda-
 ries: An Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. Pol. 73 (1989).
 305. Cf. Clark, Democracy and the Capitalist State: Towards a Critique of the
 Tiebout Hypothesis, in Political Studies from Spatial Perspectives 111, 120-27 (A.
 Burnett & P. Taylor eds. 1981) (Tiebout's focus on the provision of local public goods
 and services has obscured the democratic potential of local governments).
 1990]  415
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 15:54:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COLUMBMBIA LAW REVIEW
 locality and the critical decisions do not involve the structure of local
 decision making, the substance of local policies or the process of local
 political activity, but rather the decision whether or not to exit.
 This conception contrasts sharply with that of participationists like
 Frug. Whatever the shortcomings of participation theory in accounting
 for the actual scope and potential of local power, its basic premise is
 that local governments are political institutions that decide on public
 issues in a manner influenced by and accountable to an involved con-
 stituency of local residents. Its critical decision makers are the resi-
 dents who stay, commit time and effort to their relations with other
 local citizens and have a stake in the community. Participation theory
 recognizes, indeed is built on, the normative assumptions about local
 government that have long been basic to the structure of American
 government. At least sinceJefferson and Tocqueville, the appeal of lo-
 calism has been rooted in a view of local governments as "little repub-
 lics"306-places of self-government, of collective decision making by
 local residents about local problems-and that such local self-determi-
 nation enables local governments to serve as "primary schools" of lib-
 erty,307 educating and training citizens for national democracy.
 The idea of local governments as governments-as centers of col-
 lective decision making rather than as firms that supply goods to the
 municipal marketplace-is certainly the underpinning of the legal au-
 thority of local governments. State restrictions on special commissions
 that would perform municipal services and on special acts relating to
 municipalities, state authorizations of home rule and state statutes de-
 centralizing power to localities, all were intended to protect the integ-
 rity of local decisions, not to facilitate interlocal movement.308 And the
 ascent of local autonomy in state and federal jurisprudence grows out
 of a belief in democracy within localities, not in the external relations of
 local governments to each other or to their departing "consumer-
 voters."
 The most emphatically localist decisions-the ones providing the
 firmest basis for stating that local autonomy enjoys a measure of legal
 protection-are based on the interest of local residents in local self-
 government and on the rights of local residents to participate politically
 in local decision making, not on their right of exit. Thus, the United
 States Supreme Court's response to the complaint about the malappor-
 tioned county legislature in Avery v. Midland County309 was not that
 plaintiffs were free to move to a jurisdiction with a governance struc-
 ture responsive to their taste for the "one-person, one-vote" principle
 but rather that local residents have a right to be represented and par-
 306. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), reprinted in 13
 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 394, 400 (A. Bergh ed. 1905).
 307. A. Tocqueville, Democracy in America 63 (Bradley ed. 1945).
 308. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 9-10.
 309. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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 ticipate in the decisions of the local governments in which they reside
 on the basis of"one person, one vote."310 The essence of Avery is that
 cities and counties are governments and, as such, must be structured in
 accordance with the principles that govern the operations of
 governments.311
 In other cases that affirmed local control over land use and educa-
 tion finance-Belle Terre,312 Arlington Heights,313 Rodriguez,314 Milliken v.
 Bradley315 and Buse v. Smith316-the legitimacy of local authority and
 the appropriateness of local control and deference to local actions were
 grounded not on the availability of a choice of local governments or on
 the possibility of emigration but on the locally representative nature of
 local institutions. Local laws and policies were seen as outcomes of lo-
 cal democratic processes and were accordingly deserving of respect.
 Voice, not exit, accounts for the normative power of localism in our
 legal and political system because voice, not exit, more accurately re-
 flects the commitment to self-government that is at the heart of legal
 localism.
 Some economic theorists have recognized the anomaly of a theory
 of local autonomy that accords a preferred position to the most mar-
 ginal residents and ignores the inner workings of local governments.
 These economists have sought to construct an efficiency-based theory
 rooted in Tiebout's model but addressed to the internal dynamics of a
 local polity and focused on the costs of participation and of local polit-
 ical action. As exemplified by Bish, Ostrom, Oates and others, this ap-
 proach builds on Tiebout's assumptions but prizes primarily the
 smaller, more homogeneous and responsive political units that it as-
 sumes will result from the multiplicity of local governments and the
 freedom to move among them.
 This more political version of the economic model shares
 Tiebout's commitment to personal mobility within a multilocal metro-
 politan area, since mobility and large numbers of local governments
 310. Id. at 480. Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the abil-
 ity of Tuskegee's black residents to relocate to other communities that might have
 shared their preferences on matters of public policy was no remedy for the denial of
 their right to vote in Tuskegee itself.
 Not surprisingly, the leading legal scholar of urban government adopting the
 Tiebout perspective would overrule Avery and allow localities to experiment with differ-
 ent local governance structures including those not based on principles of equal repre-
 sentation and participation. See Ellickson, Growth Controls, supra note 7, at 1558-63.
 311. See 390 U.S. at 480.
 312. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see Briffault, supra note 1,
 at 101-03.
 313. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
 (1977); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 104-05.
 314. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see Briffault,
 supra note 1, at 99-101.
 315. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 94-96.
 316. 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); see Briffault, supra note 1, at 29-31.
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 increase the likelihood of local homogeneity.317 But the political ver-
 sion of the economic model displays conflicting concerns when free-
 dom of movement, local autonomy and the efficiency value of local
 government come together. Mobility is the "crucial lever"318 of both
 the Tiebout model and the more political version. Yet the shift from an
 external model to an internal model featuring homogeneity, citizen in-
 volvement in local decision making and local autonomy renders mobil-
 ity problematic.
 Mobility is destabilizing. The movement of individuals from one
 locality to another changes the nature of both places. The locality of
 departure loses people and institutions that were constitutive of that
 community's life; the locality of arrival must absorb people whose val-
 ues, needs, interests, ethnicity or lifestyle may differ from those of the
 previous inhabitants.319 The destabilizing effect increases with num-
 bers. A city that loses many residents may lose the resources necessary
 to provide the programs its residents want. A locality that receives
 many newcomers may find the scale of local life transformed, with at-
 tendant problems of congestion, infrastructure needs, service burdens
 and a loss of the quality of life that made the locality attractive to resi-
 dents and immigrants in the first place.320
 As a result, local residents often seek to resist mobility. The locali-
 ties of departure lack the legal authority to prevent people from leav-
 ing. But the localities of arrival, through their power to regulate land
 use and determine the rate of investment in new infrastructure, can do
 much to determine the wealth, life style and, indirectly, the ethnicity of
 new arrivals and to control the pace of growth.
 Moreover, "interlocal mobility" is not an abstraction; most move-
 ment is from the central cities to the suburbs. The typical suburb is
 smaller and more homogeneous than the nearby central city, suburban
 residents are likely to feel more threatened by change and suburban
 governments are more apt to adopt measures intended to retard
 317. Indeed, these scholars have been even more normative than Tiebout, arguing
 affirmatively for the creation of more, and more specialized, governments in metropoli-
 tan areas and opposing laws that would restrict new incorporations or create area-wide
 metropolitan governments. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 45-62; Wagner &
 Weber, supra note 245, at 684; cf. Martin & Wagner, supra note 246, at 425 (concluding
 that California limitation on incorporation of unincorporated territory through adminis-
 trative review has increased monopoly power of local governments).
 318. G. Clark, supra note 8, at 164.
 319. Tiebout's theory suggests only that new residents are likely to agree with pre-
 vious residents concerning the locality's tax-services packages. Even if this is accurate,
 migration may create new ethnic, cultural or social divisions within the locality.
 320. As Oliver Williams notes, the advantages in terms of the quality of public ser-
 vices and the quality of life which result from location in a particular community "must
 be safeguarded" by the community "for the curse of urbanism is the instability of site
 advantages. A variety of social institutions, of which the municipality is one, help to
 protect the place of advantage for its constituents and to slow down the forces of
 change." Williams, supra note 131, at 302.
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 change. Suburbs, themselves the products of residential mobility and
 ongoing beneficiaries of unimpeded interlocal commutation, are most
 likely to pass exclusionary ordinances that reduce mobility.321
 Mobility, which is pivotal to the efficiency of Tiebout's system, is in
 tension with the internal local efficiency prized by other economists.
 Mobility creates heterogeneity, bringing into a community new people
 with different backgrounds, different concerns, different attitudes to-
 ward the community and different expectations about local govern-
 ment. The new arrivals increase the size of the locality and cause new
 divisions within it; both changes drive up the cost of local government.
 Thus, some economists have endorsed local efforts to control mobility.
 Exclusionary zoning has value "as a mechanism for controlling the
 composition of the local population,"322 thereby preserving local ho-
 mogeneity, reducing disputes over the role of local government and
 increasing the satisfaction of the average member of the community.
 But, of course, this efficiency-based claim for local policies that ad-
 vance homogeneity by excluding others is in direct conflict with the
 economic model's commitment to the free movement of people among
 localities. Local policies that promote small size and homogeneity and
 serve the interests of current residents interfere with the ability of non-
 resident consumer-voters to move into the community and conse-
 quently impede the smooth functioning of the metropolitan
 marketplace in municipal services.
 The economic argument for local autonomy, thus, contains diver-
 gent strands respecting the value of interlocal mobility. These differ-
 ences are indicative of the normative difficulties of the economic
 analysis. Tiebout's "pure theory" is built around the structure of in-
 terlocal relations and the role of the marginal consumer-voter in re-
 vealing preferences through exit. Although it contributes to an
 understanding of how interlocal mobility constrains local government
 action, it is not a theory of local government or of the inner workings of
 a local polity. Its exclusive reliance on mobility means that it has noth-
 ing to say about how governments relate to those constituents who do
 not move or how constituents may participate in local public activities.
 Tiebout's pure theory yields no normative argument for local
 autonomy.
 The second economic approach, with its more political orientation,
 is a theory of government based on the mechanism of public choice in
 the locality and the importance of homogeneity in reducing the costs of
 local political activity. It contributes to an appreciation of why many
 321. See, e.g., Ellickson, Growth Controls, supra note 7, at 404-10.
 322. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers &
 Proceedings), May 1981, at 93, 96; see also Neenan & Ethridge, supra note 35, at
 181-82 (positing connection between "qualities of the local population" and "quality of
 [local] public services"; discussing effect that exclusionary zoning has on nature of local
 population and consequently on nature of services).
 419 1990]
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 15:54:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
 places pursue policies that aim to preserve homogeneity. But by valu-
 ing local decision making and local actions that limit or prevent the
 entry of would-be residents, political economy is in tension with
 Tiebout's basic assumption about the normative significance of mobil-
 ity in enabling all individuals to satisfy their preferences for public serv-
 ices at the local level.
 The internal cleavage within economic theory over the place of
 "consumer-voter" mobility in determining the efficiency of urban gov-
 ernment signifies a further problem with relying on mobility and ease
 of exit in justifying local autonomy: people are not equally mobile, and
 exit is not equally easy for all residents. Economic theory ignores this
 interpersonal inequality. Indeed, economic localism in general fails to
 address interpersonal and interlocal inequalities. This silence produces
 a theory that is biased in favor of business and the affluent.
 Interjurisdictional movement is not cost-free. It is constrained by a
 variety of economic and social factors that tend to affect poorer people
 more than affluent ones. First, there are the out-of-pocket costs of relo-
 cation-of picking up, selling a home or otherwise disinvesting from
 one's original locality, searching for a new place to live, transporting
 one's self and family and finding and paying for a new home. Second,
 most people can only reside where they have access to work.323 Thus,
 corporate investment decisions and local zoning regulations that deter-
 mine the location of jobs, the education and skills requirements that
 determine who will be eligible for those jobs and the costs of commut-
 ing from home to workplace all limit ease of movement. Poorer, less
 educated potential movers will have fewer options and will be forced to
 bear more costs if they attempt to move.324
 Similarly, people can only reside where they can afford to reside.
 Suburban exclusionary ordinances, such as large-lot zoning and the ex-
 clusion of multifamily and subsidized housing, drive up the cost of
 housing in many jurisdictions, denying many potential movers a mean-
 ingful choice of places to live. Access to jobs and access to homes are
 often interrelated. Suburban zoning decisions often make the commu-
 nities adjacent to new manufacturing facilities, office and industrial
 parks or corporate headquarters economically inaccessible to all but
 relatively affluent people, effectively refusing poorer people both hous-
 ing and employment opportunities or forcing them to endure long
 commutes as the price of a job.325
 323. SeeJ. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 41.
 324. Cf. Sharp, supra note 272, at 73 (mobility differs by race and, to a lesser ex-
 tent, by educational level).
 325. Despite the rapid movement of industry to the suburbs in recent decades, rela-
 tively little low-income housing has been built there. As a result, employment opportu-
 nities have been separated from the low-income people in the inner cities who need
 them most. See D. Harvey, Social Justice and the City 60-64 (1973).
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 Economic factors are not the only restrictions on movement. Peo-
 ple are tied to their home jurisdictions by bonds of emotion and senti-
 ment. A home is not just a house but a place with friends, family and
 neighbors. The home jurisdiction is not just a political unit but a famil-
 iar and dependable environment, the setting of one's daily routine, a
 source of physical and psychic security and a component of one's sense
 of personal identity. Although patterns of mobility and commutation
 strain the notion of community, sentimental attachments to place do
 exist, and the severing of personal ties is a cost of relocation and a
 restriction on interlocal movement.326
 Residents are, to some degree, grounded by social forces.327 The
 relocation decisions of businesses and investors, by contrast, are usu-
 ally less constrained by feelings of community or attachments to neigh-
 borhood. The economic costs of shifting capital from one place to
 another are also less than the costs of relocation for residents. Inves-
 tors can transfer wealth across local boundaries instantaneously.
 Although investment in plants and equipment is less mobile, firms can
 cut back on maintenance and decline to modernize old plants, while
 gradually shifting new investments to new settings.328
 Thus, investors of capital and owners of businesses, rather than
 residents, are the prime beneficiaries of the system of multiple jurisdic-
 tions and ease of movement. They can consider a broader array of ju-
 risdictions as sites for investment than are available to individuals as
 possible new homes. These interjurisdictional shifts in investment will,
 in turn, determine the location of jobs, the patterns of residential mi-
 gration, local economic and fiscal prosperity (or decline) and the ability
 of localities to provide programs that respond to the needs of local
 residents.329
 The relative mobility of capital330 and, to a lesser degree, of more
 affluent residents is central to the dynamics of the contemporary in-
 326. See, e.g., J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 99-110.
 327. Logan and Molotch argue that social costs of relocation also have a differential
 impact reflecting differences in income. They contend that the disadvantaged are more
 tightly "tied down by the surrounding social net" and more dependent for assistance on
 friends, family and neighborhoods than are more affluent people. See id. at 42-43.
 328. See id. at 39-40. On industrial disinvestment and relocation, see B. Bluestone
 & B. Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Aban-
 donment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (1982).
 329. The easy mobility of business and investment means that "capital clearly will
 flow in a way which bears little relationship to need or to the condition of the least
 advantaged territory. The result will be creation of localized pockets of high unfulfilled
 need .. ." D. Harvey, supra note 325, at 112.
 330. The mobility of capital is, of course, only relative. "There is considerable fric-
 tion in the movement of investment capital." Swanstrom, supra note 281, at 94-95.
 And there are differences of mobility among various kinds of investments. For example,
 it is more difficult for advanced corporate services to relocate than it is for manufactur-
 ing. Id.
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 terlocal competition for new investment and new taxpayers.331 The op-
 erational significance of mobility and the multiplicity of jurisdictions in
 shaping local government behavior cannot be denied. But it is hard to
 see why, given the system's built-in economic discrimination and its
 preference for capital over residential consumer-voters, capital mobility
 and jurisdictional multiplicity should constitute a normative justifica-
 tion for the preservation, let alone the extension, of local autonomy. A
 metropolitan marketplace for municipal services in which local "firms"
 cater primarily to the interests of businesses and wealthy residents may
 enable investors and the affluent to maximize the satisfaction of their
 preferences for local services, taxes and regulation. Clearly, however,
 such a system provides fewer benefits for residents whose mobility is
 constrained by the economic and social costs of moving and by local
 exclusionary regulations.
 The importance of economic and social inequalities in calling into
 question the normative value of the Tiebout hypothesis cuts deeper
 than the class- and wealth-based distinctions in ability to move. The
 economic model assumes that the tax, service and regulatory differ-
 ences among localities are the result of variations in "tastes." In the-
 ory, one locality may prefer a municipal swimming pool, another might
 favor parks, a third might opt for new roads and a fourth might decide
 to lower taxes and spend less on local services. In fact, however, local
 taxing and spending decisions are often based not simply on idiosyn-
 cratic tastes but also on the stark differences in local fiscal capacity that
 divide localities within each metropolitan area.
 As the record of the school finance cases indicates, in state after
 state the level of local spending on education and the quality of local
 schools correlated with local taxable wealth, not just with local tax
 rates. Wealthy communities generally spend much more per capita on
 their schools, but can still tax their residents at much lower rates than
 poorer communities, which typically tax at high rates but can still man-
 age only relatively low levels of school spending. The small per-stu-
 dent amounts of school spending in poorer jurisdictions were a result
 not of the lack of a "taste" for education among residents of that local-
 ity, but rather of the inadequacy of local taxable resources.332 Other
 331. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing rise of suburban indus-
 trial enclaves such as City of Industry, California and Forest View, Illinois). See R.
 Healy & J. Rosenberg, Land Use and the States 20-21 (2d ed. 1979); M. Danielson,
 supra note 24, at 46.
 332. Thus, as the California Supreme Court found in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, (1971), although the Beverly Hills Unified School
 District was spending $1232 per child while the Baldwin Park Unified School District was
 spending $577 per child, the difference in expenditures could hardly be said to have
 been the result of Beverly Hills' greater "taste" for education. Indeed, Beverly Hills'
 school tax was only $2.38 per $100 of assessed valuation while in Baldwin Park the tax
 rate was more than twice as high-$5.48 per $100. The spending disparity was attrib-
 uted to an enormous difference in assessed valuation per child-$3,706 in Baldwin Park
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 studies have found that the quantity and quality of other local services
 also vary directly with local fiscal capacity.333
 This is hardly surprising. Communities with larger tax bases per
 capita can purchase the same amount of services at lower individual tax
 rates. Other things being equal, where the effective tax price of a ser-
 vice is lower, more of the service will be bought. There is a generalized
 interest among local residents in services such as good schools, paved
 roads and safe streets. Given these common concerns it is likely that
 interlocal taxing and spending differences are a result less of radical
 differences in preferences than of the broad fiscal disparities among
 municipalities.334
 The disparities in local fiscal capacity reduce the normative appeal
 of the economic theory of local autonomy in a second way. Local fiscal
 capacity is not so much a matter of local preferences as the result of the
 siting decisions of industrial, commercial and financial firms and of
 broader regional, national or international economic developments.
 Although local governments regularly seek to influence the locational
 and investment decisions of private firms, and may have some impact at
 the margin, for the most part local fiscal resources are dependent on
 decisions over which local governments have little control. Local
 wealth thus is often not a result of local decisions but rather of external
 forces-but the legal rules that constitute the system of local govern-
 ments allow wealthier jurisdictions to reap the benefits of these exter-
 nal decisions.335
 Interlocal differences in taxing and spending result from differ-
 ences in local needs as well as from disparities in fiscal capacity. As
 and $50,885 in Beverly Hills-mitigated somewhat by state and federal aid. Id., 5 Cal.
 3d at 589-602 & n.15, 487 P.2d at 1244-52 n. 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. 604-12 & n.15; Briffault,
 supra note 1, at 35-36.
 333. See, e.g., C. Gilbert, supra note 223, at 280-81.
 334. According to Markusen, "If Tiebout's view were correct, suburban political
 units would exhibit a wide variety of public-service packages .... In fact, the most
 striking characteristics of suburban units are their . . . nearly identical public-service
 mixes, with quality of service rising quite consistently with class composition of resi-
 dents." Markusen, supra note 251, at 83-84 (citation omitted).
 Bish rejects the idea that public service levels ought to be relatively equal through-
 out a metropolitan area, contending that it reflects the false assumption that all individu-
 als have identical tastes and therefore the desire to purchase the same mix of goods. See
 R. Bish, supra note 142, at 153-54. But it seems equally implausible to suppose that
 differences in the level and mix of basic services are not influenced by local fiscal capac-
 ity, especially in jurisdictions marked by high levels of tax but relatively low levels of
 spending. As Meltsner observed, "fiscal federalism ... is a euphemism that masks local
 poverty ... ." A. Meltsner, The Politics of City Revenue 252 (1971).
 Jenny Holzer disposes of the relationship between preferences and wealth more
 succinctly: "Money creates taste." See D. Waldman, Jenny Holzer, at cover, 29, 38, 39
 (1989) (Guggenheim Museum exhibition catalog depicting selections from artist's 1986
 work Truisms).
 335. See Reschovsky, An Evaluation of Metropolitan Area Tax Base Sharing, 33
 Nat'l TaxJ. 55, 56 (1980).
 1990]  423
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 15:54:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 90:346
 discussed earlier, older, more crowded cities, with poorer, more depen-
 dent populations have qualitatively different, and greater, demands on
 their local resources than do smaller, newer communities with relatively
 more affluent inhabitants.336 These differences in service demands are
 at least partially attributable to history, migration patterns, the social
 and economic attributes of city residents, federal and state welfare
 mandates, population and business concentration and the exclusionary
 practices of the suburbs337-all factors beyond the cities' control. Criti-
 cal aspects of the size and mix of city spending programs, and the dif-
 ferences between the bigger cities and the suburbs, are significantly
 determined by past events or nonlocal forces and do not simply reflect
 the idiosyncratic tastes of local residents.338
 Local regulatory decisions are also profoundly affected by local fis-
 cal capacity. In affluent residential localities, land use policies often
 seek to limit growth. These localities do not need the additional fiscal
 capacity that industry would provide and affirmatively seek to avoid the
 fiscal drain that admitting new, less affluent inhabitants would im-
 pose.339 In other jurisdictions, where residential wealth is more limited
 and local fiscal capacity is based on the presence of business property,
 localities will pursue policies designed to attract "clean" business
 uses-industrial parks, research and development firms, high technol-
 ogy companies, shopping malls-and middle-class residents, while ex-
 cluding other forms of industry and low-income residents.340 Poorer
 336. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
 337. Suburban commuters, who daily travel in and out of the city, use the city's
 transportation system and other services, but do not pay city property taxes, are them-
 selves a source of central city expense. Studies have found that neither the size nor the
 population composition of central cities affects city operating costs nearly as much as
 does the number of suburbanites who commute to work in the central city. See, e.g.,
 Kasarda, Urbanization, Community and the Metropolitan Problem, in Handbook of
 Contemporary Urban Life, supra note 157, at 27, 53. The central cities also tend to bear
 the costs of providing facilities like hospitals, libraries and museums which serve the
 region as a whole but are funded out of city, and not suburban budgets. See, e.g., M.
 Edel, E. Sclar & D. Luria, supra note 127, at 35. Although Kasarda contends that this is
 evidence of suburban exploitation of the central city, other scholars, noting that subur-
 ban commuters pay city sales taxes and contribute to the productivity of city businesses,
 find the question of exploitation uncertain. See, e.g., Neenan & Ethridge, supra note 35,
 at 182-85.
 338. See, e.g., W. Colman, supra note 37, at 51-53 (noting that in 1970 per capita
 total expenditures in the 37 largest metropolitan areas were from 26% to 48% greater
 in the central cities than in the suburbs, and that on average city residents paid 6.7% of
 their income for state and local taxes while suburban residents paid 5%).
 Although the fiscal austerity practiced by many cities since the mid-1970s indicates
 that urban tax and spending practices are susceptible of local modification and are not
 ineluctably compelled by an objective definition of local economic and social needs, the
 economic and social facts of city life still powerfully constrain municipal government.
 See generally Setting Municipal Priorities: American Cities and the New York Experi-
 ence (C. Brecher & R. Horton eds. 1984).
 339. See, e.g., J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra note 17, at 191-92.
 340. See id. at 188-90.
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 jurisdictions, with limited tax bases and limited job opportunities, will
 often be forced by their need for tax revenue to encourage develop-
 ment and make efforts to attract a wide range of commercial and indus-
 trial users.341 It is these disparities in local fiscal capacity and in local
 economic and social conditions, rather than free-floating variations in
 tastes, that tend to drive the differences in local policies.
 In summary, the economic model, for all its descriptive power, fails
 to provide a satisfactory normative basis for localism. The critical role
 of mobility and the marginal "consumer-voter" in the Tiebout model
 does not account for the relationship of the locality, as a polity, to its
 residents. And the political version, which attempts to propound a the-
 ory of the internal workings of the local polity, must, in the name of
 small size and homogeneity, jettison the free mobility that is said to
 make the whole system work.
 More importantly, economic localism reflects and reinforces ex-
 isting interpersonal and interlocal inequalities. By accepting the pre-
 existing distribution of wealth, economic localism prefers the interests
 of businesses and investors over those of individuals and families, those
 of the affluent over those of the poor and those of localities with
 healthy tax bases over those of localities with limited fiscal capacity.342
 The local government system may be efficient, but if the amelioration
 of inequality is to remain an important value in our legal and political
 culture, then economic localism cannot provide a sufficient normative
 basis for protecting, let alone extending, local autonomy.343
 341. See id. at 190-91. These communities may also adopt residential land-use
 policies that are at least partially exclusionary, as for example, by refusing to accept
 public or subsidized housing. But for older, less affluent communities, it may be too late
 to adopt exclusionary policies since there will already be substantial numbers of working
 class or poor people resident within the jurisdiction whom the local government is le-
 gally powerless to eject-although urban renewal at one time was an important mecha-
 nism that allowed cities to displace poorer residence. See, e.g., J. Mollenkopf, supra
 note 121, at 162-79.
 342. As Yates has observed, "Tiebout's argument is a recipe for certain disaster
 because most cities simply cannot compete with most suburbs for fiscally profitable resi-
 dents and industries .... Because of their fiscal structure and service obligations, cities
 cannot compete (or even survive) in a system of free market federalism." D. Yates, The
 Ungovernable City 186-87 (1977).
 343. Participation theorists also pay relatively little attention to the implications of
 interpersonal or interlocal wealth inequalities for localism. Although local participation
 is said to be empowering, class and wealth differences affect the ability to participate
 within a locality, as well as the ability to relocate from one locality to another. See
 Sharp, supra note 272, at 72, 80 ("[C]onsidered individually, responsiveness to voice
 and responsiveness to potential exit each should tend to bias local government decision-
 making toward the preferences of the higher status group; but more importantly, the
 combination of responsiveness to voice and responsiveness to potential exit would, in
 principle, compound that bias"); cf. J. Mansbridge, supra note 207, at 80-82 (impor-
 tance of education, status and income cleavages, particularly among newcomers, in af-
 fecting propensity to participate in New England town meeting). Moreover, differences
 in wealth among localities create substantial disparities in the potential scope of local
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 c. Local Size and Local Boundaries: The Shared Shortcomings of Political
 and Economic Localism. - Although the economic and political theories,
 when examined separately, fail to provide a persuasive justification for
 local autonomy, the two together might make the case for localism. In-
 stead, cumulating the two theories only highlights their common short-
 comings: both rest on assumptions about the relationship between
 local governments and the scope of local actions that reveal strong and
 largely unresolved tensions between each theory's central animating
 concerns and the actual practice of local autonomy.
 Both models assume that the consequences of local actions are
 borne primarily within the acting locality-internalized, in the econo-
 mists' term. Tiebout makes this premise express: in his idealized
 model, local government will be efficient only when locally supplied
 public services "exhibit no external economies or diseconomies be-
 tween communities."344 Frug makes no similar explicit statement, but
 for him the value of participation is that it enables people to be directly
 involved in the collective decisions that affect their lives.345 This as-
 sumes that all individuals affected by a locality's action have a right to
 participate in those decisions. A local government that permitted only
 some of its residents to participate in local politics or gave greater
 weight to the participation of some over others would fail the standard
 of participatory democracy.346 Yet a locality that includes within its
 borders only some of the people directly affected by the local govern-
 ment's actions should be equally problematic from a participatory
 perspective.347
 Today, local borders cut across densely packed and economically
 and socially intertwined metropolitan areas, virtually guaranteeing that
 there will be externalities and that some people, namely nonresidents,
 will be excluded from participating in the decisions of one of the re-
 programs. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 20-21 (discussing disparities in wealth revealed
 in trial records in school finance cases).
 Nevertheless, since inequality is an important contemporary political concern, the
 failure of economic localism to address the problems of interlocal inequality provides an
 important political perspective on the economic justification of local autonomy. The
 implications of differences in local wealth for the participation-based argument for local-
 ism are discussed more fully in Section E, infra.
 344. Tiebout, supra note 230, at 419; see Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note
 247, at 837-38.
 345. See Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1068.
 346. See, e.g., Board of Estimate v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433 (1989) (applying one-
 person, one-vote standard to invalidate New York City Board of Estimate); Hill v. Stone,
 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (municipal bond elections that required approval of concurrent
 majorities of all voters and all property taxpayers unconstitutional); Avery v. Midland
 County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying one-person, one-vote rule to general purpose
 local governments).
 347. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating under the fif-
 teenth amendment Alabama's redrawing of Tuskegee's municipal boundaries, which
 had resulted in exclusion of blacks from municipality and, consequently, denied blacks
 the right to vote in Tuskegee's municipal elections).
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 gion's many local governments though they are intimately affected by
 these decisions. Thus, full internalization of all local actions and full
 participation for all those affected by local decisions would tend to re-
 quire larger local units. Yet both economic and political localism are
 predicated on the smallness of local governments.348
 Localists must reconcile the conflict between large and small. A
 commitment to local autonomy based on efficiency requires a theory of
 local size that would draw local boundaries large enough to internalize
 costs and benefits, minimize spillover effects and achieve economies of
 scale, yet small enough to keep down political decision-making costs
 and maximize ease of relocation. A participation-based theory of local
 autonomy requires localities small enough to permit each citizen to en-
 gage in face-to-face dialogue with her neighbors and affect local deci-
 sions, yet large enough so that local governments would have the fiscal
 and administrative resources to carry out the results of local delibera-
 tions and allow participation by all those directly affected by local
 decisions.
 Although issues of size and boundaries are critical to a theory of
 local government, neither economic nor political localism has a theory
 of optimal local size or of local boundary formation. Moreover, in prac-
 tice there is an enormous variance in the size of local governments,
 which range in area from less than a square mile to several hundred
 square miles and in population from hamlets of a few dozen people to
 New York City, with its nearly eight million inhabitants. Surely a signif-
 icant number of local governments are simply the wrong size for effi-
 cient or participatory operation. Yet neither political nor economic
 localism accounts for this wide range of local sizes or addresses the
 question of what to do about those localities that are too large or too
 small.349
 Frug's writings are silent on optimal local size. He appears to em-
 brace both large and small localities, despite the enormous differences
 between them.350 The importance of small size is a basic tenet of his
 348. It is the locality's smaller size that differentiates it from state and nation; small
 size that reduces the costs of interlocal mobility and the internal costs of political deci-
 sion making; and small size that enhances the role of the individual citizen and makes
 possible both individual empowerment and community-spirited decisions. See supra
 text accompanying notes 215-222, 250-253.
 349. Although localists usually have more trouble with cities that are too large for
 optimal efficiency, see, e.g., V. Ostrom, R. Bish & E. Ostrom, supra note 24, at 71-73, or
 participation, see, e.g., D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 46, it has also been suggested that
 small towns are too small to be politically effective. See R. Martin, Grass Roots 42-70
 (1957).
 350. Frug defines "city" "to include the concepts of neighborhood and regional
 government," Frug, City as Legal Concept, supra note 6, at 1061, and "to refer to any
 other institution that exercises general governmental authority in an area smaller than,
 yet within, an American state." Id. at 1061 n.4. Thus, he "generally make[s] no distinc-
 tion between cities and towns, or between them and any other local government entity."
 Id.
 1990]  427
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 15:54:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
 theory; small size is intimately connected to citizen empowerment, the
 incentive to participate and the possibility of community-spirited deci-
 sion making. Yet Frug repeatedly uses the term "city" with all of its
 connotations of major urban centers.351 He relies on the history of
 home rule and state interference with local autonomy, which is primar-
 ily the story of political conflict between states and big cities.352 His
 call for cities to operate financial institutions, provide housing, create
 food cooperatives and run profit-making businesses is primarily a pro-
 gram for large cities, not small towns or residential suburbs.353
 Frug apparently would not exclude New York or Chicago from the
 category of optimally sized local governments, even though they have
 larger populations than many states and some nations.354 These are
 just the municipalities with the political constituencies to support and
 the resources to undertake activist economic and social programs. Yet
 given their large populations, they are too big to realize the par-
 ticipatory benefits of small size and local autonomy.355 How a theory
 based on participation and small size can justify autonomy for all locali-
 ties given the enormous differences in local size is never addressed.
 Without formally resolving the conflicting imperatives of reduction
 of externalities and maximization of internal efficiency and ease of exit,
 the urban economists appear to prefer smaller units for most govern-
 mental functions.356 They contend that most economies of scale are
 achieved by cities of 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants and that benefits
 beyond this range are often attained at too great a price in terms of
 increased local decision-making costs and burdens on relocation.357
 351. The title of Frug's principal article, as well as the title of four of the five parts
 of that article, use the words "city" or "cities." See id. at 1057 (table of contents).
 352. See id. at 1109-19.
 353. See id. at 1150; Frug, Property and Power, supra note 203, at 687-91.
 354. New York City is bigger in population than all but 9 of the 50 states. See A.
 Hacker, supra note 21, at 15-18.
 355. As Robert Dahl put it, from a participationist perspective "[t]o regard the gov-
 ernment of New York as a local government is to make nonsense of the term." Dahl,
 supra note 210, at 968.
 By contrast, Dean Sandalow, writing from a Madisonian perspective sensitive to the
 dangers of majoritarian excess in small units, has observed that these dangers would be
 mitigated if home rule were limited to the big cities, whose larger and more heteroge-
 neous populations resemble those of states. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal
 Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 709-10 & n.263
 (1964).
 Douglas Yates contends that New York City is both too large and too small-too
 large to permit a participatory government and too small to affect the state and national
 forces that contribute to local problems and constrain the range of local solutions. D.
 Yates, supra note 342, at 178.
 356. See V. Ostrom, R. Bish & E. Ostrom, supra note 24, at 153-82; Bish, supra
 note 142, at 54, 55.
 357. SeeJ. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 85, at 232 (citing W. Henderson &
 L. Ledebur, Urban Economics: Processes and Problems 94-98 (1972)); Bish, supra note
 142, at 153; see also D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 38-42 (concluding that communities
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 Even without developing a standard linking size and efficiency, this eco-
 nomic analysis implies that large cities are too big to be efficient,
 although calls for the actual dissolution of big cities are rare.358 How
 can a theory based on efficiency and on the connection between effi-
 ciency and small size, justify local autonomy in general when so many
 localities are the wrong size to be efficient?
 The question of proper local boundaries adds another slant to the
 problematic nature of localism. Local boundaries do not simply define
 the size of the locality; they also determine who is left out. If local
 boundaries corresponded to divisions between relatively self-contained
 and self-sufficient communities, marked by tight economic, political
 and social bonds, distant or at least relatively detached from their
 neighbors, then the exclusionary aspect of boundaries might not be sig-
 nificant. Each person could then reside in and be a member of the lo-
 cality that had the dominant impact on her life. But today most
 localities are not self-contained or self-sufficient. Nor are local bounda-
 ries typically drawn with a concern to promote efficient local operations
 or to include within local borders all those people with a strong stake in
 local decisions.359 Local borders enclose only small fractions of inter-
 dependent urbanized areas. As a result, local decisions regularly im-
 pose externalities on people outside the local polity who are not
 entitled to participate in the local decision-making process.360
 Neither economic nor political localists give much attention to the
 problem of local boundaries. Nor do they attempt to justify their ac-
 ranging in population from 40,000 to 120,000 are optimal for political communication
 and economies of scale).
 358. Urban economists more commonly are content to warn against the dangers of
 central city expansion or the consolidation of cities with their metropolitan areas. See,
 e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 79-103 (comparing costs of a consolidated metropolitan
 area with benefits of a fragmented region composed of smaller localities); Warren, supra
 note 245, at 193; cf. Greene & Parliament, Political Externalities, Efficiency, and the
 Welfare Losses from Consolidation, 33 Nat'l Tax J. 209, 215 (1980) (pointing to in-
 efficiencies created by combining local school districts to form county-wide school dis-
 trict).
 Daniel Elazar, an urbanist writing from an economic perspective, does urge "seri-
 ous consideration" to breaking up central cities. D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 222. Elazar
 does not address the question of how slum neighborhoods would fare after such a
 breakup.
 359. Municipal boundaries are often the product of history and reflect political and
 geographic concerns and considerations arising from the production, communications,
 or transportation technologies of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Other bound-
 aries may have originated in the self-interested schemes of developers. Municipal
 boundaries are usually determined by local interests and, once fixed, are usually difficult
 to alter. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 73-85.
 360. Moreover, the policies of one locality may have a direct effect on the policies
 of another. A locality's decision to exclude multifamily housing, for example, may lead
 neighboring localities to adopt the same exclusionary measures in order to prevent an
 influx of residents from the initial excluding community. See Burnell & Burnell, Com-
 munity Interaction and Suburban Zoning Policies, 24 Urb. Aff. Q. 470 (1989) (develop-
 ing this hypothesis and applying it to zoning policies in the Chicago metropolitan area).
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 ceptance of boundaries that were laid down without concern for either
 participation or efficiency and that ineluctably create unfair exclusions
 and externalities. Instead, both are drawn to the same solutions: in-
 terlocal contracts and cooperation.
 Localists argue that local governments can deal with the problems
 of spillovers, economies of scale and the unequal distribution of re-
 sources through a process of interlocal bargaining, accommodation, in-
 formal understandings, dialogue and compromise.361 Localities, they
 maintain, can form joint ventures or special-purpose districts when the
 supply of services on a regional basis provides economies of scale.362
 Localities that are too small to provide basic services efficiently can con-
 tract to buy them from other governments.363 Interlocal service con-
 tracts can improve efficiency by eliminating the duplicative
 administrative and infrastructure costs that would occur if many small
 localities each supplied all of their own services. Negative externalities
 can be dealt with through bilateral bargaining and the payment of
 compensation.364
 According to localism's adherents, even exclusionary zoning and
 the unequal resources available for public schools may be addressed
 through interlocal discussion and deliberation. In Frug's view, "the is-
 sue of exclusionary zoning [is] a problem of establishing a mechanism
 that will allow dialogue among the communities affected by the zoning
 action; both those excluded and those seeking to exclude must be al-
 lowed to participate in the process of resolving their interconnected
 housing problems."365 Similarly, school finance reform could be ac-
 complished by having institutional forums in which property-rich and
 property-poor school districts participate as "equal[s] in working out
 how school funds are to be allocated."366
 By contrast, Frug views recourse to the states, even to redress the
 effects of local exclusionary activity, as a threat to local autonomy to be
 avoided at all costs: "[e]very time a decision is made to defer decision-
 making responsibility to someone else, there is a loss of freedom-a
 loss of the ability to have a voice in determining one's own future."367
 The state court decisions limiting exclusionary zoning and ordering
 361. See, e.g., R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 66-68; D. Elazar, supra note
 20, at 145-47; Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 6, at 561-63; Ostrom, Tiebout &
 Warren, supra note 247, at 831; Warren, supra note 245, at 193.
 362. See, e.g., R. Bish & V. Ostrom, supra note 147, at 59-61, 99; Ostrom, Tiebout
 & Warren, supra note 247, at 838; see also supra text accompanying notes 128-140
 (discussing special purpose districts).
 363. See supra text accompanying notes 141-148 (discussing interlocal con-
 tracting).
 364. See, e.g., Fox, An Evaluation of Metropolitan Area Tax Base Sharing: A Com-
 ment, 34 Nat'l Tax J. 275, 276-77 (1981).
 365. Frug, Empowering Cities, supra note 6, at 560.
 366. Id.
 367. Id. at 562.
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 school finance reform are considered no improvement over local exclu-
 sion and interlocal inequalities, because, through those cases, "some
 cities have been stripped of their ability to participate in the decision
 making that vitally affects their interests, let alone of the ability to de-
 cide their future by themselves."368 Reform must come out of interlo-
 cal discussions and agreements, not state intervention.
 Although theoretically attractive, interlocal cooperation has in
 practice been relatively narrow in scope369 and typically confined to
 matters of technical infrastructure that realize economies of scale and
 effectuate regional economic integration, but that have only limited im-
 plications for local wealth and social status.370 For services affecting
 local prestige and individual lifestyles, interlocal cooperation is "a func-
 tion of social and economic distance."37' Localities will tend to make
 agreements concerning such services only with localities of comparable
 status and wealth. The more socially and economically differentiated
 the region, the more cooperation is tied to social rank.372
 Thus, localities may cooperate in providing roads, sewers, water
 supply, waste disposal, fire-fighting equipment and other capital-inten-
 sive projects that benefit from a regional commitment of resources and
 enhance the general economic well-being of the area but do not sacri-
 fice local control over the pace and character of local development or
 require interlocal wealth transfers.373 With respect to those activities
 with the greatest significance for local wealth, status and character-
 land-use planning, zoning, housing, urban renewal and schools374-in-
 368. Id. at 566.
 369. See, e.g., J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 85, at 328 (the number of
 interlocal agreements involving suburbs "is remarkably small" because of suburban
 fears of becoming dependent); E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations ? 1.53, at
 79 (3d ed. 1988) ("Generally, attempts to deal with metropolitan problems through the
 collaboration of the municipalities concerned have not been very successful.").
 370. See, e.g., Dye, Liebman, Williams & Herman, Differentiation and Cooperation
 in a Metropolitan Area, 7 MidwestJ. Pol. Sci. 145, 154-55 (1963); Williams, supra note
 131, at 303-05; see also supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text (discussing narrow
 topical focus of special-purpose districts).
 371. Dye, Liebman, Williams & Herman, supra note 370, at 146.
 372. See, e.g., id. at 154-55; Street & Davidson, Community and Politics in City
 and Suburb, in Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life, supra note 157, at 476, 476.
 373. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 64-72.
 374. Localities may sometimes cooperate with respect to education, as when locali-
 ties that are each too small to run separate high schools agree to provide one jointly, but
 because of the close connection of schools to family class and status, and local social and
 cultural values, such cooperation occurs primarily between communities composed of
 residents of comparable income and ethnicity. See Dye, Liebman, Williams & Herman,
 supra note 370, at 149-51. Affluent school districts stoutly oppose aiding other districts.
 See, e.g., Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 557, 247 N.W.2d 141, 144 (1976) (suit by
 affluent school districts and property taxpayers residing in those districts to challenge
 state school aid plan that would require affluent districts to make payments to the state
 for distribution to poorer districts); Brief for 85 Public School Districts as Amici Curiae
 at 3, Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982)
 (brief filed by affluent suburban school districts in appeal of lower court determination
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 terlocal cooperation is highly unusual and more commonly the product
 of state or federal compulsion than voluntary local action.375
 Localities may accept some form of regional planning as long as
 the regional body lacks the power to effectuate its plans without local
 approval.376 Similarly, the federal or state government may create re-
 gional housing authorities, but if, as usually is the case, permission to
 build new housing is contingent on local cooperation, the more affluent
 localities will decline to cooperate.377 And, of course, voluntary in-
 that New York school financing system was unconstitutional; principal argument of
 amici, as contained in a caption in their brief, is that "present system is premised on, and
 required by, the fundamental interest in local control of local schools"), appeal dis-
 missed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983).
 Some metropolitan areas have engaged in voluntary city suburb interdistrict school
 desegregation plans, but these have usually resulted from settlements designed to avert
 even more intrusive court orders and have required substantial state financial support.
 See, e.g., Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (metropolitan area school
 desegregation plan involving consensual settlement and significant state assistance),
 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Wells, St. Louis Evaluates Its Pioneer Integration
 Plan, N.Y. Times,June 8, 1988, at B4, col 1. More commonly, suburban school districts
 resist interdistrict remedies, see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 728-31 (1974)
 (intervention by suburban school districts to oppose court-ordered metropolitan area
 school integration plan);Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en
 banc) (affirming district court's imposition of intradistrict remedy and rejection of in-
 terdistrict relief), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987), and states resist funding remedial
 and compensatory programs, see, e.g., School Bd. of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d
 1308 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding state's refusal to fund remedial and compensatory edu-
 cational programs following intradistrict desegregation program that left Richmond's
 schools over 86% black).
 375. See, e.g., J. Bollens & H. Schmandt, supra note 85, at 327-28.
 376. See, e.g., Lineberry, supra note 134, at 684-85 (metropolitan Seattle authority
 created to handle sewerage problems also granted enabling authority to expand into
 water supply, public transportation, garbage disposal, parks and comprehensive plan-
 ning; but voters rejected metropolitan action on public transportation and no expansion
 of the authority's roles took place); id. at 705-06 (Minnesota Metropolitan Council cre-
 ated for the Twin Cities area was given taxing authority, but its operational powers were
 limited to planning, data gathering and research); see also M. Danielson, supra note 24,
 at 269-70 (failure of councils of governments to develop voluntary "fair share" plans for
 the siting of federally subsidized housing in the suburbs).
 Even when local governments are given veto power, states are still reluctant to cre-
 ate metropolitan bodies with authority to build low- and moderate-income housing.
 The Minnesota legislature, which has been more progressive than most state legislatures
 in dealing with metropolitan problems, rejected a proposal for a metropolitan housing
 board with authority to stimulate and coordinate low- and moderate-income projects
 throughout the metropolitan area, including the power to acquire, sell and lease land.
 Before implementing any project, the board would have had to seek approval from the
 municipality involved. If approval were denied, review by a special appeals board would
 have been possible. See F. Bosselman & D. Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use
 Control 150-51 (1971).
 377. See, e.g., Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087, 1089 n. 2
 (6th Cir. 1974) (52 of 56 municipalities in metropolitan Cleveland refused to accept
 subsidized housing), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975); see also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425
 U.S. 284, 303-06 (1976) (Court relies on local right to veto public housing projects in
 affirming metropolitan remedy for discriminatory siting of public housing); N.Y. Uncon-
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 terlocal payments not tied to the provision of services, for example, as
 compensation for spillovers or to ameliorate wealth differences are vir-
 tually unknown.
 Voluntary interlocal cooperation is tightly linked to class and sta-
 tus. It may realize certain economies of scale, but it is highly unlikely to
 resolve negative externalities, ease interlocal wealth disparities or give
 nonresidents affected by local exclusionary actions a voice in local deci-
 sion making. This should not be surprising. Our localism gives local
 governments exclusive control over local resources and broad discre-
 tion in local land-use regulation, permits governments to be formed to
 maintain class and status differences and makes the decision to enter
 into an interlocal agreement itself a matter of local self-interest. Afflu-
 ent localities may find it worthwhile to collaborate on matters that are
 perceived as having little or no impact on local status or class composi-
 tion and that permit the reduction of local costs. But they have no in-
 terest in cooperation which would open them to less affluent settlers
 from different ethnic groups or would expose them to demands for
 assistance from poorer jurisdictions.378
 In the absence of state or federal intervention to change the under-
 lying legal rules of local autonomy within pre-existing boundaries, vol-
 untary interlocal contract or cooperation is at best a limited solution to
 the local government boundary problem.379 Economic and political lo-
 sol. Law ? 6265 (McKinney 1988) (state Urban Development Corporation may not
 adopt any new residential projects if the governing body of municipality in which project
 is proposed to be built objects).
 A study of the suburbs around Philadelphia found that suburban counties had re-
 fused federal assistance for the acquisition of open land to be used as parks or recreation
 areas because of federal requirements that the lands be open to use by nonresidents,
 e.g., people from Philadelphia: "better no land at all than invasion and vandalism from
 the central city" was the suburban attitude. C. Gilbert, supra note 223, at 173. Only
 when federal assistance was increased, with a premium for regional cooperation, did all
 five counties of southeastern Pennsylvania finally join in a consultative arrangement.
 See id.
 378. Cf. R. Babcock, supra note 120, at 38. Indeed, a locality may decline to coop-
 erate even with respect to an infrastructure matter like a mass transit system if that de-
 velopment is seen as a means of opening the suburbs to city residents. See, e.g.,
 Schmidt, supra note 134 (Cobb and Gwinnett Counties north of Atlanta have refused to
 join the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), allegedly because they
 fear that MARTA will bring blacks to the suburbs); Reinhold, Plan for Rail Line Sets
 Suburb Against City in Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, at A22, col. 1 (residents
 of San Fernando Valley opposing light rail connection to Los Angeles because of fears it
 would lead to closer contacts between city and suburb).
 379. In land use and housing, the most significant form of interlocal cooperation is
 the New Jersey regional cooperation agreement-the arrangement by which New
 Jersey's suburbs may discharge part of their Mount Laurel obligation by making payments
 to poorer municipalities for the construction or rehabilitation of housing in those cities.
 But the cooperation agreements did not grow out of the suburbs' recognition that their
 exclusionary practices were imposing costs on nonresidents and on the fiscal capacities
 of other localities. Nor are they a result of a dialogue among localities in which the
 affluent came to understand their commonalities with the poor or suddenly acknowl-
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 calists have no effective response to the cross-border effects and in-
 terlocal fiscal disparities built into our localism. These fiscal disparities,
 the inequalities in the provision of basic public services that flow from
 them and the exclusionary land-use policies that they inspire, are a con-
 stant challenge to localism. Local governments will not, as long as they
 need not, take extralocal effects into account, give a voice to nonresi-
 dents affected by local actions, internalize externalities, make compen-
 satory payments for negative spillovers or transfer local wealth to other
 communities in the region to ameliorate fiscal disparities. Without fed-
 eral or state intervention, so roundly condemned by localists, the per-
 vasive problems of externalities and interlocal service inequalities
 reflecting tax-base disparities will certainly persist.380
 The reliance on interlocal cooperation to redress the externalities
 and inequalities that grow out of the local government system-and the
 failure of interlocal agreements to do so-indicate the problematic na-
 ture of contemporary localism. The greater opportunities for exit and
 voice at the local level may make local governments more responsive to
 their inhabitants and may promote efficiency and public participation
 within local units. But most local governments today are not self-con-
 tained communities, set apart from each other. They are tightly packed
 together in metropolitan areas, with decisions made in one locality reg-
 ularly affecting the lives of residents in neighboring jurisdictions. So
 long as negative externalities remain endemic, at least when viewed
 from a regional perspective, the efficiency of the system will remain
 contestable.
 Localist theory also overlooks the race, class and wealth differences
 among localities and the accompanying tendency of many localities to
 be hostile to each other and to the residents of other places. Economic
 localism trivializes interlocal inequality into a matter of varying private
 tastes and preferences. Participation theory either does not see the in-
 equality and the pattern of conflict among localities or blithely assumes
 the problem can be resolved through an interlocal dialogue that will
 lead to the transcendence of differences. As the school finance and ex-
 clusionary zoning litigations and boundary formation law reviewed in
 Part I381 and the history of the emergence of the suburbs presented in
 section B of this Part382 should suggest, however, the last thing that
 many localities want is to transcend differences with their neighbors.
 The problems with localism become apparent when one steps back
 from the individual locality and from the usual contrast of the locality
 edged that all localities are members of a broader community. Rather, they are the
 product of the Mount Laurel litigation and subsequent state legislative action. See
 Briffault, supra note 1, at 54-56.
 380. See, e.g., F. Levy, A. Meltsner & A. Wildavsky, Urban Outcomes: Schools,
 Streets and Libraries 251 (1974) (calling for federal intervention to remedy extreme
 disparities in taxes paid and benefits received at local level).
 381. Briffault, supra note 1, at 20-41, 65-69, 78-91.
 382. See supra text accompanying notes 50-158.
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 with the state and focuses instead on the set of localities in a region, the
 differences among them and the structure of interlocal relations. This
 requires a return to the issues raised previously concerning the
 suburbanization of local government and of local government law.
 E. Toward a Legal Theory for Local Government in the Age of Suburbs
 1. Local Government in the Suburbs: Participation in the Private Polis.
 Legal theory must take into account the suburbanization of local gov-
 ernment, especially the impact of suburbanization on the nature of par-
 ticipation at the local level.383 The suburbs are essential to the analysis
 of local participation because suburbs are the future-indeed, the pres-
 ent-of American local governments.384 Moreover, suburbs constitute
 the principal case for participatory localism today.385 Suburbs are gen-
 erally smaller in population and area than the larger cities, so suburban
 residents have a greater opportunity for direct involvement in local de-
 cisions. The legal and fiscal resources of more affluent suburbs may
 enable them to be more successful in attaining local goals, thus satisfy-
 ing the concern that participation will occur only where governments
 are effectively empowered. Indeed, there is some evidence that citizens
 do participate more in suburbs than in cities and that suburban govern-
 ments are more responsive to their residents.386 Suburbs may be the
 best hope metropolitan America has of capturing the participatory pos-
 sibilities of the polis ideal, and this may account for some portion of the
 suburbs' appeal to prospective residents.387 But does the prospect for
 383. Participation, rather than efficiency, is critical because the commitment to par-
 ticipation accounts for the powerful hold localism has on legal doctrine. See generally
 A. Syed, supra note 255; see also E. McQuillin, supra note 369, ? 1.37, at 44 ("our
 country was conceived in the theory of local self-government").
 384. As indicated in Section A, more people live in suburbs than in any other type
 of locality, and the suburban share of population, employment opportunities and na-
 tional wealth continues to rise. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
 385. Economic localism is also better suited to the suburbs. It is the large number
 of small suburbs, adjacent to each other and in commuting range of job prospects in
 many other localities in the region that economists see as validating Tiebout's theory
 and giving residents multiple opportunities to satisfy their preferences. Big cities are
 often considered to be inefficient. See, e.g., R. Bish, supra note 142, at 100-03; Os-
 trom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note 247, at 837. Elazar combines both the economic
 and political criticisms of big cities: "[Large] cities, undivided, cannot be meaningful ...
 communities from either a functional or a democratic point of view." D. Elazar, supra
 note 20, at 42.
 386. The higher level of suburban participation may also be attributable to the
 higher levels of income, education and professional attainment of suburban residents
 since these characteristics generally correlate strongly with political participation. See,
 e.g., Checkoway & Van Til, What Do We Know About Citizen Participation? A Selective
 Review of Research, in Citizen Participation in America 25, 28 (S. Langton ed. 1978)
 (" 'The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
 class accent.' ") (quoting E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People 35 (1960)).
 387. Some theorists argue that the exodus from city to suburb and the suburban
 resistance to annexation to the central city are motivated in part by the migrants' desire
 for smaller, more accessible, more participatory government. See, e.g., H. Arkes, The
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 political participation even in idealized suburbs provide a satisfactory
 justification for localism?
 For legal theory, the critical aspects of the suburban model of local
 government should not be a small size-Frug's concern-or ease of
 relocation-Tiebout's point-but metropolitan area fragmentation, the
 social and economic differences both among suburbs and between sub-
 urbs and cities and the resulting constraints on the range of issues on
 suburban political agendas and the quality of internal local political
 life.388
 Suburbs, although small, are not microcosms of metropolitan areas
 or reflections of regional diversity. Instead, suburbs are often highly
 specialized by economic function,389 race and ethnicity390 and class and
 income of residents.391 Race, class and income go together in subur-
 ban settlement patterns as they do in so much else of American life,392
 and contemporary metropolitan areas are characterized by a close con-
 nection between interpersonal and interjurisdictional economic ine-
 Philosopher in the City: The Moral Dimensions of Urban Politics 323-25 (1981); R.
 Wood, supra note 24, at 12-19, 102-14. Wood, in particular, defines suburbia "as an
 ideology, a faith in communities of limited size and a belief in the conditions of inti-
 macy." Id. at 18. Indeed, according to Wood,
 [T]heory has been the crucial force that preserves the suburb. There is no eco-
 nomic reason for its existence and there is no technological basis for its sup-
 port. There is only the stubborn conviction of the majority of suburbanites that
 it ought to exist, even though it plays havoc with both the life and government
 of our urban age.
 Id. at 19.
 388. As previously noted, one result of the suburbs' fragmentary nature is the inev-
 itability of spillovers and cross-border effects. See supra text accompanying notes
 348-380.
 389. Many suburbs are residential, some are primarily industrial or commercial, but
 relatively few accommodate both businesses and residences. See, e.g., Logan, Industri-
 alization and the Stratification of Cities in Suburban Regions, 82 Am. J. Soc. 333, 334,
 341 (1976). Even with the significant shift of new employment opportunities to the sub-
 urbs, few suburbs that contain substantial employment include homes as well as jobs for
 the workers employed there. For example, "[I]n 1970 the zoning ordinances of twenty
 suburbs in central New Jersey set aside sufficient land for industrial and research pur-
 poses to support 1.17 million jobs, but would allow residential development to house
 only 144,000 families ...." M. Danielson, supra note 24, at 41; see also Southern
 Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 67 NJ. 151, 161-64, 336 A.2d
 713, 718-19 (1975) (township with population of 11,000 zoned 29.2% of its land for
 industry; if land were fully utilized 43,000 jobs could be created, but no provision was
 made for a commensurate increase in residential use).
 390. Few suburbs are racially integrated. See, e.g., W. Frey & A. Speare, Regional
 and Metropolitan Growth and Decline in the United States 258-66, 277-78 (1988).
 Blacks, in particular, appear to be segregated in predominantly black communities,
 whether inner city neighborhoods or black suburbs. Massey & Denton, supra note 43, at
 593-94.
 391. See, e.g., P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 23.
 392. See id. This is partly attributable to exclusionary suburban land-use controls.
 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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 quality.393 Indeed, the greater the number of municipal governments
 in a metropolitan area-in other words, the more suburbs there are-
 the greater the intermunicipal inequality.394
 The functional, racial and class specialization of suburbs sets them
 off from the larger cities, the larger urbanized regions in which they are
 located and the polis of the legal theorist's nostalgic memory.395 The
 fragmentation of heterogeneous urbanized areas into municipalities
 segregated by race, class and function has obvious consequences for
 local public services. The separation of rich from poor and of busi-
 nesses from residences leads to a separation of taxable wealth from
 public service needs. Central cities are, of course, also marked by wide
 ethnic, functional and class differences among neighborhoods, but
 within cities services are ordinarily funded on a city-wide basis, so that
 all neighborhoods can call on the tax base of the entire city.396 Fur-
 thermore, poorer and minority residents can participate in city politics,
 are represented in city legislatures and influence the allocational deci-
 sions of city governments.397 In the suburbs, by contrast, the spatial
 segmentation of rich and poor and industry and homes takes on added
 significance, because the separated spaces are also autonomous legal
 jurisdictions. With municipal budgets largely dependent on the local
 tax base, intermunicipal wealth inequality becomes the source of signif-
 393. See, e.g., J. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 40-41.
 394. See Hill, Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis,
 68 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1557, 1566 (1974).
 395. The cities continue to be characterized by a mix of races, classes and economic
 activities. The shift of people and jobs out of the cities may have reduced their internal
 diversity, but they remain home to industry, commerce and residence, whites and non-
 whites, rich, middle class and poor. The historic small town was also a place of both
 homes and jobs and included people of all income levels, even if the class differentiation
 and ethnic diversity of the small town was much less than in contemporary urban cen-
 ters. See, e.g, W. Frey & A. Speare, supra note 390, at 236-79.
 396. There is some evidence that the quality of services within cities does not nec-
 essarily correlate with neighborhood wealth. See, e.g., F. Levy, A. Meltsner & A.
 Wildavsky, supra note 380, at 70-90 (in terms of expenditures, the schools in the
 poorest areas of Oakland received very high levels of city resources); R. Lineberry, supra
 note 286, at 181-86 (finding that service inequalities within cities are unpatterned, and
 in particular not biased against the poor). Moreover, although intracity service inequali-
 ties no doubt exist, legal theory may support a requirement that internal local expendi-
 tures be based on need or at least that equal local service levels be provided for all
 neighborhoods. See C. Haar & D. Fessler, The Wrong Side of the Tracks 194-221
 (1986). But as the school finance cases indicate, it has been very difficult to establish a
 doctrinal basis for requiring the equalization of local tax bases or local spending across
 jurisdictional boundaries. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 24-39; see also Milliken v.
 Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-750 (1974) (sharply limiting the availability of interlocal
 remedies for school segregation).
 397. The 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42
 U.S.C. ?? 1971-1973c (Supp. III 1985)) has provided a particularly important impetus
 to the enhancement of minority representation in local governments through the re-
 structuring of local legislatures from at-large to district election systems. See supra note
 122.
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 icant differences in the quantity and quality of public services.398
 The jurisdictional separation of wealth and need that results from
 the fragmentation of most metropolitan areas into a central city sur-
 rounded by a multiplicity of suburbs perpetuates interpersonal as well
 as interlocal economic and social inequalities. The movement of indus-
 trial and commercial firms to the suburbs, combined with the exclu-
 sionary land-use practices of many suburbs and the lack of adequate
 mass transit systems in most metropolitan areas, limits central city resi-
 dents' access to new job opportunities and contributes to the ever-
 widening income gap between city and suburb. Suburban zoning
 makes it more difficult for less affluent people to buy homes, thereby
 restricting their access to the major source of wealth and equity appre-
 ciation available to most Americans and reinforcing the wealth differ-
 ences between homeowners and nonowners.399 Most importantly,
 children in poorer localities are likely to receive inferior educations and
 thus remain at a disadvantage in the competition for jobs and income
 when they become adults.400
 Although the fragmentary character of most suburbs has evident
 class-related consequences for the quality of local public services, these
 398. See Logan, supra note 389, at 340. Poorer suburbanites, residing in commu-
 nities lacking either industry or more affluent residents, have little local wealth to draw
 on and tax themselves at higher rates, but still cannot fund services comparable to those
 in richer suburbs. Poorer localities usually have greater economic and social needs than
 more affluent ones, but they must meet these needs out of smaller tax bases. And
 poorer suburbanites are often even worse off than central city residents in terms of pub-
 lic services since the poorer suburbs lack the commercial and industrial property still
 found in many large cities. Id. at 337-38.
 399. In his study of metropolitan Cleveland, Swanstrom found that suburban seg-
 regation led not only to the uneven provision of public services but to the uneven distri-
 bution of the externalities of the metropolitan housing market-noise, air pollution, lack
 of open space, crime-thereby exacerbating income inequalities. See T. Swanstrom,
 supra note 28, at 69-70.
 Suburban class segregation has a further regressive effect through the uneven ap-
 preciation of home values. Swanstrom found that suburban homeowners were able to
 monopolize the positive externalities of the housing market so that suburban home val-
 ues soared while inner city home values stagnated. In 1969, the average selling price of
 a single-family home in Cleveland was only 53% of the average sales price in the sub-
 urbs. In 1979, the average sales price of all one- to four-family properties in the city was
 only 44% of the average sales price in the suburbs. Id.
 400. See, e.g., D. Harvey, supra note 325, at 60-64 (discussing the distributive ef-
 fects of the increasing separation of jobs from housing); J. Logan & H. Molotch, supra
 note 17, at 48-49; C. Perin, supra note 93, at 194 (analogizing local zoning, taxes and
 services to immigration restriction as the "major rationing and categorizing device" for
 determining access to financial, educational and social resources).
 Hill found that interpersonal and interlocal inequalities were closely correlated.
 The greater the inequality in the distribution among families in the metropolitan area,
 the greater the inequality among municipalities; the greater the residential segregation
 by social class in the metropolitan area, the greater the inequality among municipalities;
 and the more segregated the distribution of housing by quality, the greater the inequal-
 ity among municipalities. In addition, Hill found that the more municipal governments
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 may be ameliorated by intergovernmental assistance. But the fragmen-
 tation of metropolitan areas has additional consequences for the quality
 of local public life that are perhaps more damaging to the participation-
 ist commitment to local autonomy.
 The fragmentary nature of contemporary localities-the separation
 of work from home and the segregation of ethnic and income groups-
 has two consequences for the quality of local political activity: the nar-
 rowing of discussion through the exclusion of a broad range of critical
 public issues from local debate and, as a corollary, a tight focus on the
 private economic and social concerns of local residents.
 Suburban politics is the politics of residence. Suburban residents
 share a bit of territory and, perhaps, common social and cultural values
 growing out of their relationship to the local territory. But they do not
 have work in common. They neither work in their home locality, nor
 do they usually work together in another jurisdiction. The separation
 of residence from work means that issues relating to the organization of
 the economy, the role of government in regulating business, the rela-
 tionship between the nature of production and distribution of the
 goods and services produced, the size of business profits, the structure
 of the work place-issues at the heart of contemporary American life-
 are simply off the local agenda. There is little room for the politics of
 the work place or the politics of the economy in residential
 communities.401
 in a metropolitan area, the greater the inequality among municipalities. See Hill, supra
 note 394, at 1565-66.
 Metropolitan development appears to result in an increase in the social and eco-
 nomic differentiation of city and suburb. The gap in local wealth between central cities
 and suburbs is greatest in the oldest metropolitan areas. See, e.g., J. Harrigan, supra
 note 18, at 157-60; see also P. Florestano & V. Marando, supra note 43, at 17.
 401. Ira Katznelson makes an analogous argument that the separation of work and
 residence within a large city takes work place issues off the agenda of neighborhood
 politics. See I. Katznelson, supra note 211, at 1-72. But at least in a large city-and
 Katznelson's book is primarily concerned with politics in one New York neighborhood-
 work and home are still often found within the same jurisdictions. When work and
 home are fragmented into two separate municipal corporations, as is the case for most
 suburban residents, the argument seems even more compelling.
 Popenoe makes a similar point when he contends that the physical separation of
 work and residence into separate localities leads people to divide life into two distinct
 social worlds-the external world of work and the private world of home and leisure.
 Work is seen as a means for attaining a rewarding personal life, not as a basis for social
 activity. The separation of work and residence thus contributes to an ethic of consump-
 tion, not production. See D. Popenoe, supra note 297, at 112. This further diminishes
 the ability of local politics in residential areas to address seriously issues of economic
 organization.
 The separation of work and residence was itself connected to the emergence of
 suburbs. As Fishman observes, "The growth of suburbia was to build into the physical
 environment that division between the feminine/natural/emotional world of family and
 the masculine/rational/urban world of work." R. Fishman, supra note 51, at 62.
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 The separation of work and residence also makes it difficult for
 questions concerning the roles of government and private enterprise in
 the organization of the economy and the place of workers in the gov-
 ernance of firms to be debated in public life. The more political power
 is devolved to the local level, the less likely the basic components of the
 economic system will be addressed within the political process.402
 Thus, more affluent residential localities become concerned about
 industry and the role of the private sector in the economy only when
 they feel threatened by the possibility that unwanted businesses or
 housing developments will come into their communities, where the
 benefits to the local tax base may be outweighed by the problems of
 pollution, congestion, necessary new infrastructure and potential ero-
 sion of property values. Conversely, poorer localities confront the
 broader economy only when they seek to attract commercial or indus-
 trial firms and are willing to accept the costs those firms impose in or-
 der to build up the local tax base. But in neither case do residents
 confront, in the course of local public life, the basic presuppositions
 about the appropriate power of business and government. As a result,
 localism tends to assure that what Charles Lindblom calls the "privi-
 leged position of business"403 in American life will remain unexamined
 and unchallenged.
 With issues related to work and the economy off the agenda, the
 focus of local public life in most autonomous residential localities is on
 issues of residence-land use, schools and property taxes. These ques-
 tions are usually addressed primarily in terms of their implications for
 the residents' private lives-their homes, families, privacy and personal
 security, the preservation of personal wealth and the creation and
 maintenance of an atmosphere conducive to the individual consump-
 tion of consumer goods.404 Politics is framed in terms of "family terri-
 toriality": "The motivating vision in the development of the American
 suburbs has been . . . that of the family preoccupied with achieving a
 private environment, and extending the family's personal space both
 within and without the house."405
 In this setting, public life is often focused on the protection of pri-
 vate life and the insulation of home and family from broader public
 concerns.406 Local authority over land use, schools and taxes typically
 402. The ethnic and income separation of residents into distinct localities within
 metropolitan areas also contributes to the inability of most local governments to address
 broader issues of economic and social organization. Such spatial separation exacerbates
 the factors like race, religion or life style that divide workers and obscure whatever class
 interests they have in common. See, e.g., Sawers, New Perspectives on the Urban Polit-
 ical Economy, in Marxism and the Metropolis, supra note 88, at 3, 12-13.
 403. C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets 170 (1977).
 404. See M. Castells, supra note 286, at 169 ("American residential suburbs ... are
 powerful instruments for the stimulation of commodity consumption.").
 405. Buder, supra note 166, at 200.
 406. See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 54-61, 279-80.
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 is deployed to secure the domestic autonomy of the family. Local con-
 trol over schools permits the reproduction of family values and the
 minimization of the possibility that education will expose family mem-
 bers to alien social and cultural influences, while providing local family
 members with the preparation essential for future economic competi-
 tion when they enter the work force. Similarly, zoning and other poli-
 cies are geared mainly to the defense of the home-the family's
 principal investment, the center of domestic consumption and the envi-
 ronment for family development.
 In contemporary metropolitan areas, local government in autono-
 mous, residential localities frequently serves to mirror and extend the
 suburban settlement pattern of relatively deconcentrated neighbor-
 hoods of single-family detached homes.407 Much as modern culture
 tends to sanctify the private life of family and home as a place of refuge
 and a personal bastion against society, local public policies-incorpora-
 tion, zoning, school finance, property taxation-defend the insulation
 of the family and the separation of homes. Under the suburban model,
 local government becomes a legal rampart for the defense of the family
 castle.
 The privatization of the local public sector becomes more apparent
 and takes on a parochial edge when the segregation of people by in-
 come and race is joined to the separation of work from residence. The
 protection of home and family is not simply about assuring domestic
 privacy and individual autonomy, it also tends to become associated
 with efforts to preserve interlocal class differences and the economic
 and social benefits of residence in high-income, high-status localities.
 Internally, this results in a local politics aimed at the maintenance
 of class and ethnic homogeneity. Local homogeneity is attained by sep-
 arate incorporation, often followed by the adoption of exclusionary
 land-use policies. Although most common in affluent areas, exclusion
 is not the prerogative of the wealthy; less well-to-do communities are
 just as concerned about maintaining community status against the dete-
 rioration usually attributed to the influx of racial and ethnic minorities
 and poorer people.408 The protection of turf through the prevention
 of internal racial or income differentiation is an important feature of
 suburban politics.409 Observers of suburban life have noted, "[O]ne
 need only attend a few public hearings on controversial zoning changes
 in suburban areas to realize that the people consider their right to pass
 judgment upon their future neighbors as sacred."410 Similarly, the in-
 sistence on separate suburban school districts reflects a determination
 407. See R. Fishman, supra note 51, at 185 ("The true center of this new city is not
 in some downtown business district but in each residential unit.").
 408. SeeJ. Harrigan, supra note 18, at 259 (Philadelphia suburbs with residents of
 different social classes agreed on the importance of "keeping undesirables out.").
 409. See M. Baldassare, supra note 22, at 76-77.
 410. R. Babcock & F. Bosselman, Exclusionary Zoning 90 (1973).
 1990]  441
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 16 Sep 2016 15:54:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
 to shield local children from exposure to economic, social and cultural
 differences that are perceived as a threat to family values.
 Externally, suburban policies frequently seek to deny the suburb's
 membership in the metropolitan community or its responsibility for the
 economic and social ills of the region, especially those of the central
 city. Suburbs often refuse to permit facilities necessary for the eco-
 nomic development or social order of the region to be located within
 their borders. Solid-waste disposal sites, power plants, transportation
 facilities, low-cost housing for area workers, shelters for the homeless,
 halfway houses for the mentally ill and convalescent homes for AIDS
 patients; all lead to cries of "NIMBY"-"not in my back yard."411
 NIMBY is certainly not a uniquely suburban phenomenon. City-dwell-
 ers are no more altruistic than suburbanites, and the residents of city
 neighborhoods also frequently resist locally unwanted facilities,412 but
 411. See, e.g., Winerip, NIMBY Views on People with AIDS, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5,
 1988, at Bi, col. 1. Winerip describes demonstrators in Wanaque, NJ. who protested
 state plans to house 120 AIDS patients at the Wanaque Convalescent Home, and quotes
 local civic leader as saying "We believe in Nimby too! You said it, Nimby! That's what
 we believe." Wanaque is in Passaic County, which has the third highest number of AIDS
 cases in New Jersey. Id. See also Feron, 3 Targeted Suburbs Fight a Novel Plan to
 House Westchester's Homeless, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1988, ? 1, at 30, col. 1; Glaberson,
 Coping in the Age of 'Nimby,' N.Y. Times, June 19, 1988, ? 3, at 1, col. 2; Winerip,
 Neighborliness, the Homeless, and Westchester, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1988, at BI, col.
 1; Winerip, There's No Room in Neighborhood for Mentally Ill, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
 1987, at B1, col. 1; Massachusetts Town Weighs Seceding Over a Waste Site, N.Y.
 Times, Feb. 19, 1984, ? 1, at 84, col. 1.
 412. See, e.g., Verhovek, Neighbors Now More Likely to OpposeJails and Shelters,
 N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
 "NIMBY" is often an unfair pejorative term. NIMBY problems may arise as a result
 of the failure of upper level governments-city halls or the states-to give sufficient
 notice to or adequately consult with affected communities or neighborhoods or to prop-
 erly take into account particular local circumstances in making siting decisions. As then
 New York City Councilmember and current Manhattan Borough President Ruth
 Messinger has observed, the city government
 in its role as a facility locator ... attempts to surprise and overwhelm communi-
 ties. It waits until the crisis is, quite literally, in the streets. Then it opens an
 ill-conceived and poorly-planned shelter, names a pier for a new prison barge,
 or shuts down a school literally overnight if it can .... Communities and com-
 munity boards feel besieged, and they respond in kind. They focus all their
 energies on what they don't want, because no one seems the least bit interested
 in what they do seek. Their positions escalate and they stake them out with
 ferocity.
 Messinger, Framing the Issues: Land Use and Charter Revision, in Neighborhoods,
 Land Use and the New York City Charter: A Working Conference on Options for Char-
 ter Revision, Conference Summary at 31-32 (November 20-21, 1987). Better plan-
 ning-including requirements that locally undesirable land uses be fairly distributed
 among communities-procedures that require early consultation and measures
 designed to ameliorate the negative effects of new facilities on communities could go far
 to mitigate NIMBY attitudes. Cf. New York City Charter ? 203(a) (1989) (requiring the
 development of criteria for the location of City facilities that "further the fair distribu-
 tion among communities of the burdens and benefits associated with city facilities, con-
 sistent with community needs for services and efficient and cost effective delivery of
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 they usually lack the legal authority to enforce NIMBY attitudes: they
 may be overruled by city governments. But suburbs, as independent
 municipal corporations, usually have presumptive authority to exclude
 regionally necessary but locally undesirable facilities. States have the
 formal power to displace such local decision making, but such state ac-
 tion is unusual, and is focused more on controlling development or
 permitting the siting of industrial infrastructure rather than supersed-
 ing local decisions that exclude facilities intended to serve the
 disadvantaged.413
 Suburban autonomy and the focus of suburban politics on internal
 concerns may contribute to a declining interest in cooperative interlo-
 cal approaches to regional economic development or the solution of
 the social problems of metropolitan areas. Suburbs compete with each
 other and with the cities to attract desirable residents and nonpolluting
 industries and to exclude undesirable production facilities, subsidized
 housing and all programs to assist the poor. In most metropolitan ar-
 eas there is little interest in cooperation among municipalities concern-
 ing local taxes, schools, housing or economic development. Integrated
 regional policies on these matters are uncommon, as the suburbs prefer
 to rely on their own resources, protect their own values and shun fis-
 cally draining and socially threatening ties to the cities.414
 Most striking is the emergence of what historian Kenneth Jackson
 calls "a new suburban consciousness,"415 which denies the historic as-
 sociation of suburbs with their cities and treats cities and their residents
 with a mixture of fear and disdain. At one time, the central cities set
 the tone for their metropolitan areas. The city was the primary center
 of jobs and commercial and cultural institutions for the region. The
 prosperity of the suburbs was linked to that of the cities, suburbanites
 knew it, and suburbs cooperated with policies aimed at promoting re-
 gional interests. The movement of industry out of the city and the cre-
 ation of centers of commerce and employment in the suburbs has
 reduced suburban dependence on the city and has made it possible for
 residents to deny the economic links that integrate a region.416
 Whereas formerly "suburban" implied a relationship to the city, it now
 services and with due regard for the social and economic impacts of such facilities upon
 the areas surrounding the sites."); id. ? 204(g)(1) (providing for community review of
 proposed City facilities in light of the "fair share" siting criteria).
 413. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 67-70.
 414. See, e.g., M. Danielson &J. Doig, supra note 47, at 5.
 An extreme example of suburban efforts to separate themselves from adjacent cities
 is the decision of Hammond, Indiana to build a nine-foot-high barricade along its bor-
 der with the city of Gary. See Schmidt, Earthen Barrier Serves as Both Dam and Sym-
 bol, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1988, at A6, col. 3; see also Some Rich Towns Being Walled
 Off, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1983, at A12, col. 4.
 415. K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 276.
 416. See R. Fishman, supra note 51, at 199 (the sundering of the social and eco-
 nomic ties that once linked cities and suburbs and contributes to the "profoundly anti-
 urban" feeling of contemporary suburbs).
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 suggests a distinction from the city and from the problems the city has
 come to symbolize.417 So, too, the widening gap between suburban
 and urban incomes418 and the polarization of the races between city
 and suburb sharpen the suburban sense of city-suburb differences and
 heighten the suburban tendency to treat the city as an alien place, one
 which merits little assistance, support or cooperation. Local politics in
 the suburbs is aimed at keeping the city and its concerns out, and the
 law of local autonomy-the rules governing local government forma-
 tion, land use, school finance and local taxation-enables many suburbs
 to attain these goals.
 The privatization of suburban public life, the class and race homo-
 geneity of many suburbs, the parochialization of the local relationship
 to outsiders and the legal rules that permit and sustain the insulation of
 suburbs from regional problems, all breed an ideology of localism-a
 belief that land-use regulation, schools and tax policy ought to be con-
 trolled locally, with the interests of local residents as the exclusive de-
 sideratum of local decision makers. Localism reifies local borders,
 using invisible municipal boundary lines to delimit the range of local
 concern and the proper subjects of local compassion and treating the
 creation and maintenance of local borders as a basic right.
 Localism translates questions about the proper structure of gov-
 ernment and the proper relationship between different levels of
 government (and between different governments at the same level) into
 a language of rights. The focus of local public policy on home and
 family and the use of local public powers to advance these private inter-
 ests lead to an association of the locality with individual autonomy. Lo-
 cal self-government within existing borders and effective local powers
 417. As Jackson points out, at one time the very name of the suburb emphasized
 the linkage to the city, as in East St. Louis, North Chicago and West New York, and
 suburbanites knew that their well-being was tied to the health of the city. Today, subur-
 ban names seek to invoke a bucolic image as distant from the city as possible. In the
 Chicago area there are now 24 suburbs with either "Park" or "Forest" in their names
 (including both Park Forest and Forest Park). In recent years, East Paterson, NewJersey
 changed its name to Elmwood Park, and East Detroit, Michigan became Erin Heights.
 See K. Jackson, supra note 50, at 272-73.
 West Paterson, NewJersey started out its municipal life as Little Falls and renamed
 itself in 1914 to emphasize its proximity to the then-booming industrial city of Paterson.
 West Paterson is currently considering a change of name, and all of the candidates-
 Woodcrest Park, Westmont, Wedgewood and Great Notch-represent an increase in
 rusticity and a disaffiliation from Paterson's urban problems. See James, W. Paterson
 Wavers on Namesake, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
 418. See, e.g., Winsberg, Income Polarization Between the Central Cities and Sub-
 urbs of U.S. Metropolises, 1950-1980, 48 Am. J. of Econ. & Sociology 3 (1989) (between
 1950 and 1980 considerable polarization of household income between central cities
 and suburbs occurred in the 37 largest U.S. standard metropolitan statistical areas; by
 1980 the median share of the poorest within total households in central cities had risen
 to well over double the share of the same group in total households in suburbs and the
 share of the wealthiest households in total for suburbs rose to double that of that
 group's share of total central city households).
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 over land use and schools are treated as a right much like the personal
 right to privacy in one's home and to make family decisions immune
 from state interference.
 Localism as a set of beliefs adds to the existing legal restrictions
 that inhibit the realignment of local boundaries to better match local
 wealth to local needs or the adoption of area-wide approaches to re-
 gional problems.419 Local borders, once created, reinforce local identi-
 fication, become a focus of sentiment and symbolism and create a
 powerful legal bulwark for the preservation of local interests. Localism
 provides a normative basis for excluding regionally necessary but lo-
 cally undesirable facilities and for treating problems that originate
 outside local borders as unworthy of local concern or the expenditure
 of local resources.
 The suburbanization of local government thus presents a paradox
 for the participationist case for local autonomy. By their size, homoge-
 neity and power over issues of basic importance to local residents, sub-
 urbs are optimal places for participatory government. Suburbanites
 have greater opportunities to participate in local decision making and
 suburban governments are particularly responsive to the values and in-
 terests of their residents. Local autonomy empowers residents of sub-
 urban communities-but does so at great cost to other localities and to
 the public values participation theory holds dear.
 The appeal of participation theory is the promise it offers for the
 transformation of public life: the vision of people actively engaged in an
 ongoing discussion over issues fundamental to their collective lives,
 reconciling their differences through dialogue and mutual accommoda-
 tion and creating a community of public-spirited citizens.420 It assumes
 that local participation will provide the experience in community-re-
 garding decision making that can provide a basis for a more par-
 ticipatory national political life. But participatory activity on the
 suburban model is unlikely to fulfill that promise or advance the realiza-
 tion of that goal. Many critical public issues relating to the operation
 and regulation of the economy and the nature and structure of work are
 off the suburban agenda. Greater local autonomy would make it even
 more difficult to raise these issues; further, the intensity of the interlo-
 cal competition for development assures that when most local govern-
 ments address economic issues, they do so to satisfy the demands of
 business or wealthy residents.
 419. See, e.g., Baldassare, Citizen Support for Regional Government in the New
 Suburbia, 24 Urb. Aff. Q. 460, 463 (1989) (survey of public opinion in heavily suburban
 Orange County, California found 63% of respondents opposed to governmental re-
 organization that would merge local and county governments into "one large county-
 wide government"). According to Baldassare the preference for municipal-level
 authority indicated "an unwillingness by residents to give away local power, even if it
 means a suburban-level, rather than a metropolitanwide, reorganization." Id. at 467.
 420. See supra text accompanying notes 202-214. R. Fishman, supra note 51, at
 199.
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 Moreover, the combination of jurisdictional boundaries with resi-
 dential segregation along ethnic and economic lines contributes to the
 polarization of races and classes. Local approaches to interlocal or re-
 gional problems are too often shaped by an apparent tendency to adopt
 an "us against them" mentality. Participation in suburban local gov-
 ernments thus may result in the opposite of what the participationist
 argument for local autonomy anticipates. Instead of promoting the rec-
 onciliation of ethnic and economic differences, political participation
 may lead to policies and attitudes that seek to insulate the smaller, rela-
 tively more homogeneous locality and to deny its connection to a more
 heterogeneous nation.
 Localism in this setting enables residents to believe that their
 range of concerns is, and ought to be, limited by local boundary lines.
 Poverty, crime, deteriorating school systems and the lack of affordable
 housing outside the home community are defined as the private, local
 problems of other communities and not as subjects of public concern.
 Local participation may drive communities apart, intensify the sense of
 interlocal difference and reduce the possibilities of fashioning regional
 solutions to regional problems.
 This objection to local autonomy derives not from the potential
 internal oppressiveness of local majorities that troubled Madison, but
 rather from the function-, race- and income-segregated nature of the
 contemporary polis. The suburb can be a very private polis,421 both in
 terms of the issues that are the focus of local politics and the desire to
 avoid extralocal problems. The fragmentary nature of localities and the
 interlocal differences in personal wealth and municipal fiscal capacity
 mean that local autonomy will be worth a great deal more to some lo-
 calities than others. Interlocal ethnic and class differences shape local
 decision making, leading to the adoption of land-use, tax and spending
 policies that perpetuate inequities and maintain residential separation.
 The private nature of local public values leads to the narrowing of local
 politics, the disclaiming of responsibility for problems beyond local
 borders and the rejection of interlocal cooperation on matters of social
 significance. They tend to lead as well to the pursuit of localist objec-
 tives at higher levels of government.
 Local autonomy, thus, should be seen as normatively ambiguous.
 Although it may provide opportunities for political participation and
 421. Notions of what is "public" and what is "private" are, of course, endlessly
 debatable. Although Elazar describes the purposes of suburban incorporation as "pub-
 lic," I think he is making the same point about the "private" nature of suburban political
 activity when he states:
 People sought suburbanization for essentially private purposes, revolving
 around better living conditions. The same people sought suburbs with in-
 dependent local governments of their own for essentially public ones, namely
 the ability to maintain those conditions by joining with like-minded neighbors
 to preserve those lifestyles which they sought in suburbanization.
 D. Elazar, supra note 20, at 31.
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 responsive government, local autonomy also contributes to the preser-
 vation of the political, economic and social status quo and to the priva-
 tization of American politics. In empowering some, local autonomy
 disempowers others. Given the political economy of contemporary
 metropolitan areas and the resulting implications for local politics, the
 contention that greater local power and a categorically localist resolu-
 tion of questions of local government law would enhance the quality of
 American political life and create new opportunities for the advance-
 ment of a progressive political agenda simply cannot be justified.422
 2. Legal Theory and a Role for the States in Contemporary Local Govern-
 ment Law. - Localism generally deprecates the states. The states are
 seen as too big and too remote from the ordinary citizen to permit
 either voice or exit, and state power is equated with excessive centrali-
 zation and the loss of participation and efficiency. State governments
 are frequently treated as backward, rural-dominated institutions, hos-
 tile to cities and prone to intervene in local matters for partisan, polit-
 ical purposes. Even Robert Dahl, whose support for local autonomy is
 tempered by a recognition of local limitations, assumes that the states
 are "destined for a kind of limbo of quasi-democracy .... [W]henever
 we are compelled to choose between city and state, we should always
 keep in mind, I think, that the city, not the state, is the better instru-
 ment of popular government."423
 But much as the fragmentation of the contemporary metropolis
 into multiple local governments changes the significance of local auton-
 omy, it also provides a different perspective on the place of the states in
 local government law. The states are larger and far more politically,
 economically and socially complex than are individual localities. States
 are usually demographically diverse, and include both businesses and
 homes. They consist of many localities, cities as well as suburbs, so that
 422. The Fabian socialist H.G. Wells reached a similar conclusion in an early twen-
 tieth-century paper opposing the adoption of socialism at the local level. Wells noted
 that in metropolitan London the daily lives of an increasing proportion of the popula-
 tion straddled municipal lines-that people had become "delocalized." A salient aspect
 of that delocalization was "the withdrawal of all the wealthier people from the areas that
 are specializing as industrial centers, and which have a rising population of poor work-
 ers, to areas that are specializing as residential, and which have, if anything, a falling
 population of poor labourers." The residents of the more affluent communities be-
 longed "to the same great community" as the city's industrial workers, and yet "pay only
 the most trivial poor rate and school rate for the benefit of their few immediate
 neighbours, and escape altogether from the burthens of West Ham [a poor district]."
 Wells, A Paper on Administrative Areas Read Before the Fabian Society, reprinted in
 Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government 217 (A. Maass ed. 1959).
 Under these circumstances, Wells determined, "to put more power, and still more
 power in the hands of these petty little administrative bodies that we have today, is, I
 submit, folly and darkness." For Wells, the solution was the redrawing of municipal
 boundary lines and the consolidation of metropolitan regions into municipalities. Id. at
 221.
 423. Dahl, supra note 210, at 968.
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 an aggregation of internally homogeneous localities will constitute a
 heterogeneous state.
 Moreover, the states have greater resources than most local gov-
 ernments. States contain and therefore can tax the corporations and
 affluent residents beyond the reach of most localities. Their larger and
 more diversified tax bases and superior administrative capabilities en-
 able them to tax personal and corporate income and sales-sources of
 revenue beyond the reach of most localities' fiscal powers.
 The states' greater geographic scope, superior fiscal resources and
 social and economic heterogeneity give them a greater capacity to con-
 trol local externalities and address interlocal and interpersonal wealth
 differences. Because they include many localities, the states can inter-
 nalize a wider range of decisions and can take a regional perspective on
 regional problems. The states are potentially subject to the political
 influence of low income and poor as well as affluent residents, to the
 demands of cities as well as suburbs. The larger size and smaller num-
 bers of the states make it harder for taxpayers to exit their states and
 may reduce state vulnerability to the flight of capital. Interstate wealth
 and tax differences are smaller than such interlocal differences, making
 it more difficult for businesses to play the states off against each other
 and to find state tax havens.
 The states in recent decades have, in fact, become somewhat more
 progressive, certainly when compared to local governments and the
 federal government. Reapportioned state legislatures and modernized
 state governments have experimented with innovative economic devel-
 opment, social services, environmental, educational and housing pro-
 grams.424 Following the Reagan budget cuts, the states assumed some
 financial responsibility for many health, social service and training pro-
 grams that had previously been funded by the federal government.425
 In terms of interlocal relations, some states have taken modest
 steps toward addressing interlocal externalities and fiscal disparities.
 As noted in Part I, a number of states have adopted boundary review
 laws to control the formation of new localities and to limit the ability of
 regional fragments to separate themselves from regional problems.426
 Several states have enacted land-use laws to control the external effects
 of local economic development and to require localities to take regional
 interests into account.427 The few efforts to promote interlocal cooper-
 424. See D. Osborne, Laboratories of Democracy (1988).
 425. See R. Nathan, F. Doolittle & Associates, Reagan and the States (1987).
 426. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 82-83.
 427. Massachusetts has adopted some restrictions on the ability of localities to ex-
 clude subsidized housing. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40B, ?? 20-32 (Law Co-op. 1983).
 Connecticut recently established an "affordable housing land use appeals procedure for
 the judicial review of local actions having "a substantial adverse impact on the viability"
 of certain low- and moderate-income housing. Act of June 29, 1989, Conn. Pub. Act.
 No. 89-311, 1989 Conn. Legis. Serv. 706 (West). New Jersey's Fair Housing Act of
 1985, 1985 N.J. Laws C. 222, (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. ?? 52:27D-311-312 (West
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 ation in areas affecting local social status or fiscal capacity have been
 the results of state actions.428 A number of state supreme courts con-
 tinue to grapple with the dilemmas of school finance reform, seeking to
 coax their legislatures into committing the resources necessary to fulfill
 state constitutional guarantees of adequate education to children in all
 localities while respecting the deep-seated political value of maintain-
 ing considerable administrative responsibilities at the local level.429
 With or without the prodding of state judiciaries, some state legisla-
 tures have put more of the fiscal resources of the state as a whole into
 school aid formulas, thereby indirectly compelling the residents of
 more affluent districts to contribute to those who live in the poorer
 ones.430 Looking at interlocal fiscal disparities more generally,
 Minnesota has adopted a form of tax-base sharing for municipalities in
 the Minneapolis-St. Paul area that requires localities enjoying above-
 average industrial and commercial property tax growth to share a per-
 centage of the increment with other localities, with the size of the in-
 terlocal payments turning on the population and needs of the
 recipients.431
 1986)), has endorsed the regional fair share principle for the location of low- and mod-
 erate-income housing and now requires affluent communities either to take steps to en-
 courage the location of low-cost housing within their borders or to make payments to
 other localities.
 Other states have also sought to make regional housing needs a factor in local land-
 use planning. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code ?? 65302(c), 65583(a), 65584(a), (b) (West
 1983 & Supp. 1989) (local land-use plans must provide for the "locality's share of the
 regional housing needs ... of persons at all income levels"); id. ? 65584(a) (West 1983)
 (local housing plans to be developed through state-local consultation, with state agency
 having authority to ensure that local determinations accord with statewide housing
 needs). But cf. id. ? 65584(d), (e) (local governments retain power to limit building
 permits and impose moratoria on residential construction; state's authority to revise a
 local government's share of regional housing need "shall not constitute authority to
 review, approve, or disapprove the manner in which the local government's share of the
 regional housing need is implemented through its housing program," id. ? 65584(e)
 (Supp. 1989)).
 428. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 65-72 (discussing regional contribution agree-
 ments under the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, DRI measures in Florida, Massachusetts
 Zoning Appeals Law and new Connecticut law).
 429. In 1989, three state supreme courts invalidated their states' school finance
 systems; see Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 1989 Ky. Lexis 55, 1989 W.L. 60207
 (Ky.); Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, amended, 784 P.2d
 412 (Mont. 1989); Edgewoood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
 1989). This makes 1989 the most propitious year for court-ordered school finance re-
 form in more than a decade. In all three cases, the courts sought to combine interpreta-
 tions of state constitutional education articles that would mandate "substantial equality"
 of educational opportunities throughout their states with continued autonomy for local
 school districts. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 36-37.
 430. See id. at 59-60. State school equalization formulas tend to stop well short of
 complete equalization. See id. at 60-64.
 431. Minnesota Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act, 1971 Minn. Laws c. 24 (codi-
 fied as amended at Minn. Stat. Ann. ?? 473F.01-.13 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990)). The
 constitutionality of the Minnesota Act was sustained in Village of Burnsville v. Onis-
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 This brief summary of redistributive state programs should not ex-
 aggerate what the states have accomplished or ignore the structural
 limitations on state correction of the inequities endemic to localism.
 Only a minority of states have been active in any of these areas. Many
 of those prominent reforms-the Massachusetts Zoning Appeals
 Law,432 the Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act,433 the various state
 boundary review commissions434-were adopted some years ago and
 have not been emulated by other states. Although individual states
 continue to deliberate new school finance and land-use programs,435
 the evidence of a nation-wide trend toward systemic reforms in these
 areas is tentative at best.
 An irony of state legislative reapportionment is that it came too
 late for most cities. Decades of rural domination have ended, but in
 states with large metropolitan areas the principle of one person, one
 vote means that the largest bloc of legislators will come from the sub-
 urbs and will represent suburban concerns. This assures that legisla-
 tive action, even in the direction of a greater state role, will continue to
 be influenced by a localist orientation and will likely leave much of the
 structure of local autonomy intact. State legislatures remain attentive
 to the suburban interest in local autonomy, particularly in land use,436
 and state programs of intergovernmental assistance are only modestly
 redistributive, often providing general support for all local govern-
 ments rather than directing aid to communities most in need.437
 chuck, 301 Minn. 137, 152-54, 222 N.W.2d 523, 532-33 (1974), appeal dismissed, 420
 U.S. 916 (1975); see also Reschovsky, supra note 335, at 55; Note, Minnesota's Metro-
 politan Fiscal Disparities Act-An Experiment in Tax Base Sharing, 59 Minn. L. Rev.
 927 (1975).
 432. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40B, ?? 20-23 (Law. Co-op. 1983). For a critical evalua-
 tion, see Reed, Tilting at Windmills: The Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income
 Housing Act, 4 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 105 (1981).
 433. See supra note 431.
 434. For a discussion of state boundary review commissions, see Briffault, supra
 note 1, at 82-83.
 435. See, e.g., the recently enacted Connecticut low-income housing law discussed
 id. at 70 n.301.
 436. State legislative departures from local land-use autonomy are more likely to
 involve the siting of infrastructure facilities and the control of local development that
 has extralocal effects than housing for low- or moderate-income people. For example,
 New York repealed the authority of its Urban Development Corporation to supersede
 local zoning in the siting of subsidized housing. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 68-69.
 Even New Jersey's Fair Housing Act is as noteworthy for its authorization to the suburbs
 to buy their way out of the Mount Laurel fair share obligation through its regional contri-
 bution agreements as for its formal acceptance of the fair share standard as a criterion
 for local zoning. See id. at 33-35.
 437. One study of the states' reaction to the Reagan budget cutbacks found that to
 a substantial degree the states replaced the lost federal aid. The study went on to ob-
 serve that the states were less likely to fund redistributive programs and tended to
 change the intrastate allocation of aid to provide small grants to a larger number of
 localities rather than aid a targeted number of needy cities, which had been the federal
 pattern. "[T]he stronger the redistributive purpose of a given grant program (i.e., redis-
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 Moreover, the states, like localities, are constrained by the mobility
 of capital and the decreasing significance of particular places in the lo-
 cation of economic activity. The fact that there are fewer states may
 entail longer, costlier moves than interlocal relocation, but state redis-
 tributive activity, too, is restricted by the ability of investors, industries
 and affluent residents to decamp to states with lower taxes and less of a
 commitment to redistribution. Although less pressed than many locali-
 ties, the states are also in competition for economic development, in-
 vestment and tax base. Progressive economic and social programs are
 difficult to carry out at any subnational level in an increasingly inte-
 grated national economy. But that is a problem for "our federalism" as
 well as our localism, and beyond the scope of this Article.
 A more compelling objection to a greater state role would be that
 the states have always had the nominal authority to control the local
 government system and typically have exercised that authority by dele-
 gating power to local governments-just the phenomenon this Article
 has criticized. How, in other words, can states be the solution when
 they are the source of the problem? The answer is that what is needed
 is not greater state power-states already have ample underlying au-
 thority-but a greater willingness on the part of state governments to
 exercise that power and take a state-centered approach in policy mak-
 ing. States must take more active responsibility for government deci-
 sions, state and local, within their borders, either by making more
 decisions at a state level or by making greater efforts to ameliorate or
 control the consequences of interlocal inequality and the external ef-
 fects of local actions. State power is not, by itself, sufficient to remedy
 the harmful effects of localism since state power has often been exer-
 cised to promote localism; a state-oriented perspective in state decision
 making is also necessary. But greater use of state power provides the
 essential prerequisite for controlling local autonomy. Without greater
 recourse to the states and greater state activism in pursuit of statewide
 tributive to the poor), the less likely was it to be protected by state and local govern-
 ments from the effects of cuts made in federal aid." R. Nathan, F. Doolittle &
 Associates, supra note 425, at 96. The states were more likely to fund highway, mass
 transit, waste water treatment programs and assistance to the elderly and less likely to
 replace lost federal money for welfare or housing. See id. at 96-98. When federal block
 grant rules were rewritten to give the states greater discretion in the intrastate allocation
 of federal funds, small towns and rural areas tended to benefit at the expense of central
 cities:
 New state distribution decisions further reduced funding for some community
 services agencies; this was particularly the case in large cities. A number of the
 states in the sample spread the funds they received under this block grant more
 widely across the state, taking some funds away from big-city community action
 agencies that had done relatively well under direct federal administration of the
 program.
 Id. at 80; see also id. at 152, 256, 278 (under state funding practices in Reagan years
 cities tended to lose funds relative to other areas); Briffault, supra note 1, at 60-64 (dis-
 cussing limitations on equalizing effects of state school aid).
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 goals, the problems of interlocal inequities and local externalities can-
 not be satisfactorily addressed.
 The real barrier to addressing the problems of the local govern-
 ment system, and the most significant constraint on state action, is not
 local autonomy per se but the ideology of localism. In theory, local
 autonomy is purely a matter of state legal and political decisions to vest
 certain state powers in local governments. Local authority, according
 to black-letter law, is merely a delegation from the state, to be exercised
 by the locality as agent on behalf of the state as principal.438 But, sus-
 tained by legal doctrines, embraced by powerful economic and political
 interests and legitimated by academic theorists, local autonomy has
 been transformed from a principle of administration to a faith in the
 decentralization of responsibility for the provision of public services
 and the exercise of public power. Local electorates have become the
 principals and local self-interest the principle governing the actions of
 local government agents. Localist ideology masks local power and
 hides the privatization of local public life behind the rhetoric of effi-
 ciency, participation, community and local self-determination. The
 contingency of local authority, the linkage of location to wealth, class,
 race and status and the parochial nature of local political activity are
 obscured by the nostalgia for the polis and the New England town and
 by abstract assumptions about the marketplace for municipal services.
 Localist ideology has a hegemonic effect, imbuing localities with a
 belief in the justice of their freedom from extralocal concerns while
 crippling the willingness of states to take a statewide perspective and
 displace local authority when considerations of equity or efficiency
 make it appropriate to do so. The localist faith imposes a conceptual
 obstacle to the framing of public policies for the manifold economic
 and social ills pressing on cities, states and metropolitan areas.
 Local autonomy is not always wrong; state displacement of local
 authority is no panacea for public policy. Although this Article has
 been critical of local government decision making, that is due in part to
 a desire to rectify the prolocal bias reflected in both state law and the
 existing academic literature. Many matters are, in fact, inappropriate
 for uniform state-wide treatment and are better suited to local deci-
 sions that reflect particular local beliefs and local needs. Many areas of
 public action benefit from the opportunities for experimentation that
 the decentralization of law-making and regulatory authority provides.
 It is understandable that land use and schools form the heart of local
 autonomy since they are closely connected to core areas of personal
 autonomy and many people want the locus of decision making over
 these matters vested in the governments they feel are closest to the
 community.
 438. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 6-18; id. at 85-91 (federal constitutional law).
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 Local autonomy as community-based governance would be an at-
 tractive, indeed a compelling vision in a more equal society or even in a
 society composed of more racially and economically integrated commu-
 nities. In such a society, interlocal wealth differences would play a
 lesser role in determining the quality of public services, and local par-
 ticipation would entail efforts to find common ground out of ethnic and
 economic diversity. Participation could mean empowerment for all.
 But in contemporary America, where local boundaries mark racial
 and class inequalities as well as the divisions between jurisdictions, the
 value of local autonomy is fundamentally uncertain. By championing
 autonomy even in settings where local action without state monitoring
 or support is inappropriate, localism is too often a recipe for the per-
 petuation of injustice. The proliferation of municipalities in metropoli-
 tan areas translates race and wealth differences into territorial
 segregation and fiscal separation. The interplay of local incorporation
 law and state decentralization of fiscal and regulatory responsibilities
 turns poor places into poor municipalities. By forcing residents of
 these poorer municipalities to rely primarily on local resources and dis-
 crediting their claim to a share of the resources of the region, state or
 nation, localism further disempowers the weak. By enabling affluent
 localities and their residents to separate themselves from their poorer
 neighbors and by providing them with an ideology that justifies their
 resistance to the claims of the larger society outside their borders, lo-
 calism further empowers the already powerful. Given the extent of
 place-related inequality in American society, an absolute commitment
 to local autonomy is not a basis for a progressive social transformation
 but rather can be an obstacle to efforts to reduce inequality and amelio-
 rate class and race antagonisms.
 Rather than seeking a state-local relationship characterized by
 either complete state dominance or one of complete local autonomy,
 elements of both perspectives should be combined. We must strive to
 develop legal doctrines and governmental structures that combine local
 initiative, participation and voice with state financial support, state
 oversight and statewide perspectives for evaluating local action.439
 Such an integration of state and local concerns would be more appro-
 priate than either a general expansion of local power or a centralization
 of authority in the states.
 439. The three recent state court decisions vindicating school finance reform
 claims, see supra note 429, indicate the possibility that state legal systems will take an
 approach for education, a core local concern, at least when the limited fiscal capacity of
 poorer localities to provide the public service with the broadest implications for the
 long-term well-being of the national economy and the national polity has been demon-
 strated. Nonetheless, as the overall record of the courts in deciding school finance re-
 form cases indicates, see Briffault supra note 1, at 24-39, it is too soon to treat these new
 decisions as a harbinger of a new era in the decades-old school finance reform move-
 ment, let alone as evidence of the beginning of the end of legal localism.
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 But to achieve such a pragmatic stance, the ideology of localism
 must be jettisoned and state and local problems examined without a
 preexisting commitment to the normative superiority of local power. I
 hope this Article, by demonstrating the scope of local legal authority in
 practice, examining some of the effects of local autonomy on urban de-
 velopment, exploring some of the differences among cities and suburbs
 and criticizing the dominant contemporary theories of localism, will
 provide a basis for the proper understanding of our localism and will
 serve as a first step in moving local government law beyond localism
 and toward a less abstract attention to particular substantive problems
 and policies.440
 If I have been persuasive, the attitude of the reader should be that
 of Philip Roth's Doctor Spielvogel: "So [said the doctor]. Now vee
 may perhaps to begin. Yes?"441
 440. But cf. Libonati, Reconstructing Local Government, 19 Urb. Law. 645, 651
 (1987) (describing critically most literature about urban government as "policy
 analysis").
 441. P. Roth, Portnoy's Complaint 309 (1969).
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